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Derrida  after the End of Writing

1
This is a book about Jacques Derrida. In it I try to open up some new ways 
to read his philosophy by focusing on his emphasis on religion and politics 
 toward the end of his  career, and then using this to develop a more mate-
rialist reading of Derrida. I have had a lot of inspiration for this proj ect, in-
cluding the work of John D. Caputo, Catherine Malabou, and Karen Barad. 
My contention is that Derrida’s thought remains impor tant; it cannot be 
relegated to the dust- bin of some late– twentieth- century linguistic ideal-
ism and subjectivist constructivism that just plays with language. This has 
always been the wrong understanding of Derrida, from its earliest incar-
nation, but this bad reading has been reasserted with some of the newer 
theoretical currents in the twenty- first, such as Speculative Realism, New 
Materialism, and Object- Oriented- Ontology, not to mention the po liti cal 
Lacanianism of Slavoj Žižek and Alain Badiou.
 Here I do claim that something changes in Derrida’s work, but this shift 
cannot be described precisely as a “turn.” Using Malabou’s idea of a motor 
scheme, an organ izing image of thought or root meta phor that expresses 
the broadest information of a time period or epoch, I suggest that Derrida’s 
philosophy works mostly within the motor scheme of writing. At a cer-
tain point, however, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, this cultural- 
intellectual- technological scheme of writing evolves into a motor scheme 
that Malabou describes as one of plasticity. For Derrida, the works of the 
1990s and early 2000s are dif er ent  because they are written in some ways 
as a response to and expression of this change of scheme. In efect, the 
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concerns of ethics, politics, and religion emerge into the foreground as 
writing becomes more and more backgrounded. Michael Naas gets at the 
heart of what animates Derrida’s work with the title of his impor tant book, 
Miracle and Machine,  because Derrida is explic itly more engaged with the 
tension between belief and responsibility as a kind of singular, miraculous 
living event and the repetition of a kind of machinic technicity that ex-
poses this life to a form of death from the beginning.1
We strug gle to read Derrida  because something is dif er ent and we are 
not sure what it is. I think that Malabou’s notion of a motor scheme and her 
distinction between writing and plasticity as motor schemes are impor tant 
heuristics for helping us understand Derrida. I am less invested in as sharp 
a distinction as Malabou makes with this change in scheme, but I am using 
it to explore what it would mean to read Derrida beyond the scheme of 
writing. Malabou collapses the two “sides” of Derrida’s  later work, the re-
sponsibility of the living being and the mechanical repetition that gives 
death, into her understanding of neurobiological form, which is character-
ized by plasticity. For his part, Derrida increasingly adopts a biological 
meta phor of auto- immunity to make sense of religion and politics, most 
significantly in his explicit essay on religion, “Faith and Knowledge.” This 
notion of auto- immunity exceeds any  simple or even extended sense of 
writing.
I claim, then, that something changes in Derrida’s  later work that is not 
simply a “turn,” but a more background context of and for his work, which 
is well articulated with Malabou’s idea of a motor scheme.  There is a kind 
of transition from an intellectual motor scheme based on writing in a broad 
sense to one based on what Derrida sometimes characterizes in terms of 
the machinic, teletechnology, or technoscience, and Malabou calls plas-
ticity. Arthur Bradley calls this situation an “originary technicity” in his 
book on technology from Marx to Derrida.2 This transformation in the 
1980s and 1990s changes how Derrida writes and how he is read in his 
 later work. Caputo is one of the first American readers to  really appreciate 
this, although he pres ents his interpretation more in terms of religion than 
in terms of plasticity or technicity. But I think that many of the arguments 
about Derrida’s engagements with religion and with politics in his  later 
work are tied to this shift in one way or another. It’s not that Derrida 
changes his philosophy; he is clear about how consistent his interests, ideas, 
and themes are across his  career. Rather, something has changed in the 
background or the cultural and intellectual context of how we read him.
My interpretation, however, is not just about getting the correct exege-
sis of Derrida’s works. It also consists of an intervention concerned with 
developing a constructive understanding of Derrida that shows his con-
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tinuing relevance for con temporary philosophical discussions, including 
 those concerning New Materialism, speculative realism, ideas about ecol-
ogy and the natu ral sciences, and object- oriented ontology. That is, within 
a new intellectual context in the twenty- first  century, we need new resources 
and new ways of seeing how his thought is impor tant and relevant beyond 
 simple polemics ( whether pro or anti).  Here is where I constructively 
engage Derrida with Jacques Lacan, to a certain extent, and also with 
Caputo’s radical theology, with Malabou’s biological materialism, and with 
Barad’s understanding of quantum physics as a materialist hauntology.
To read and think about Derrida beyond the motor scheme of writing 
is to engage with the religious and po liti cal significance of his  later work. 
I want to take this one step further and argue that working through  these 
po liti cal and religious themes opens the possibility for a more materialist 
interpretation of Derrida. Derrida certainly kept a critical distance from 
materialism; he does not use this term in a positive sense. At the same time, 
I think that the non- reductionist materialism expressed in terms of New 
Materialism ofers impor tant tools to understand Derrida. In some ways, 
I am appropriating Derrida as a new materialist, but I  don’t think that 
deconstruction proscribes such an entanglement.
 Here I  will specify the arguments and themes of the specific chapters of 
the book, before returning  later in the introduction to this topic of New 
Materialism. The first chapter, “Reading Derrida Reading Religion,” is a 
more straightforward account of religion in Derrida’s philosophy. In this 
chapter, I provide an introductory and background analy sis to set the stage 
for the rest of the book. I discuss Derrida’s work as a  whole, although I do 
not engage it comprehensively or systematically. I argue that religion is a 
constant ele ment of Derrida’s work, even as the treatment of religion shifts 
in his  later work. Chapter 2, “Surviving Chris tian ity,” focuses more spe-
cifically on the idea of the deconstruction of Chris tian ity, including how 
Jean- Luc Nancy makes the deconstruction of Chris tian ity the main theme 
of deconstruction in general, and how Derrida both endorses Nancy’s proj-
ect and keeps his distance from it. I suggest as a conclusion that it may be 
better to mourn Chris tian ity while surviving it than to simply try to over-
come it, which ironically perpetuates a triumphalist Chris tian ity. I also 
consider Derrida’s interpretation of Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice, which 
opens onto a discussion of Gil Anidjar’s impressive book Blood.
In Chapter 3, “Po liti cal Theology Without Sovereignty,” I engage Der-
rida’s  later work more directly, and place it in contact with the tradition of 
po liti cal theology. Much of Derrida’s  later philosophy involves a critique 
of the notion of sovereignty, which is understood in generally Schmittian 
terms. Insofar as po liti cal theology rotates around sovereignty, Derrida 
4 ■ Introduction: Derrida and the New Materialism
wants nothing to do with it. At the same time, if we think about po liti cal 
theology in distinction from sovereignty, then it is pos si ble to read Derri-
da’s thought in terms of a po liti cal theology without sovereignty. I suggest 
that much of Derrida’s  later philosophy consists of an implicit engagement 
with Schmitt, and ofers ways to think about po liti cal theology that do 
not presuppose a Schmittian paradigm, partly by drawing on the work of 
Jefrey W. Robbins.
Chapter 4, “Interrupting Heidegger,” reconsiders the theme of sover-
eignty by way of an interruption, by considering how Derrida uses the 
poetry of Paul Celan to contest Heidegger. In par tic u lar, I focus on 
Derrida’s essay “Rams,” where he analyzes a poem by Celan, “Vast Glowing 
Vault,” as a way to call into question Heidegger’s three  theses concerning 
the concept of world from his lecture course on The Fundamental Con-
cepts of Metaphysics. For Heidegger, the stone is without world, the animal 
is poor in world, while the  human being or Dasein is characterized as world- 
building. Derrida quotes Celan’s final line, “The world is gone / I must 
carry you” as a way to challenge Heidegger’s  theses. So many of Derrida’s 
 later reflections return to his complication and contestation of  these Hei-
deggerian  theses, including his engagements with animality. Fi nally, at the 
end of his last seminar on The Beast and the Sovereign, Derrida returns to 
Heidegger and considers the sovereignty of death as something that both 
supersedes and explodes our ideas about  human sovereignty.
Lacan is an impor tant resource throughout this book, and I claim that 
Derrida is an extremely careful as well as critical reader of Lacan. In Chap-
ter  5, “Derrida, Lacan, and Object- Oriented Ontology,” I use Lacan’s 
thought to bring Derrida into contact with Speculative Realism and Object- 
Oriented Ontology as a way to reflect on philosophy of religion “at the 
end of the world.” The promise of recent philosophies of SR and OOO is 
their engagement with the physical sciences, and their understanding of 
objects as extremely complex entities with their own properties and quali-
ties apart from  human conscious perception and language. At the same 
time, some of  these philosophies go too far in their attempt to eliminate 
 human subjectivism, and in their critiques of poststructuralism. I think it 
is more in ter est ing to read phi los o phers such as Derrida, Lacan, and De-
leuze creatively, in more speculative and object- oriented ways, than to read 
OOO over against poststructuralism. In this chapter, I discuss Timothy 
Morton’s book and idea of Hyperobjects, and use this conception to think 
about philosophy of religion at the end of the world. For Morton, a hyper-
object is a very strange object, and it helps us think about how Lacan’s ob-
ject petit a is also an object, and how we can imagine OOO as aOO 
(a- oriented ontology). Furthermore, for Derrida, and picking up on the 
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theme of objects in the world introduced in Chapter 4, we can pay more 
attention to the third of Heidegger’s objects, the stone or the natu ral ob-
ject, which Heidegger says completely lacks a world. Derrida contests all 
of Heidegger’s  theses, and he spends a lot of time specifically on the theme 
of the animal in his  later work, but Derrida does not  really elaborate on 
this specific thesis of the stone. OOO ofers resources to draw out this un-
derdeveloped theme of Derrida, the rejection of how Heidegger character-
izes the object, a stone, and the possibility for expanding the context and 
horizon in which we read and think about Derrida’s philosophy.
 After this critical and constructive engagement with OOO, I then turn 
in three consecutive chapters to explic itly treat the (for me) three most sig-
nificant con temporary interpreters of Derrida, each of whom takes Der-
rida’s philosophy to new places and new contexts that are in some sense 
beyond writing (as is OOO). Caputo is the most impor tant con temporary 
phi los o pher of religion in the United States, and  after his influential book 
on The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, he has pivoted to take up the 
challenge of radical theology. Although Caputo’s interpretation of Derrida 
has become a standard and even ste reo typical understanding of the reli-
gious aspects of Derrida’s philosophy, against which newer readings of Der-
rida, such as Martin Hagglünd’s argue, I claim that Caputo’s interpretation 
is more complex than it may sometimes appear. Caputo radicalizes a cer-
tain reading of Derrida, not against Derrida, but in a profound affirma-
tion of a religion without religion, and this attends to something that 
does change in Derrida’s  later work. Caputo uses his sophisticated under-
standing of Derrida’s philosophy to develop his own, radical Derridean 
theology, based on the concept of the event in The Weakness of God, and 
then the notion of “perhaps” in The Insistence of God.
From Caputo I turn to the philosophy of Catherine Malabou. In many 
ways, Malabou provides the framework for my understanding of Derrida, 
with her distinction between a motor scheme of writing and a motor scheme 
of plasticity. Furthermore, I think that she is perhaps the most brilliant 
and creative con temporary phi los o pher in her own right, and she takes 
Derrida’s philosophy in impor tant and unforeseen directions. Chapter 7, 
“Deconstructive Plasticity,” traces the work of Malabou beyond Derrida 
as she develops a biological materialism that is informed by deconstruc-
tion even as it transforms our understanding of deconstruction. Malabou’s 
signature term is “plasticity,” and she engages with brain plasticity and 
 later with biological evolution and epigenet ics in her work in impor tant 
ways. Derrida’s terms include mechanics, automaticity, tele- technology, 
and techno- science, and the two ele ments of this generalized technicity are 
what Michael Naas calls miracle and machine, which can be distinguished 
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but cannot be fully separated. Malabou collapses both of  these ele ments 
into her conception of form, and the inherent plasticity of form includes 
its own “miracle” of auto- annihilation or destructive plasticity.
The last chapter, “Quantum Derrida,” takes up the work of Karen Barad 
on quantum physics, including quantum field theory, and shows how she 
develops an understanding of “hauntological materialism” that is indebted 
to Derrida.  Here I explain how the phrase “ every other is  every other,” or 
tout autre est tout autre, can be viewed in a quantum theoretical context, 
not simply an ethical or religious context. Each of the last three chapters 
contributes to a more materialist understanding of Derrida. In the After-
word to this book, “The Sins of the  Fathers— A Love Letter,” I reflect a 
 little more personally on the issues of gender and patriarchy as they relate 
to philosophy, a topic that Derrida also addressed.  Here I consider how 
Derrida came to serve as a kind of  father figure for me, and how this is a 
symptom of the perpetuation of what Derrida calls “phallogocentrism.” 
From a consideration of  fathers and substitute  father figures, including 
Caputo and my own teacher, Charles Winquist, I turn to more directly 
consider and reflect on the ideas of  women phi los o phers such as Malabou, 
Julia Kristeva, Bracha Ettinger, Catherine Keller, and Katerina Kolozova. 
 Here is another context in which Derrida’s philosophy  matters in ways 
that push us beyond writing and call for another paradigm, which for me 
is a paradigm of New Materialism.
To summarize, this book argues that we need to engage Derrida’s  later 
philosophy not from the standpoint of a turn, but from a new materialist 
perspective that treats politics and religion as material and spiritual prac-
tices. For Derrida’s philosophy,  there is a change, but it is not a  simple 
change of theme or perspective. It is more a change of context. With 
Malabou, I argue that in the 1980s and 1990s we can see a shift from a 
motor scheme of writing to a motor scheme that she calls plasticity. If we 
want to be more faithful to Derrida’s words, we could use a term such as 
machinic, automaticity, or teletechnology; or, following Arthur Bradley, 
we could call Derrida’s post- writing motor scheme an “originary technicity.”
 Whether we want to call it technicity or plasticity, a careful consider-
ation of Derrida’s work attends to this shift that wrenches his philosophy 
out of an explicit context of writing. Writing is always already material, 
and Derrida was never a linguistic or transcendental idealist, but this new 
perspective opens up new ways to read Derrida’s work afresh. In the late 
1990s and early 2000s, religion and politics intersect and interact in a kind 
of po liti cal theology, even though Derrida wants to avoid this term  because 
of its association with sovereignty in the work of Carl Schmitt.
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In the twenty- first  century, English- language studies of Continental phi-
losophy have become more aware of and engaged with mathe matics and 
the natu ral sciences with the work of Malabou, Alain Badiou, Bruno 
Latour, Quentin Meillassoux, François Laruelle, and the subsequent Spec-
ulative Realism and Object- Oriented Ontologies of Graham Harman, 
Ray Brassier, Levi Bryant, Timothy Morton, and  others. I think this re-
turn to the natu ral sciences is impor tant and necessary, but it risks carica-
turing previous representatives of post- structuralism, such as Derrida, 
Deleuze, and Lacan. As I argue in Chapter 5, I think some of the newer 
realisms and OOOs go too far in their eforts to avoid subjectivism and 
subjectivity, and I think that they are more productive when read along 
with Deleuze, Lacan, and Derrida rather than against them.
My preferred theoretical perspective is New Materialism as opposed to 
Speculative Realism or OOO. New Materialism gives us tools to think 
about and better understand the complex relations among science, energy, 
money, power, politics, philosophy, and religion in the early twenty- first 
 century. New Materialism is not a reductionist materialism, but a materi-
alism based on body as theorized by feminism and cultural studies and 
energy as theorized by chaos and complexity sciences. Influenced by the 
philosophies of Alfred North Whitehead, Maurice Merleau- Ponty, and 
Gilles Deleuze, some of  these theorists include Rosi Braidotti, William 
Connolly, Manuel DeLanda, Jane Bennett, and Isabelle Stengers.3
This New Materialism is sometimes described as a neo- vitalism, but if 
it is vitalist, it does not appeal to any transcendent immaterial or spiritual 
power, but stresses the vital immanence of material pro cesses. In this book, 
I am suggesting that rereading Derrida in terms of New Materialism is 
fruitful, and this is the case in both Catherine Malabou’s biological mate-
rialism and Karen Barad’s work on quantum physics. Religion, politics, 
and ethics are complex material pro cesses, and sovereignty, if  there is such 
a  thing, is not a unified entity but a distributed pro cess that occurs along 
the edge of chaos in the form of a singularity. A singularity is not simply a 
determinate entity; it is a significant transformation or threshold where a 
new arrangement occurs as a result of a bifurcation or change.
With New Materialism, I am employing a theoretical perspective on 
Derrida’s  later philosophy that also can be characterized as a religious or 
spiritual materialism. Derrida does not endorse the term “materialism” 
 because he views it in the older reductionist sense, but I think that  there is 
a case to be made for reading Derrida as a new materialist. We could say 
that Derrida specifically avoids the word “materialism” for good and bad 
reasons. To the extent that one would think about a positive idea of 
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materialism in Derrida’s work, we might associate it with the notion of 
pure empiricism that he uses to think about a limit of and an outside to 
metaphysics, philosophy, and language. In “Vio lence and Metaphysics,” 
Derrida claims that empiricism is “the dream of a purely heterological 
thought at its source. A pure thought of pure diference.”4 He says that we 
have to not renounce this dream of empiricism but to find another way to 
think about it.
What is crucial about this New Materialism for me is that it is a non- 
reductionist materialism; it employs ideas from the sciences and science 
studies, but it is not a form of scientism, which is something Derrida wants 
to avoid. It is above all not an atomic materialism. The New Materialism 
does not depend on any sort of dualistic relationship between what we call 
 matter and what we call spirit. In the book I wrote with Jefrey W. Rob-
bins, Religion, Politics and the Earth, this spiritual materialism is based on 
energy transformation, where energy is at once fully material and fully spir-
itual.5  Here we more explic itly draw on Deleuze, and Deleuze and Guat-
tari’s thinking of the Earth, in connection with Hegel’s idea of Substance 
becoming Subject in the Phenomenology of Spirit. We suggest a transition 
from anthropocentrism to a thinking of and from the Earth. Earth  here 
becomes thought of not just as substance, but precisely as subject, and we 
are at least in part an efect of the Earth. This is a Deleuzian interpreta-
tion of Hegel, where we posit a “Geology of Morals” that asks “Who Does 
the Earth Think it is?”
This new religious materialism, like most forms of New Materialism, is 
more explic itly influenced by Deleuze than by Derrida. But I am arguing 
that it is pos si ble, and in fact impor tant, to think about Derrida’s philoso-
phy from a more new materialist perspective. Rosi Braidotti, who coined 
the term “neo- materialism” in the 1990s, says that she wants to distinguish 
a materialist strand of post- structuralism from the more hegemonic lin-
guistic strand of post- structuralism. “Thus ‘neo- materialism’ emerges as a 
method,” Braidotti states, “a conceptual frame and a po liti cal stand, which 
refuses the linguistic paradigm, stressing instead the concrete yet complex 
materiality of bodies immersed in social relations of power.”6 This materi-
alist strand is more informed by Georges Canguilhem, Michel Foucault, 
and Deleuze, whereas Derrida is usually seen as the major representative 
of the linguistic strand of post- structuralism.
From the perspective of the 1990s, especially in the English- speaking 
world,  these two strands of post- structuralism indeed seemed oppositional 
and incompatible, but I think that they are less so now. Even if Derrida 
and Deleuze used very dif er ent languages, we have a much better sense of 
their complementarity. I  don’t think we need to rescue Derrida from this 
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linguistic paradigm, but instead to see how the so- called linguistic para-
digm was already a material paradigm, and that it functioned and func-
tions far more broadly than is usually assumed. The linguistic turn seems 
excessive  today to many scholars and phi los o phers, although we ignore the 
complexities of language at our peril, and we need to be careful not to lose 
sight of the many insights developed by poststructuralist thinkers not 
only about language but also about real ity. Malabou’s philosophy helps 
greatly in this efort to overcome the opposition between a linguistic and 
materialist poststructuralism. This is  because she is more explic itly work-
ing in the tradition of Hegel, Heidegger, and Derrida, but she engages de-
construction with her new biological materialism in a way that crosses the 
two strands of poststructuralism that Braidotti identifies.
Both deconstruction and New Materialism go from  human activities 
and interactions all the way down to the subatomic level. For Karen Barad, 
the self- touching of virtual particles that intra- act in quantum field theory 
is a queer example of tout autre est tout autre, and it expresses what she calls 
a hauntological materialism that is partly inspired by Derrida. Like Barad, 
I am envisioning Derrida as a theorist of deconstruction operating at a 
quantum level, not simply on large- scale actions such as  human ethics and 
language. For the feminist theorist Vicki Kirby, who has both influenced 
and been influenced by Barad, “deconstruction discovers itself in enter-
prises such as cybernetics, biology, and chemistry.”7 In her book Quantum 
Anthropologies, Kirby asserts that “language is not a second- order repre-
sen ta tion or model of an absent world, but rather, an ontological energy 
through which the world makes itself known.”8
Derrida is not a phi los o pher of materialism, but New Materialism is a 
 viable perspective from which to engage Derrida. In an article on “ Matter 
and Machine in Derrida’s Account of Religion,” phi los o pher of religion 
Michael Barnes Norton argues that attention to the machinic nature of 
religion in Derrida’s work helps us think about the intrinsic materiality of 
religion and other pro cesses.9 According to Norton, religion is a material 
practice, and the machinic material practice of religion can be viewed in 
both positive and negative terms. Like Derrida, John D. Caputo is ambiva-
lent about the term “materialism,” although he does use it in The Insistence 
of God.  Here Caputo argues that his positive idea of “cosmo- poetics could 
be formulated in terms of a ‘religious materialism.’ ”10  Here, religious ma-
terialism is about refusing—or deconstructing— the opposition between 
 matter and spirit, form and force, body and brain.
In an essay on “Becoming Feces,” radical feminist theologian Karen Bray 
cites Derrida’s two columns from Glas, one on Hegel and one on Jean 
Genet. While the Hegelian column represents a desire for mastery and 
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absolute knowledge, “Derrida’s Genet column, the fecal column, runs 
alongside and betrays this search for mastery over ‘unconscious’ organic 
agencies.” Bray imagines a new materialist, dishonored God “that becomes 
both brain and shit, vibrates in the material powers of decomposition and 
recomposition; and occupies with us and feels the black rage.”11 In this 
re spect, she affirms a metabolic materialism of re sis tance that is informed 
and inspired by Derrida’s work, among  others, including feminism, queer 
theory, and afect theory.
In the case of Malabou’s philosophy, her materialism concerns the no-
tion of form, and I appreciate how she opens up and explains form in a 
complex and plastic manner. I do not subscribe to any  simple opposition 
between form and force or energy. Malabou grounds force within form, 
whereas I see form more as a product of energy transformation. For me, 
New Materialism is fundamentally about energy. What is energy? Energy 
is a strange sort of object, and it stretches what we mean by object almost 
to the breaking point.  Matter and energy are convertible at the square of 
the speed of light. In complexity theory, we see a phenomenon called self- 
emergence, where new objects emerge at thresholds of singularity some-
times called the edge of chaos. The Belgian scientist Ilya Prigogine calls 
certain kinds of dynamic systems that can be sustained far from equilib-
rium “dissipative structures.”12  These dissipative structures temporarily re-
sist the overall tendency  toward entropy so long as they are fueled by a 
continuous flow of energy.
Just as he  doesn’t write about materialism, Derrida also does not write 
explic itly about energy. What or where is energy for Derrida? I think 
 there is a more direct connection between energy and force. For Derrida, 
force is a vital and necessary concept with which to think the limits of 
language. In his essay “Force and Signification,” Derrida contrasts the title 
of his essay with a book on structuralism called Form and Signification. 
 Here Derrida protests the “aesthetic which neutralizes duration and force” 
between two phenomena.13  Later, in a brief reflection on Hegel’s phenom-
enology, Derrida claims that “force is the other of language without which 
language would not be what it is.”14 I prefer the word “energy” to that of 
“force,” but I think that we need to attend to the operation of the idea of 
force in Derrida’s work. We could say that  there is an underground cur-
rent from Derrida’s “Force and Signification” to his “Force of Law.” Force 
is a kind of energy, a transformative energy, and Derrida mostly attends to 
the way that force disrupts language and dislocates meaning.
We could also, however, naively attempt to think force as energy more 
directly. Kirby’s book helps us do just that, with her insistence that decon-
struction is intrinsically tied to physical real ity, and that language is an 
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ontological energy. Carl Raschke also contributes to this perspective in his 
book Force of God when he says that “the Derridean undecidable amounts 
to an engagement with the force of the other.”15 For Raschke, the predomi-
nance of po liti cal theology means that  every force is— provocatively—at 
least potentially a force of God. Energy is force, forces, and  these forces 
make us— they are us.  These energy forces are at one and the same time 
fully material and fully spiritual.  Here is where materialism, religion, and 
politics, including the themes and concerns of po liti cal theology, intersect. 
And Derrida remains one of our most power ful and provocative resources 
to think about this intersection.

13
At his death in 2004, Jacques Derrida was the most famous phi los o pher 
in the world. Born in 1930 in El Biar, Algeria, Derrida was a Jewish child 
caught between Arab Muslim North Africa and Eu ro pean Christian 
France. Derrida never fully embraced his Jewish identity, calling himself 
ironically “the last of the Jews.”1 He moved to France to matriculate at the 
École Normale Supérieure, and then lived and taught in France and the 
United States, writing complex, influential and impor tant texts. Although 
his early work treated religious ideas and themes, it was only in the 1990s 
that he began more explic itly discussing religion in positive terms. In the 
late 1990s and 2000s, readers in En glish began reflecting and comment-
ing on the significance of this interaction, with the most famous inter-
preter being John D. Caputo, who published The Prayers and Tears of Jacques 
Derrida in 1997.2
In this opening chapter, I  will survey some of Derrida’s major writings, 
and draw out some of the primary religious themes. This survey  will 
proceed chronologically, but it  will not be exhaustive of Derrida’s extraor-
dinary and wide- ranging work, and it  will provide context for  later chap-
ters that go into more depth on Derrida and  others.  Here I want to make 
two impor tant claims. First, I think that Derrida was fascinated by religion 
during the course of his entire life, but he was never interested in tradi-
tional religious identity, dogma, or orthodoxy. As Edward Baring shows 
in his impor tant study on The Young Derrida and French Philosophy, 1945–
1968, “Derrida’s thought can be understood within the context of French 
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Christian philosophy.”3 This is the case  because of the importance of 
French Christian existentialists and their influence at the École Normale 
Supérieure, and the division  there between the Catholic Christians and the 
Communists aligned with Louis Althusser.4 Derrida was sympathetic to 
both sides, but he aligned himself with neither, choosing to work on Hus-
serl as a phi los o pher who was compatible with both groups.5
Derrida’s interest in religion is always balanced by a critical suspicion 
about the ways in which religion has been used to oppress  people and ob-
scure knowledge. Derrida’s philosophy maintains this delicate balance, 
thinking along the knife- edge between faith and doubt. His religion is a 
“religion without religion,” as Caputo puts it,  because he wants to think 
about religion in itself as a pure possibility beyond any determinate or phe-
nomenal form of religion. Derrida comes to name this first type of reli-
gion a kind of messianicity, but this messianicity cannot be equated with 
the presence of a Messiah. This messianicity is Jewish in a way, and a lot 
of work has discussed Derrida’s complicated relationship to Judaism, but 
it is not a  simple Judaism partly  because Derrida does not think that one 
can avoid thinking about Chris tian ity if one is thinking about religion.6 
That  doesn’t mean one has to be or become Christian, but Chris tian ity is 
always  there to influence what we mean by religion, for good and for bad. 
Derrida wants to deconstruct or dislocate substantial religious identities, 
but he affirms a certain kind of faith that he believes is irreducible or 
undeconstructible.
Derrida does not believe that you can simply have a generic, indetermi-
nate religion without a specific, historical religion; he affirms that one never 
exists without the other. At the same time, he wants to think what reli-
gion means in excess or outside of this or that par tic u lar religious tradition, 
and that is what deconstruction is about. Deconstruction attends to that 
which exceeds any par tic u lar tradition or structure, and shows how that 
excess is both included within the tradition and excluded from it in its 
very formation. For Derrida, the pure possibility of religion concerns the 
promise, the possibility of making a promise and being responsible to and 
for another person. This responsibility is ethical in many re spects, and 
Derrida is profoundly influenced by the Jewish phi los o pher Emmanuel 
Levinas, but at the same time ethics is always at the same time religious 
and po liti cal,  because  these bound aries are not fixed but permeable.
The second point I want to emphasize  here concerns the idea of a “turn” 
in Derrida’s philosophy from early to late. This suggestion of a turn cor-
responds to the distinction between early and  later Heidegger, as a shift 
from Dasein as the being who asks the question of being, to the notion of 
being in itself that shows itself in an appropriating event, or Ereignis. I think 
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that in the case of Derrida, this language of a turn is overstated. Yes,  there 
is a definite shift in emphasis in Derrida’s philosophy  after 1989, but this is 
already prefigured in his work in the 1970s, and the shift in emphasis does 
not imply any sort of repudiation of Derrida’s earlier work in the 1960s and 
1970s. Derrida has always been interested in religion, but he comes to 
write about it more explic itly in relation to ethics and politics, and the co-
incidence of  these three themes  after 1989 becomes more prominent in 
his  later work. 1989 is the year of the pre sen ta tion of his impor tant essay 
“Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority,’ ” at a conference 
at Cardozo Law School in New York City. If  there is a turn in Derrida’s 
philosophy  toward an explicit engagement with religion, it can be traced 
to this essay. The  later works dealing with religion all stem from this impor-
tant paper, which I  will discuss shortly.
If  there is a turn in Derrida’s philosophy, however,  there is not just one. 
At a conference devoted to his work in 1982, Derrida himself reflects on a 
shift in his own thought, from “guarding the question,” “insisting on the 
priority of an unanswerable question,” which is différance, to responding 
to a call to support the other, as “that which must be difered- deferred so 
that we can posit ourselves, as it  were.”7 This other is both wholly other 
and also at the same time a par tic u lar, historical concrete other. As Der-
rida expresses it in The Gift of Death, “tout autre est tout autre,” that is,  every 
other (one) is  every (bit) other. Even if  there is this shift, though, it is not 
a repudiation of his earliest work on Husserl and grammatology  because 
this early work has always been engaged with liberating the otherness of 
phenomenology, grammatology, and language.  There is no question with-
out the other, and no other without the posing of a profound question that 
implicates me. In his book Derrida and Theology, Steven Shakespeare claims 
that “Derrida’s thought invites the coming of the other, the address of the 
other, and this is an irreducibly religious motif.”8 Insofar as Derrida’s phi-
losophy constantly and consistently treats the relation with the other, it is 
marked by a religious sensibility.  Here Derrida follows the work of his close 
friend and collaborator, Levinas, whose philosophy is also primarily con-
cerned with the other, and is also entwined with religion.
So I resist the language of a strong turn in Derrida’s philosophy, espe-
cially a turn to religion. At the same time,  there are impor tant emphases 
in his  later works to which I  will attend. And in terms of the book as a 
 whole, I suggest that Derrida’s  later emphasis on religion, ethics, and poli-
tics can be read not as a turn or reversal but as an opening up of decon-
struction beyond writing in a narrow, technical sense. As Carl Rashke 
claims in his impressive book Force of God, “this opening amounts less to 
a ‘turn’ away from pure deconstruction to  matters ethico- political and 
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religious than a kind of epochal elucidation of what has been tacit but not 
apparent in his philosophical enterprise all along.”9
Many critics of Derrida associate his philosophy with the linguistic par-
adigm that came to dominate structuralism and post- structuralism, and 
read différance mainly as a linguistic operation. Language and writing are 
what Catherine Malabou calls the motor scheme of mid—to late– twentieth- 
century philosophy, and this scheme has receded in significance over the 
past  couple of de cades. My argument is that  there is still reason to read 
Derrida beyond and even  after the paradigm of “writing,” at least in a tech-
nical sense. The arguments about Derrida and religion, especially his 
affirmation of this or that religion, are less impor tant than understanding 
how his work demonstrates that deconstruction begins as a form of writ-
ing but then opens up beyond any narrow definition of writing.
This chapter highlights some general themes of Derrida and religion that 
carry through his life and work. First I consider some of the religious reso-
nances that animate his earlier texts. Derrida cut his teeth on the philoso-
phy of Edmund Husserl, and his first publication in 1962 was a translation 
of Husserl’s Origin of Geometry, along with a long, critical introduction. 
In this work, Derrida develops his proj ect of pushing philosophy through 
and beyond phenomenology, and this efort culminates in his longer work 
on Husserl, Voice and Phenomenon, published in French in 1967. Derrida 
wants to show the limits of phenomenology by noting its dependence on 
speech as a kind of living pres ent, on which phenomenology bases its 
understanding of the Idea. An Idea is both historical and ahistorical at the 
same time, which means that it is divided from itself and cannot be a pure, 
consistent idea. Husserl’s Idea of God is equivalent to the Idea of Log os, 
and this Log os or Speech is at the same time constituted in and through 
history and provides history with its telos and transcendental meaning.
Derrida writes:
God speaks and passes through constituted history, he is beyond in re-
lation to constituted history and all the constituted moments of 
transcendental life. But he is only the Pole for itself of constituting 
historicity and constituting historical transcendental subjectivity.10
This is a complex argument, but Derrida is showing how an understand-
ing of God animates Husserl’s phenomenology in a problematic way 
 because it is aligned with traditional understandings of God as Log os.  Here 
God is equivalent to the Platonic Idea, which both participates in history 
and at the same time transcends history in an idealist way. Derrida ques-
tions the consistency of this articulation and suggests that even in his  later 
work Husserl cannot escape the paradoxical formulation of an idea in tran-
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scendental, and even implicitly theological, terms. Derrida’s early work is 
seen as more hostile to religion  because he is showing how the fundamen-
tal opposition between speech, as closer to the ahistorical Idea, and writ-
ing, as the fall of the Log os into history, deconstructs, and how writing 
always already inhabits our notions of speech.
In Of Grammatology, published in French in 1967, Derrida further de-
velops his analy sis of the interrelation between speech and writing by way 
of a reading of Rousseau’s Essay on the Origin of Languages. Western phi-
losophy is religious insofar as it desires pure self- presence in the form of 
speech or Log os, and it wants to separate and segregate writing as a form 
of corruption, decay and death. Writing is an external supplement that 
delays the self- presence of speech, that must be kept exterior to living speech. 
Derrida demonstrates that what we call writing already inhabits and 
animates speech. In Of Grammatology, he develops the conception of “arche- 
writing” as a name for that which makes speech and writing pos si ble, and 
prevents them from ever fully closing in on themselves.
Writing has to do with spacing, deferral, and delay. It is what prevents 
full self- presence, and it disrupts, deconstructs, and opens up metaphysics 
to something other than itself. In the  middle of the twentieth  century, the 
sciences of anthropology, psychoanalysis, and linguistics demonstrate the 
profound importance of the written signifier, and this renders philosophi-
cal logocentrism problematic, as Derrida shows in his work on Western 
philosophy from Plato to Heidegger. Derrida says that the “notion of the 
sign always implies within itself the distinction between signifier and sig-
nified.”11 The prob lem, however, is that “fundamentally nothing escapes 
the movement of the signifier and that, in the last instance, the diference 
between signified and signifier is nothing.”12 If  there is no absolute difer-
ence between signifier (writing), and signified (concept, speech as a  whole), 
then  there is no transcendental signified.
The idea of a transcendental signified is  here associated with God, or 
with what Heidegger calls “ontotheology,” where the idea of God governs 
and supports the totality of beings in a metaphysical way. Readers of Der-
rida who maintain a traditional conception of God as supreme being read 
this claim that “ there is no transcendental signified” as declaring that  there 
is no God. This conclusion is an interpretive leap, but Derrida does break 
with traditional concepts of God, and he shows how our linguistics and 
semiotics often invoke this logic of God as a transcendental signified, even 
if we are atheists.
If the diference between signifier and signified is not absolute, then Der-
rida claims that even categories like Heidegger’s ontological diference 
“are not absolutely originary. Diferance by itself would be more ‘originary,’ 
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but one would no longer be able to call it ‘origin’ or ‘ground,’  those no-
tions belonging essentially to the history of ontotheology, to the system 
functioning as the efacing of diference.”13  Here is Derrida’s famous 
neologism, diferance, in French différance, which is simply the word dif-
ference spelled with an a instead of an e.14 In his famous essay “Diférance,” 
included in Voice and Phenomenon as well as the  later book Margins of 
Philosophy, Derrida claims that to difer is both to be dif er ent in a static 
sense and also to defer in a temporal sense. By distinguishing his word 
diferance with a mark that can be read but not heard in oral speech, he is 
designating a “temporization” at work in diference. Diferance is tem-
poralization and spacing, and therefore it is “the becoming- time of space 
and the becoming- space of time.”15
Diferance is what disrupts self- presence, and it testifies to a trace of sig-
nification that leaves a mark that makes signification pos si ble and refuses 
to allow it to come to any final completion. Language, history, philoso-
phy, meaning and sense:  These are all ongoing transforming and transfor-
mative pro cesses that make us even as we use them to get a  handle on what 
we are  doing with them. Diferance is not a  simple origin  because it means 
that  there is no  simple unified origin. Diferance precedes God and makes 
God as Log os impossible in any pure or undivided way. This is why Derrida 
is seen as hostile to religion in his early works.
If Derrida’s early work seems to dismiss traditional ideas of religion, the 
essay that introduced him as a rising star to an American audience expresses 
the impor tant notion of an event, which  later becomes infused with reli-
gious meaning. In 1966, Johns Hopkins University held a conference on 
“The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man,” featuring well- 
known theorists such as Roland Barthes, Paul de Man, Jean Hyppolite, 
and Jacques Lacan. This conference was intended to help introduce and 
clarify structuralism for intellectuals in the United States. In some ways, 
Derrida’s pre sen ta tion, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the 
 Human Sciences” upstaged his elders and signaled a transition  toward what 
became known as post- structuralism.
The first sentence of Derrida’s talk, which was given in French, reads: 
“Perhaps something has occurred in the history and concept of structure 
that could be called an ‘event.’ ”16 In the rest of his famous essay, Derrida 
develops some of the implications of this idea of an event. An event distorts 
and disrupts structure, even as it serves to make structures pos si ble. An 
event is not simply an event contained within a structure, but more fun-
damentally an event that founds a structure. An event is not a  simple ori-
gin, but a working of diferance in and through events and structures. 
A structural field cannot be totalized, and this is  because “this field is in 
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efect that of play, that is to say, a field of infinite substitutions only  because 
it is finite.”  There is no center or transcendental signified “which arrests or 
grounds the play of substitutions.”17 Even if  there is no God who functions 
to arrest or ground the play of substitutions, the event ofers a kind of re-
ligious interruption of systemic structures that animates and inspires post- 
structuralism. In his recent work, John D. Caputo takes up the idea of an 
event as a theological occurrence that manifests the insistence of God rather 
than the existence of God, as discussed in Chapter 6.18
Before turning to Derrida’s  later work, to see where and how religion 
becomes more central to it, I  will look briefly at another early essay by Der-
rida. His impor tant engagement with Levinas, “Vio lence and Metaphys-
ics,” was originally published in 1964 and is included in the collection 
Writing and Difference. This critical treatment of Levinas touches on 
religious themes, and  later leads to associations and questions about the 
relation between deconstruction and negative theology. “Vio lence and 
Metaphysics” is an extraordinary encounter with Levinas, who in the early 
1960s was not very well known even in France, and Derrida is incredibly 
affirmative of Levinas’s philosophy even as he criticizes it at certain points.
Derrida begins by posing the question of the death of philosophy, and 
then moves to take on the challenge of Levinas’s thought as both a chal-
lenge to philosophy as well as a renewal of it. He claims that “this thought 
calls upon the ethical relationship— a nonviolent relationship to the infinite 
as infinitely other, to the Other—as the only one capable of opening the 
space of transcendence and of liberating metaphysics.”19 Derrida questions 
 whether Levinas can fully liberate metaphysics, but he does affirm the value 
of making ethics and metaphysics “flow into other streams at their source,” 
namely Jewish streams.20 Levinas is deeply engaged with philosophy, and 
he is opposing philosophy in the name of ethics and religion. Derrida states 
that “the ethical relation is a religious relation. Not a religion, but the reli-
gion, the religiosity of the religious.”21 Religion names the ethical relation 
between the  human and God, or the  human and the face of the Other, 
which is a relation of asymmetry and radical alterity.
Derrida questions the ability of Levinas to  free his philosophy from 
Heideggerian Being as well as Derrida’s own deconstruction of the binary 
of speech and writing, but he does argue that Levinas ofers a thinking of 
divinity within the context of language and history rather than one that is 
solely outside in the manner of negative theology. Derrida says that “nega-
tive theology never undertook a Discourse with God in the face to face, 
and breath to breath, of two  free speeches,” in the way that Levinas does.22 
Philosophy is caught “between original tragedy and messianic triumph,” 
and the tension of this questioning animates Levinas’s philosophy even as 
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he strug gles to  free himself from the Greek, tragic pole.23 Levinas appeals 
to a language of God that would found or sustain a pure empiricism of the 
pure thought of pure diference, but he has to pass through language to 
do this. In some ways, Levinas tries to do what negative theology does, 
but Derrida judges Levinas’s attempt in more positive terms. Levinas must 
borrow Greek logic to flesh out Jewish experience, and this is not an im-
purification but a necessity, a necessity that makes history, and makes us 
subjects of this history where we no longer know  whether we are simply 
Greeks or Jews.
Despite Derrida’s clear demarcation of the distance of his philosophy 
from that of negative theology, in the 1970s and 1980s many readers sus-
pected some sort of connection. In an address given in Jerusalem in 1986, 
“How to Avoid Speaking: Denials,” Derrida argues that deconstruction is 
not a type of negative theology  because negative theologies generally ap-
peal to some sort of hyper- being beyond being. Derrida’s essay is partly a 
response to and an implicit critique of Jean- Luc Marion’s book God With-
out Being. Derrida suggests that Marion appeals to a God beyond or above 
Being in a way that accords with classical negative theology such as that of 
Pseudo- Dionysus. Despite the desire to move beyond being,  there remains 
an “analogical continuity in the rhe toric, grammar, and logic of all the dis-
courses on the Good and on what is beyond Being.”24 Although Derrida 
refuses any conventional theological identification of deconstruction, he 
also suggests provocatively that deconstruction in the form of khora is at 
work within  these more traditional theological discourses, including that 
of negative theology. Khora is a Platonic term for a material receptacle, a 
matrix or place, and Derrida suggests that this logic of khôra occurs in 
prayer, both apophatic and kataphatic prayer.25 Khôra is the locus of prayer 
that is addressed to an other or Other. This denial of negative theology is 
not a  simple denial, but in French a de- negation, which dislocates and dis-
places the denial- affirmation structure in the name of khôra.
During the  later 1980s, two controversial intellectual events occurred 
that I think helped encourage Derrida to be clearer about his ethical 
and po liti cal commitments. One was the continuing controversy over 
Heidegger’s association with Nazism in the 1930s. Derrida was heavi ly 
influenced by Heidegger’s philosophy, but he was always critical of Hei-
degger’s politics. Much of the historical work on Heidegger’s affiliation with 
the Nazi party had already been established, but a book by Victor Farías on 
Heidegger and Nazism was published in French in 1987 and created a new 
storm of accusations.26 Also in 1987, a scandal erupted as a result of the 
posthumous discovery of a number of writings by Paul de Man for a col-
laborationist Belgian newspaper in the 1940s, some of which  were explic itly 
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antisemitic. Derrida was a close friend of de Man, and he was stung by the 
fury of the scandal and the way that it was used to demonize postmodern 
literary criticism. I speculate that  these controversies surrounding Heidegger 
and de Man provide part of the context for the writing of “Force of Law.”
In 1989, Derrida was invited to give an address at the Cardozo Law 
School by Drucilla Cornell, on the topic of “Deconstruction and the Pos-
sibility of Justice.” His essay, “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of 
Authority,” distinguishes justice from law, and affirms that “deconstruction 
is justice.”27 Law is something determinate, and law is always instituted in 
the name of justice, but it can never exhaust justice. Justice is not a deter-
minate  thing; it is not deconstructible  because it does not exist as such. 
According to Derrida, “deconstruction takes place in the interval that 
separates the undeconstructibility of justice from the deconstructibility of 
law. Deconstruction is pos si ble as an experience of the impossible,  there 
where, even if it does not exist, if it is not pres ent, not yet or never,  there is 
justice.”28  Here Derrida aligns deconstruction with the experience, prom-
ise, or invocation of justice, which takes place beyond the literal existence 
of the law.  There is never law without justice, just as  there can never be 
justice without any law, but they cannot be collapsed into each other.
The affirmation of deconstruction as justice and of justice as undecon-
structible is an ethical and a po liti cal affirmation. The experience of justice 
is an aporia, a paradox or impassable passage that has no  simple solution. 
This shift of emphasis in Derrida’s philosophy opens up a new period of 
work in which he writes more explic itly and affirmatively about ethics and 
politics, which cannot be completely separated from one another. At the 
same time, this affirmation of the ethical and po liti cal aspects of de-
construction is tied to an acknowledgement of the religious nature of 
deconstruction.
Why is this the case? For Derrida, it has to do with the subtitle of the 
essay, “The Mystical Foundation of Authority,” which is a phrase from 
Montaigne that is related to an essay by Walter Benjamin. In “Force of Law,” 
Derrida is writing about a famous essay of Benjamin’s, called “Critique 
of Vio lence.” The German word for vio lence, however, is Gewalt, which 
also means force. In his essay, Benjamin distinguishes between dif er ent 
kinds of force or vio lence: lawmaking vio lence and law- preserving vio-
lence. Benjamin calls lawmaking vio lence a kind of mythic vio lence 
 because it founds a new order or way of living. Most determinate laws are 
law- preserving insofar as they protect and preserve already established 
frameworks. At the same time, Benjamin talks about a kind of divine force 
that would be more destructive, and exist outside the law and takes place 
as “revolutionary vio lence.”29
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I think Derrida sees deconstruction as a kind of revolutionary force, but 
he does not separate it from lawmaking, mythic force to the extent that 
Benjamin does. The point is that in any new lawmaking, or any institu-
tion of a new authority,  there is a “mythic” positive vio lence and a “divine” 
negative vio lence. Derrida argues that we should identify the divine force 
of lawmaking institution as justice, and see deconstruction as a non- violent 
force that accompanies the vio lence of any lawmaking institution. Any new 
foundation of law occurs in the name of justice, and justice always has a 
mystical ele ment to it.
Religion, ethics, and politics are intertwined in a complex web of prac-
tices and significations. The distinction between determinate- deconstructible 
law and aporetic- undeconstructible justice is repeated in religious terms in 
Derrida’s formulations of “messianicity without messianism” in Specters of 
Marx and “religion without religion” in The Gift of Death, culminating in 
the lecture on “Faith and Knowledge.” In The Gift of Death, published in 
French in 1992, Derrida reflects on the religious nature of con temporary 
philosophical discourse. He considers Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling 
as a retelling of a story that concerns a gift of death from Abraham to Isaac 
and from God to Abraham. In his interpretation of Fear and Trembling, 
Derrida generalizes Abraham’s situation in response to God’s call to sacri-
fice Isaac. He writes:
As soon as I enter into a relation with the other, with the gaze, look, 
request, love, command, or call of the other, I know that I can re-
spond only by sacrificing ethics, that is, by sacrificing what ever obliges 
me also to respond, in the same way, in the same instant, to all the 
 others. I ofer a gift of death, I betray, I  don’t need to raise my knife 
over my son on Mount Moriah for that.30
Our ethical obligations to each other require that we sacrifice someone  else 
to fulfill them, which is the paradox and ruin of conventional ethics. Kier-
kegaard posits a religious category beyond ethics, where absolute relation 
to the single individual holds, but Derrida wants to universalize Kierkeg-
aard’s idea of the religious.
Derrida says that “tout autre est tout autre,” which means that “ every 
(other) one is  every (bit) other.”31 He explains that “if  every  human is wholly 
other, if every one  else, or  every other one, is  every bit other, then one can 
no longer distinguish between a claimed generality of ethics that would 
need to be sacrificed in sacrifice, and the faith that turns  towards God 
alone, as wholly other, turning away from  human duty.”32 This means that 
any absolute opposition between God as wholly other and the  human be-
ing as a distinct other person deconstructs, and so does any ultimate sepa-
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ration of religion and ethics. I  will return to this power ful formulation and 
draw out more of its implications in  later chapters.
Derrida argues that neither Kierkegaard nor Levinas can maintain a 
consistent distinction between ethics and religion. “In the two cases the 
border between the ethical and the religious becomes more than problem-
atic, as do all attendant discourses,” he writes. And “this applies all the more 
to po liti cal or  legal  matters.”33 The point is that the religious, the ethical, 
and the po liti cal are imbricated upon each other in Derrida’s writings in 
the 1990s. Furthermore, in each case Derrida wants to think the possibility 
of a religion without religion, a pure promise, and a democracy to come, in 
a way that subtracts from the determinate instantiations of  these discourses. 
At the same time, we can never  free ourselves from the determinations of 
 these po liti cal, ethical and religious histories, laws and efects.
In Specters of Marx, published in French in 1993, Derrida provides a re-
reading of Karl Marx and shows how his thought still haunts our world 
despite the collapse of socialism and the apparent triumph of global capi-
talism. He points out the gap between liberal democracy and the ideal of 
democracy, and argues that this gap is irreducible  because democracy means 
for Derrida a democracy to come, which is not a  future pres ent but an in-
finite promise of justice. Democracy to come names “the opening of this 
gap between an infinite promise . . .  and the determined, necessary, but 
necessarily inadequate forms of what has to be mea sured against this 
promise.”34
 There is a quasi- mystical or religious nature of this gap and this prom-
ise, which Derrida calls spectral, and he connects this to the “strange concept 
of messianism without content, of the messianic without messianism, that 
guides us  here like the blind.”35 Messianism possesses too much content, 
so it is determinate and deconstructible, and what’s worse, it collapses the 
gap between the infinite promise of justice, democracy, or religion, and its 
 actual pres ent form. Derrida invokes a stripped- down, deserted messian-
icity as a perspective through which to read Marx’s eschatology, which 
does not work as a prediction of a  future communist pres ent. Still, Marx’s 
work continues to haunt us in its messianic spectrality, calling us to a dif-
fer ent just  future.
This work on Levinas, Kierkegaard, and Marx in the early 1990s lies in 
the background of Derrida’s famous Capri lecture of 1994, published as 
“Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of ‘Religion’ at the Limits of Rea-
son Alone.” Derrida wants to think about the pure possibility of religion 
apart from any and  every determinate religion, while recognizing the 
priority of Chris tian ity in producing the idea and concept of religion 
in general that we consider. Religion plays a role in what Derrida calls 
24 ■ Reading Derrida Reading Religion
“globalatinization,” which is a mash-up of globalization and latinization, 
or what we call the West.
According to Derrida, religion names “the convergence of two experi-
ences that are generally held to be equally religious:
1 the experience of belief, on the one hand . . .  ; and
2 the experience of the unscathed, of sacredness or of holiness, on the 
other.”36
 These two sources make up what we call religion, and the division into 
two sources already complicates the idea of the unscathed, which implies 
a certain unity or lack of division. Derrida is suspicious of this second 
source, and he suggests that our desire for the sacred is significant but not 
ultimately fulfilled.
When we desire the sacred as the unscathed, we resist anything that ap-
pears to threaten this experience, and this sets up a situation that Derrida 
calls auto- immunity,  because a social body reacts to reject what it believes 
threatens it from outside, but this very reaction is actually more danger-
ous and destructive to the body than the so- called disease. This is just like 
an auto- immune disease that destroys an organic body when the immune 
system gets out of control. So  there is a “space where all self- protection of 
the unscathed, of the safe and sound, of the sacred (heilig, holy) must pro-
tect itself against its own protection, its own power of rejection, in short 
against its own, which is to say, against its own immunity.”37  Here reac-
tionary religious fundamentalism is aligned with science and technology, 
or what Derrida calls tele- technoscience,  because  these conservative forms 
of religion both oppose modern science and reason, and at the same time, 
make use of the tools of science and technology to oppose modern reason 
and to advance their own sense of the sacred as unscathed.
Derrida is critical of the second source of religion, the experience of the 
unscathed or the holy. He is less critical of the first source, the experience 
of belief, even though he wants to be extremely careful about belief as well. 
 There is something about belief as trust that accompanies  every rela-
tionship and  every encounter; it is irreducible and ineliminable. Derrida is 
suspicious of  simple, straightforward belief, but when belief is crossed 
with a complex understanding of the unscathed (the understanding that 
the sacred is never purely unscathed or undivided) it can produce a kind 
of faith that Derrida affirms.
 There is something religious about  every conception of community, and 
that is both negative and positive for Derrida. Religious faith is composed 
of the two sources, belief and the unscathed, and cannot be reduced sim-
ply to  either one. Religion is ambiguous and ambivalent: On the one hand, 
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religion as auto- immunity threatens to shut down and close of commu-
nity, but on the other hand, religion as the bond of belief, or in Kantian 
terms dignity, is an absolute value of life “above and beyond the living, 
whose life has absolute value by being worth more than life.”38
The exposure of life to what is more than life is not a  simple belief, but 
a complex and contested experience of faith that tests and contests itself. 
According to Derrida, “this self- contesting attestation keeps the auto- 
immune community alive, which is to say, open to something other and 
more than itself.”39 Religion also indicates the convergence of  these two 
sources in what Derrida calls witnessing, which is at stake in “ every ad-
dress to the other.”40 Ultimately I do not think Derrida sees the two sources 
as equal, preferring the experience of belief as fiduciary trust, while at the 
same time complicating this trust by recognizing that we can only trust 
something or someone if it is pos si ble for this trust to break down or not 
be reciprocated.
In his book Miracle and Machine, Michael Naas examines Derrida’s 
entire philosophy through the lens of this essay “Faith and Knowledge.” 
Naas quotes Derrida as saying that “ there is no social bond without faith,” 
but then explains that for Derrida faith is not just a positive determinate 
relation but fundamentally a disruption or interruption.41 Derrida claims 
that he believes in faith, but at the same time “Derrida is quite clear about 
the disruptive nature of this faith.”42 Derrida’s faith contests itself, and this 
self- contestation is the essence of faith, at least responsible faith.
Jacques Derrida is one of the most impor tant phi los o phers of the twen-
tieth  century, and the thinking of religion occupies a significant portion 
of his work. Derrida’s understanding of religion is complex, ambiguous, 
and ambivalent. Religion is always contested, and it is bound up with the 
ethics of our responsibility to the other, as well as the politics of our living 
together with each other. Derrida does not endorse a par tic u lar form of 
religion, but he also does not renounce the religious as an integral part of 
what it means to be  human.
Beyond the  simple questions of  whether Derrida is or is not religious, 
or what his relationship to Judaism, Chris tian ity, or Islam is, in this chap-
ter I have tried to sketch out an overview of Derrida’s understanding of 
religion in more general terms. My claim is that religion, not only religion 
but certainly also and significantly religion, becomes a mode for Derrida 
to articulate deconstruction beyond the constraints of writing in a narrow 
sense. It’s not that Derrida turns against writing, but in his  later work he 
writes in ways that allow deconstruction to function in broader contexts. 
Of course, writing for Derrida originally has a much broader context, but 
that fact is sometimes lost on readers of Derrida in En glish.
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In the next chapter, I  will focus more specifically on Derrida’s critical 
understanding of Chris tian ity. He does not endorse Chris tian ity in any 
straightforward way, but he also sees how difficult it is to simply oppose 
Chris tian ity. He distances himself from his friend Jean- Luc Nancy’s 
appropriation of his work as indicating “the deconstruction of Chris tian-
ity.” Derrida hesitates to affirm this deconstruction of Chris tian ity as the 
destiny of deconstruction, although his goal is not to overcome Chris tian-
ity, which is impossible, but to survive it.
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To what extent is deconstruction essentially a deconstruction of Chris tian-
ity, as Jean- Luc Nancy suggests in his two- volume proj ect on “The De-
construction of Chris tian ity”: Dis- Enclosure and Adoration? In a related 
sense, what is the connection between poststructuralism and postsecular-
ism? Although Derrida endorses and embraces the term “deconstruction,” 
he keeps his distance from the word “postmodern.” At the same time,  there 
are resonances of a kind of reflection on postmodernism in The Post- Card, 
where the prefix post refers to a kind of “beyond” in the sense of Freud’s 
Beyond the Plea sure Princi ple. Derrida writes that “to bind, therefore, is also 
to detach, to detach a representative, to send it on a mission, to liberate a 
missive in order to fulfill, at the destination, the destiny of what it repre-
sents. A post efect.”1 This post efect refers to a detachment that is not be-
yond in any spatial sense or  after in a linear temporal sense, but is in some 
uncanny way already at work in the pro cess to which it refers. Postmoder-
nity is a beyond (detachment) in and of (the binding that is) modernity. 
Poststructuralism is a beyond in and of structuralism.
In a related sense, we could say that postsecularism is a beyond in and 
of secularism. In his  later work, Derrida explic itly engages with religious 
themes, prompting many readers to claim that  there is some sort of a “turn” 
post-1989 that rivals Heidegger’s turn. I think that this language of a turn 
is overwrought, as suggested in the previous chapter, but I also think 
some of Derrida’s protests to the contrary, where he cites himself at 
length treating similar themes from the beginning of his  career, are also 
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a  little overdone.  There is a shift in emphasis that emerges as what Cath-
erine Malabou calls writing as a motor- scheme recedes, and Derrida’s 
engagements with religious, ethical, and po liti cal themes appear more di-
rect, abstract and ungrounded.
A dif er ent, earlier account of a shift in Derrida’s philosophy is related by 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, the first translator of Of Grammatology into 
En glish in 1976. In A Critique of Postcolonial Reason, Spivak says that in 
1982 at a conference on Derrida’s works at Cerisy- la- Salle, he “described a 
moment in his own work” that “was a turn from ‘guarding the question’— 
insisting on the priority of an unanswerable question, the question of dif-
férance—to a ‘call to the wholly other’— that which must be difered- deferred 
so that we can posit ourselves, as it  were.”2  There is a shift from the priority 
of keeping the question alive to that of supporting the other, answering the 
call of responsibility. This turn occurs earlier than the impor tant 1989 essay 
“Force of Law” and the works that take up religious themes more directly in 
the 1990s, and it suggests that we should attend to multiple shifts within 
Derrida’s trajectory even as we look for lines of continuity.
I imagine that this turn to the other in the 1970s is also connected to 
Derrida’s statement near the beginning of his pre sen ta tion at the confer-
ence on Religion at Capri in 1994 that was expanded and published 
as “Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of ‘Religion’ at the Limits of 
Reason Alone.” Derrida remarks: “No Muslim is among us, alas, even for 
this preliminary discussion, just at the moment when it is  towards Islam, 
perhaps, that we  ought to begin turning our attention. No representative 
of other cults  either. Not a single  woman!”3  Here his exclamation about 
the lack of  women can be connected to his work on the question of phal-
logocentrism and its exclusion of  women in the 1970s, including his 
analy sis of Nietz sche’s apparent misogyny in Spurs.4
Insofar as  there exists a turn, or better an inflection point that can be 
traced to 1989, it involves the working out of a motor scheme of writing 
and beyond it, and then into a newer motor scheme that Malabou calls 
plasticity. This contrast  will be developed further in Chapter 7, in terms of 
a more substantial engagement with Malabou’s interpretation of Derrida. 
The transition from writing to plasticity as an under lying motor scheme is 
less a conscious turn and more of an under lying context. Furthermore, it 
is not exclusively connected to religion, although it is also not entirely de-
tached from it, insofar as religion is a constant theme of Derrida’s work, 
but most explic itly and intensively so in the 1990s, with works such as 
The Gift of Death, Spectres of Marx, and “Faith and Knowledge.” Further-
more, at the invitation of John D. Caputo, Derrida participated in three 
conferences—in 1997, 1999, and 2001—on Religion and Postmodernism 
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held at Villanova University. Again, I want to contextualize this focus on 
religion, and the ways in which religion figures more and more explic itly 
in Derrida’s work, as a way to think about deconstruction  after writing as 
a specific paradigm or motor scheme has receded.
So for the  later Derrida,  there is religion, a word that is “the clearest 
and most obscure,” and it has two sources, “the convergence of two experi-
ences,” one of which is the fiduciary experience of belief, faith or credit, and 
the other is “the experience of the unscathed, of sacredness or of holiness.”5 
Another way to think about this convergence is to acknowledge that we 
can never simply avoid or get beyond religion, even if  there is always this 
beyond (a detachment over and above binding) in and of religion. Any 
 simple opposition between the religious and the secular deconstructs. This 
insight problematizes the dialectical- historical interpretation of modernity 
as the triumph of secularism over religion and then the view that the re-
turn of religion in philosophy, culture, and politics somehow instantiates 
a postsecular viewpoint that dispenses with the modern secular. Postsecu-
larism is a corollary to what is often called postmodernism: Modernism 
cannot maintain its separation and elevation from what is denigrated as 
not- modern, and secularism is unable to rigorously enforce a boundary be-
tween the religious practice of a private faith and the public expression of 
secular reason and law.
Derrida advances a thinking of deconstruction that he affirms as a form 
of justice  because it renders unstable all determinate expressions of law even 
as it makes them pos si ble. Our predominant common (Eu ro pean) culture, 
Derrida acknowledges, is “manifestly Christian, barely even Judaeo- 
Christian.”6 If our common culture is Christian, and Chris tian ity as the 
universal form of religion dominates our “globalatinization,” then  wouldn’t 
the primary task in a world ridden with religious conflict be the decon-
struction of Chris tian ity?
This becomes Jean- Luc Nancy’s proj ect, to demonstrate how and why 
deconstruction involves the deconstruction of Chris tian ity. In his 1995 
essay “The Deconstruction of Chris tian ity,”  later republished in Dis- 
Enclosure, Jean- Luc Nancy identifies Chris tian ity with the heart of the 
West. He declares that “Chris tian ity is inseparable from the West.” Chris-
tian ity is coextensive with the West as West insofar as both refer to “a cer-
tain pro cess of Westernization consisting in a form of self- resorption or 
self- surpassing.”7 Nancy cites Marcel Gauchet’s book The Disenchantment 
of the World, in which Gauchet argues that Chris tian ity is the religion that 
leads religion beyond religion.
Both Chris tian ity and the West, which are essentially the same phenom-
enon, consist in a self- carrying to the limit, and then giving themselves up 
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in order to be true to “the depths of our tradition.”8 This movement is a 
kind of deconstruction, although Nancy also associates it with Hegelian 
Aufhebung— “letting go of the West and letting go of Chris tian ity.”9 So it 
is the kenotic self- emptying or progressive self- overcoming of Chris tian ity 
that issues in Western culture and thought, “a heart that risks being, if I 
dare say so, Christian.”10
What is deconstruction, according to Nancy? He claims that deconstruc-
tion “is shot through with Chris tian ity,” and it is only pos si ble from within a 
Christian horizon. “To deconstruct,” Nancy says, invoking Heidegger’s term 
Destruktion, “means to take apart, to disassemble, to loosen the assembled 
structure in order to give some play to the possibility from which it emerged 
but which, qua assembled structure, it hides.”11 Despite Heidegger’s distance 
from Chris tian ity, Nancy concludes that deconstruction is a Christian op-
eration. Deconstruction “is Christian  because Chris tian ity is, originally, de-
constructive,  because it relates immediately to its own origin as to a slack 
[jeu], an interval, some play, an opening in origin.”12
This logic of Christian exceptionalism loosely follows not only Gauchet, 
but also Réné Girard’s claim that Chris tian ity is the religion that exposes 
the workings of scapegoating and mimetic vio lence that drive most reli-
gions and cultures. For Girard, in his groundbreaking book Vio lence and 
the Sacred,  human vio lence is caused by sacrificial desire that seizes on a 
scapegoat to sacrifice for the sake of the social body.  Later Girard argues 
that Chris tian ity takes this pro cess to an extreme and exposes sacrificial 
vio lence by having Christ take on all sins and becoming the scapegoat for 
humanity.13 Chris tian ity exposes and overcomes sacrificial vio lence for 
Girard, just as Chris tian ity overcomes and leads beyond religion for Gauchet. 
In a similar and implicit way, the West overcomes ordinary non- western 
culture and surpasses it in the theories of Girard, Gauchet, and Nancy. 
We participate in this self- surpassing by acknowledging, deconstructing, 
and letting go of it. Part of this acknowl edgment would be the insistence 
that deconstruction, like the West, is essentially Christian, and is impossible 
without Chris tian ity. Chris tian ity is the exemplary, self- surpassing religion, 
and it is linked with the dominant world culture.
In this essay, which was originally presented in 1995, a year  after the 
famous seminar at Capri, Nancy claims that we must think Chris tian ity 
 today, “that the Christian or Chris tian ity is the  thing itself that is to be 
thought” rather than avoided.14 Nancy affirms  here the possibility of an 
atheism “that contemplates the real ity of its Christian origins.”15 Although 
Derrida also acknowledges the centrality of Chris tian ity to globalatiniza-
tion or Westernization in “Faith and Knowledge,” he is much more am-
bivalent about this pro cess than Nancy, and does not go so far as to affirm 
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it unreservedly, especially the teleology of Chris tian ity’s surpassing and self- 
surpassing nature.
In his 2000 book on Nancy, On Touching— Jean- Luc Nancy, Derrida 
reflects on Nancy’s extraordinary book Corpus, and on the issue of a de-
construction of Chris tian ity more generally. Derrida acknowledges the 
Christian origin of the concept of deconstruction, from Luther’s decon-
structio to Heidegger’s Destruktion. At the same time, Derrida distances 
himself from Nancy’s proj ect, warning that “ ‘The Deconstruction of 
Chris tian ity’  will no doubt be the test of a dechristianization of the world—
no doubt as necessary and fatal as it is impossible . . . .  Dechristianization 
 will be a Christian victory.”16 Neither Derrida nor Nancy believe in Chris-
tian ity in any traditional manner, and they both acknowledge the com-
plicity of deconstruction with Chris tian ity, but whereas Nancy wants to 
affirm this in a more straightforward dialectical way, Derrida wants to undo 
it at the same time.
Part of the prob lem is the hyperbolic nature of Nancy’s task. Derrida 
claims that “a certain Chris tian ity  will always take charge of the most exact-
ing, the most exact, and the most eschatological hyperbole of deconstruction, 
the overbid of ‘Hoc est enim corpus meum.’ ”17 Nancy’s hyperbolic proj ect 
can always be outbid by a counter- Christian hyperbole that would subsume 
deconstruction into Chris tian ity in a more conventional sense. Derrida 
advises Nancy that “a ‘deconstruction of Chris tian ity,’ if it is ever pos si-
ble, should therefore begin by untying itself from a Christian tradition of 
destructio.”18 The danger of the “almost impossible task” of deconstruct-
ing Chris tian ity is that it is always at risk “of being exposed as mere Chris-
tian hyperbole.”19 How can this hyperbole be avoided? Can the danger be 
avoided, or is the threat of a Christian triumphalist victory necessarily 
imminent and always exceedingly pos si ble?
I think that Nancy wagers that a stronger identification of deconstruc-
tion with Chris tian ity would help undo Chris tian ity and enable it to sur-
pass itself, which is also means letting it go. But Derrida argues that this 
self- surpassing is at the same time indistinguishable from a Christian 
victory, which neither he nor Nancy desires. To be more specific, the vic-
tory that Nancy and Derrida desire to avoid is the victory of a triumphalist 
cultural and Western Chris tian ity, what Kierkegaard calls Christendom, 
not Chris tian ity as such, if  there is such a  thing.
 Later in On Touching, Derrida turns to consider the work of Jean- Louis 
Chrétien, to show how close Chrétien’s work is to Nancy’s, and to acknowl-
edge it as well as to attend to its deconstruction. Derrida exposes Chrétien’s 
“rather complex strategy, which some might call devious.”20 On the one 
hand, Chrétien modernizes and Christianizes Aristotle via Thomas 
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Aquinas so that Aristotle can be oriented “ toward a ‘modern’ Christian 
thinking of flesh.” And on the other hand, Chrétien makes use of Aristo-
tle, Aquinas, and also John of the Cross “in order to go against or beyond 
another ‘modern’ thinking of flesh that is phenomenological in kind.”21 
 These translations are also transubstantiations of God’s hand and God’s 
heart by means of God’s Log os. Derrida says that Chrétien’s “anthropotheo-
logical thinking of flesh does not leave any spare room for a questioning of 
technics . . .  nor of the animal, or rather animals, nor of the hominization 
pro cess that produces what is termed the hand in ‘everyday’ language, nor 
of the possibility of prosthetics onto which spacing in general opens, and 
so forth.”22 That is, Chrétien makes room for a spacing, “but it is a finite 
place, which can be relieved, in the elevation of Log os and Incarnation.”23 
The prob lem is that this Christian thinking of Incarnation resists any 
“irreducible finitude”; despite the rhetorical similarity to Nancy, Chrétien’s 
phenomenology “would never lend itself to thought in what Nancy terms 
‘a finite thinking’ for ‘the sense of the world.’ ”24
Derrida worries  whether Nancy can maintain the distance between his 
deconstruction of Chris tian ity and Chrétien’s Christianization of phenom-
enology. Derrida is aware that a straightforward embrace of the decon-
struction of Chris tian ity is a ruse  because it  will end up in a Christian 
victory that ultimately overcomes deconstruction, rather than the reverse. 
The prob lem, however, is that a  simple opposition to Chris tian ity is also 
insufficient  because it gets caught in a similar trap where Chris tian ity sub-
lates this opposition and also wins. As Jacques Lacan says, “religion  will 
always triumph” over psychoanalysis, philosophy, and many other  things.25 
The prob lem is not Chris tian ity as such, if such a  thing exists, but the fact 
that Chris tian ity as the absolute religion never loses. It always wins, even 
when it loses; when all is lost, it converts a loss into a gain, and a triumph 
over its pagan, Jewish and Islamic foes.
This is the Chris tian ity that has become the modern West, as Walter 
Benjamin asserts in his unpublished fragment “Capitalism as Religion.” 
According to Benjamin, Max Weber did not take his thesis on Protes-
tantism and the spirit of capitalism far enough: “The Chris tian ity of the 
Reformation period did not favour the growth of capitalism; instead it 
transformed itself into capitalism.”26 Chris tian ity thrives on its own self- 
overcoming and its ability to subsume any and all alternatives into Chris-
tian ity. This is the standard philosophical critique of Hegelian dialectics, 
that it is able to incorporate any and all negativity and emerge victorious. 
Lacan generalizes this triumphant Chris tian ity to religion; religion gets to 
win  every time  there is a conflict. Modern capitalism emerges out of and 
draws on this self- surpassing nature of Chris tian ity  because it, too, is able 
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to convert  every loss into a gain, at least potentially.  Every move against 
capitalism is appropriated within capitalism, so that it can never lose. 
Any specific person can lose or lose out; lose one’s shirt,  house, or invest-
ments; go bankrupt— but capitalism itself cannot lose  because it lives 
of this gradient of win and loss in a way that structurally replicates the 
way that Chris tian ity lives of of the opposition between salvation and 
damnation.
In the work of John D. Caputo and Martin Hägglund, two influential 
interpreters of Derrida’s work on religion, we can see two alternative strat-
egies to deal with Derrida’s complex relation  towards religion. For Caputo, 
most explic itly in his book The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, the 
challenge is to conceive religion and Chris tian ity in Derridean terms with-
out this triumphalist strain that emerges in globalized capitalism and re-
actionary fundamentalism. Caputo ofers a religion without religion, even 
though he and Derrida both know that you never have one without the 
other. Religion as the affirmation of the promise, the primordial act of faith 
that underlies any per for mance, is one of the two sources of religion in 
“Faith and Knowledge,” as we saw in the previous chapter.
In Miracle and Machine, which consists of a sustained reflection on 
“Faith and Knowledge,” Michael Naas points out that Derrida shows a 
distinct preference to this act of faith over and above the other source, the 
experience of the sacred or holy as unscathed and indemnified, which 
leads to the structure of auto- immunity. Naas asserts Derrida’s affirma-
tion of faith as the fundamental social bond, but at the same time points 
out that Derrida wants to emphasize “the disruptive nature of this faith,” 
which is a faith that always retains a hidden or secret side.27 Caputo cele-
brates this secret faith of Derrida, this religion without religion that also 
means a Chris tian ity without Christianism. Caputo says that “I would say 
that to save the name of faith, faith must be faith without faith, without 
the assurances of faith.”28
Caputo does not collapse Derrida’s tension between religion and reli-
gion, miracle and machine, or the two sources of religion, but he wagers 
on and elaborates a positive and affirmative view of what such a decon-
structed Chris tian ity would look like. Caputo claims that “Derrida’s analy sis 
of the gift makes pos si ble another Chris tian ity,” not the same Chris tian ity 
reconfirmed and redressed in postmodern garb.29 He points out that for 
Derrida, “ ‘God’ is the name of the absolute secret, a placeholder for the 
secret that  there is no secret truth.”30 God is not an object or a being but a 
potential event that resides in the structure of articulation as such, the se-
crecy that makes faith pos si ble and that makes complete and certain belief 
impossible. Caputo  later develops his vision of another Chris tian ity in 
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the form of a weak, deconstructed theology in The Weakness of God, as I 
 will discuss in Chapter 6.31
Caputo acknowledges Derrida’s atheism, but shows how it is still faith-
ful. Derrida himself avows in an interview that “for my part, I believe in 
faith.” And then he follows up with the claim that “as soon as one pro-
nounces the word ‘faith,’ the equivocation is  there, disastrous and deserted.” 
We cannot avoid this equivocation or simply resolve it with an untroubled 
atheism or theism. “The religious,” Derrida says, “in its equivocal relation 
to faith . . .  is the equivocation in which we are.”32
Derrida’s equivocation and Caputo’s affirmation are too much for Häg-
glund, however. In Radical Atheism, Hägglund argues that Derrida’s 
affirmation of life and the living in its temporal becoming leads to a critique 
of immortality as the absolute immunity of life withdrawn from any ex-
posure to death. Hägglund is correct to claim that Derrida does not affirm 
traditional faith religion in a conventional, otherworldly sense. According 
to Hägglund, “the spacing of time makes X pos si ble while making it im-
possible for X to be in itself. Such spacing is quite incompatible with the 
religious ideal of absolute immunity.”33  There is no such  thing as absolute 
immunity  because spacing exposes  every phenomenon to something that 
potentially compromises it. Hägglund understands Derrida’s critique of 
the second source, the unscathed, which is incompatible with Derrida’s 
emphasis on the temporization and spacing of language and life.
The prob lem with Hägglund’s reading, however, is that it conflates Der-
rida’s critique of the unscathed in terms of auto- immunity with his entire 
conception of religion, which includes belief, trust, or faith. Hägglund ne-
glects the equivocation and partial affirmation of faith in Derrida’s work, 
which leads Hägglund to view religion in entirely negative and atheistic 
terms, whereas Derrida himself is much more complex. In addition, Häg-
glund assimilates Caputo’s interpretation of Derrida to a very simplistic and 
traditional view of religion, and fails to recognize that Caputo is elaborat-
ing upon Derrida’s complex notion of faith.
Hägglund makes it clear that Derrida’s affirmation of salut as a greet-
ing or welcoming of the other is not a desire for salvation in any traditional 
sense. He points out that Derrida’s “unconditional affirmation of life” in-
volves saying “yes” to the survival of our finite temporal existence rather 
than hoping or yearning for some sort of religious infinity.34 Hägglund is 
surely right to emphasize Derrida’s focus on temporal finite existence rather 
than any sort of hope for immortality, and he ofers a bracing corrective 
to some of the pious invocations of Derrida’s thought and its ability to be 
subsumed into a more traditional religious framework. Hägglund is warn-
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ing readers about the same misuse of deconstruction that Derrida warns 
Nancy about in terms of Chrétien’s phenomenology in On Touching.
According to Hägglund, “what Derrida calls the impossible does not 
refer to something that is unattainable  because of our  human limitations, 
such as the kingdom of God. Derrida explic itly emphasizes that the im-
possible is not an inaccessible ideal; it is rather ‘what is most undeniably 
real.’ ”35 Hägglund points out that the spacing of time is what makes it pos-
si ble for something to exist at all and at the same time makes it impossible 
for that something to be self- sufficient, or fully closed in on itself. This spac-
ing of time is the time of life, and “it is quite incompatible with the religious 
ideal of absolute immunity.”36 I do not disagree with Hägglund  here, but 
he misunderstands Caputo when he says that “Caputo’s notion of the im-
possible . . .  is the opposite of Derrida’s.”37 Hägglund believes that Caputo 
figures Derrida’s notion of the impossible as an ideal kingdom of God, 
which is incorrect.
How does Hägglund misread Caputo? Again, as already stated above, 
Hägglund assimilates Caputo’s faithful reading of Derrida to only one of 
the two sources, the source of the unscathed and the autoimmune sacred. 
Hägglund argues that while Derrida distinguishes between faith and the 
unscathed, they “are usually conflated in the notion of religious faith, which 
is understood as the faith in an absolute Good that is safe from the cor-
ruption of evil.”38 But since Derrida critiques the possibility of any abso-
lute immunity, Hägglund understands him to be entirely opposed to 
religion in both senses. And he assimilates Caputo to this ste reo typical re-
ligious position, which is wrong. Caputo does not defend an indemnified 
sacred that is safe from deconstruction; he pursues a hopeful but risky path 
of a finite (but then deconstruction would also question the limits of any 
 simple opposition between finite and infinite) faith. Hägglund claims that 
“Derrida undermines the religious ideal of absolute immunity, which in-
forms both Caputo’s and Kearney’s reasoning.”39 But Caputo at least de-
fends no such claim of absolute immunity, and does not endorse a God 
who is Good above and beyond all finite materiality.
Hägglund accuses religion of conflating faith with absolute immunity, 
and then assumes that  because Caputo is defending or promoting religion 
that he is also committed to championing the absolutely unscathed source 
in the form of a pure God who is Good beyond being (which is closer to 
the position of Jean- Luc Marion than Caputo) rather than the finite source 
of religious belief. Derrida suggests that  these two sources are in some way 
combined in what we call religion, and deconstruction attempts to tease 
them apart. Even if we cannot simply separate  these two sources and cannot 
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do away with one and keep the other, we can still think them distinctly 
and articulate them in impor tant ways. Caputo risks confusion by defend-
ing religious faith in passionate terms, although this is a religion without 
(absolute, unscathed, immune) religion and faith without (secure, certain, 
guaranteed) faith. Hägglund thinks that he is more faithful to Derrida’s 
atheism, but he gives up the equivocation that constantly pervades Derri-
da’s writings about religion, an equivocation “in which we are.”
For Caputo, Derrida’s equivocation and careful affirmation becomes a 
more robust affirmation of religion without religion. Derrida always stresses 
the contestation, the ambivalence and ambiguous nature of religion, while 
Caputo wagers on the unconditional cele bration of what Derrida carefully 
and hesitantly suggests. Caputo imagines a radical, ethical, self- contesting 
faith beyond any surety of the immunity of the unscathed, and this is not 
a betrayal or distortion of Derrida but a step along the way to the develop-
ment of a full- throated Derridean theology, as we  will see in Chapter 6. 
Derrida always resisted the term “theology” and distanced himself from 
it, and so did Caputo up  until The Weakness of God. Radical, nonconfes-
sional and unorthodox theology, however, ofers Caputo a way to express 
Derrida’s insights in more explic itly theological ways.
Although I think Hägglund misreads Caputo, I do not think that he 
literally misreads Derrida, even if he does betray the spirit of Derrida’s phi-
losophy to which Caputo remains faithful. They develop alternative strat-
egies to safeguard deconstruction for or from religious faith, and they work 
hard and well to defend the coherence and relevance of their respective 
positions.40 The prob lem with Hägglund’s literalist reading is that it falls 
into a trap, which is similar to the trap in which Shylock finds himself in 
Merchant of Venice.
To help flesh out Derrida’s complex attitude  toward Chris tian ity, I con-
sider another essay by Derrida, one that is less commonly referenced when 
discussing his treatment of religion or the deconstruction of Chris tian ity. 
In his essay “What Is a Relevant Translation?” Derrida discusses Shylock’s 
impossible situation in Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice in a way that pre-
figures Hägglund’s literalistic interpretation. In this essay, presented in 
1998, published in French in 1999, and then translated into En glish in 
2001, Derrida translates the first half of a sentence written by Shakespeare 
and uttered by Portia: “When mercy seasons justice, then must the Jew be 
merciful.” Derrida focuses on the first phrase, which he translates into 
French as “Quand le  pardon relève la justice. . . .”41 Shylock holds fast to his 
oath to take a pound of flesh from near the heart of the merchant Anto-
nio. His word is his bond, and he cannot forsake it. And yet, he is implored 
to be merciful as the doge of Venice has been and presumably  will be mer-
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ciful to him. Shylock eventually is forced to  pardon Antonio and to con-
vert to Chris tian ity based on his stubborn insistence on the literal bond, 
and his lack of forgiveness ultimately leads to his death.
In his essay, Derrida focuses on the tension between a literal and a spiri-
tual understanding of a word, an oath, a bond, and also a circumcision. 
Of course, he is not the first to treat this theme in Merchant of Venice, but 
it is in ter est ing where Derrida ends up in the context of his own attitude 
 toward religion and how it shows the limits of Hägglund’s straightforwardly 
atheistic reading. Derrida states that “this impossible translation, this 
conversion . . .  between the original, literal flesh and the monetary sign 
is not unrelated to the Jew Shylock’s forced conversion to Chris tian ity,” 
 because the Jew is often associated with the body and the letter whereas 
the Christian is seen on the side of a spiritualization of both word and 
flesh.42 According to Derrida, the entire play proceeds
as if the business of translation  were first of all an Abrahamic  matter 
between the Jew, the Christian, and the Muslim. And the relève, like 
the relevance I am prepared to discuss with you,  will be precisely what 
happens to the flesh of the text, the body, the spoken body, and the 
translated body— when the letter is mourned to save the sense.43
The Jew is forced to  pardon in a repetition of his own  pardon, which is 
also a threat of death, just as his oath threatened Antonio with death. And 
this  pardon is also a conversion to Chris tian ity, a seasoning of Jewish jus-
tice with Christian mercy.
According to Derrida, this short sentence uttered by Portia— “When 
mercy seasons justice, then must the Jew be merciful”— “recapitulates 
the entire history of forgiveness, the entire history between the Jew and 
the Christian, the entire history of economics (merces, market, merchan-
dise, merci, mercenary, wage, reward, literal or sublime) as a history of 
translation.”44 The Jew must be merciful, on pain of death. The Jew must 
forgive Christian vio lence, anti- Judaism and antisemitism, so that the Chris-
tian can forgive the Jew her own Jewishness and raise her up to the level of 
a Christian. Portia, a  woman disguised as a man, admits that she has been 
paid as a “mercenary of gratitude, or mercy.”45 By mercifully commanding 
the Jew to be merciful, Portia “preconverts” Shylock to Chris tian ity “by 
persuading him of the supposedly Christian interpretation that consists of 
interiorizing, spiritualizing, idealizing what among Jews (it is often said, at 
least, that this is a very power ful ste reo type)  will remain physical, external, 
liberal, devoted to a re spect for the letter.”46
According to Derrida, mercy in the play functions as a relève, a season-
ing that makes justice more palatable and that also elevates it to a higher 
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level. Relève, of course, is also Derrida’s translation of Hegel’s German term 
Aufhebung, which is “a dialectical movement of interiorization, interioriz-
ing memory (Erinnerung) and sublimating spiritualization.”47 Mercy is 
viewed as a power of God that is available to  humans to appropriate and 
use: “mercy resembles divine power at the moment when it elevates, pre-
serves, and negates (relève) justice.”48 For Derrida, mercy instantiates itself 
at the level of the divine, in a “genesis of the divine, of the holy or the sa-
cred, but also the site of pure translation.”49  Here is one of the two sources 
of religion, the holy or sacred, but at the same time it is a translation, so it 
is also a machinic iteration or repetition, a machine for making gods. And 
it is also the site of the link between the theological and the po liti cal, which 
Derrida wants to deconstruct, as we  will consider in the next chapter.
This intersection of divine and  human power in mercy constitutes West-
ern Christian sovereignty, and the grandeur of this gesture is also a ruse of 
mercy, a sham of forgiveness that tricks and abuses— and eventually kills— 
Shylock. Derrida exposes and criticizes this Christian ruse of mercy in 
his essay. At the same time, Derrida has  little mercy or sympathy for Shy-
lock’s victimization. He states that “I am not about to praise Shylock 
when he raises a hue and cry for his pound of flesh and insists on the liter-
alness of the bond.”50 Why not defend Shylock? Why  doesn’t Derrida 
want to hold to the literality of the word, the oath, the bond or the body?
Derrida recognizes and expresses “the evil that can be through the Chris-
tian ruse as a discourse of mercy,” but he still condemns Shylock’s strategy 
of literalization. Derrida says at the end of the article: “I insist on the Chris-
tian dimension” of translation.51 Why?  Because other wise, you are simply 
caught in its trap, which is where Hägglund ends up,  because he is just a 
 little too faithful to the letter of Derrida’s work. Derrida insists on the spiri-
tualization of interpretation, but then twists it into a work of mourning. 
Perhaps Caputo’s own spiritualization of deconstruction fails to mourn 
Chris tian ity explic itly enough, despite his emphasis on the tears of Der-
rida. So how do we survive Chris tian ity? We mourn it, we let it die, and 
this is a relief (relève), in a sense.
At the end of his essay, Derrida suggests that we think relevance as mem-
ory and as mourning. He argues that translation guarantees two survivals, 
referring to Walter Benjamin: “by elevating the signifier to its meaning or 
value, all the while preserving the mournful and debt- laden memory of the 
singular body, the first body, the unique body that the translation thus el-
evates, preserves, and negates.”52 The translation thus preserves both the 
original literal word and the spiritualized double in a work of memory that 
is also a “travail of mourning.” Relève is not just an elevation for Derrida; 
he gives the Hegelian Aufhebung a twist in its translation into French.
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Relève is a relief that raises the body but also loses it, and in both losing 
and preserving it mourns rather than simply affirms and celebrates this spir-
itualization. The meaning of a translation is its relevance, and “the very 
concept, the very value of meaning, the meaning of meaning, the value of 
the preserved value originates in the mournful experience of translation, 
of its very possibility.”53 Derrida calls our attention to this travail, the work 
of mourning that haunts language in its iterability and translation.
Derrida claims that by simply opposing this relève, “Shylock delivers 
himself into the grasp of the Christian strategy, bound hand and foot.”54 
You cannot fight Chris tian ity directly,  because you  will always lose. Nancy 
wants to press deconstruction into Chris tian ity to such an extent that 
Chris tian ity  will give itself up, surpass itself, which is what Chris tian ity’s 
essence has been from the beginning. But Derrida worries that this would 
be yet another Christian victory. And Hägglund wants to preserve the pu-
rity of his atheistic interpretation of Derrida uncontaminated by religion, 
which exhibits naïveté  toward Derrida’s complex thematic of auto- immunity 
as well as a betrayal of the “spirit” of deconstruction.
We can see how Derrida’s reading of Merchant of Venice converges with 
Gil Anidjar’s analy sis of Chris tian ity in Blood: A Critique of Chris tian ity. 
In this book, Anidjar makes a striking connection between the economic 
circulation of capitalism in the modern world with the circulation of blood 
as discovered by William Harvey in 1628.55 Blood is more than a meta-
phor; it is a complex, multifaceted material real ity that spreads across our 
entire existence. Anidjar’s book is a po liti cal theology  because he traces 
the origin of this preoccupation with blood to Chris tian ity, in par tic u lar the 
purity of blood. This obsession with the purity of Christ’s— and then 
Christians’— blood eventually funds an entire racial economy. “Blood 
makes and marks diference,” Anidjar writes, “an allegedly universal dif-
ference inscribed between bloods.”56 He paraphrases Schmitt  later in the 
same paragraph by asserting that “all significant concepts of the modern world 
are liquidated theological concepts.”57  These concepts are liquidated, or liq-
uefied, rather than simply secularized, which means that they still carry 
meaning and infect their  bearers.
Every thing begins with the blood of Christ. The sharing of Christ’s 
blood in the communion ritual fuses a community together, a community 
that participates in the blood of Christ. According to Anidjar, “Chris tian-
ity si mul ta neously in ven ted the community of substance as the commu-
nity of blood.”58 During the early history of Chris tian ity, from the fourth 
to the eleventh  century, it was considered a sin to shed blood, any blood, 
even of non- Christians. What changed is that around the late 1000s 
and early 1100s, during the so- called Papal Revolution, the Church 
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declared that Christians should not kill other Christians rather than other 
 humans. Urban II preached a crusade against Islam, claiming that “Chris-
tian blood, redeemed by the blood of Christ, has been shed” by infidels.59 
Anidjar relies on the work of Tomaž Mastnak, who says that from now 
on, “the church, which had long ‘considered the shedding of blood as a 
source of pollution, now encouraged the shedding of blood— non- Christian 
blood—as a means of purification.’ ”60
 Later on, in the 1449 Statutes on the Purity of Blood issued by the 
Spanish Inquisition, we can see “the institutionalized perception whereby 
Christians  were deemed hematologically distinct from converts, the latter 
having failed to achieve Christianization by reason of their tainted blood.”61 
Christian states such as Spain are called “vampire states”  because they 
search out and destroy  people whose blood is impure and non- Christian. 
The preoccupation with race and racism as represented by skin color is seen 
by Anidjar as an “intensification” of blood, where blood contains and car-
ries the essence of race.
The origin of a certain ancient type of racism emerges with the origin 
of Chris tian ity, which configures Jewish identity in ethnic terms in con-
trast with Christian universalism.62 But this racial identity is not based on 
the notion of blood. Anidjar argues that in the Hebrew Bible, “ there is no 
difference between bloods,” and the Israelite or Jewish community is based 
on a sharing of “flesh and bone.”63 With the origins of Chris tian ity in Paul, 
attention is paid to the flesh and blood of Christ, which become associ-
ated with the Eucharist ritual.  Here blood enters the picture, although it 
is not yet associated with what we call race.
In the modern world, the significance of race emerges in connection 
with a purity of blood. Anidjar argues that “the earliest evidence appears 
to point to the Spanish and Portuguese empires, where purity of blood 
served in ‘the forging of cleansed Spanish identity that referred both to 
national unity and to the overseas empire.’ ” In colonial Latin Amer i ca, 
this idea of a purity of blood gradually became divorced from its religious 
significance and became a solely racial idea around 1700.64 As Nelson 
Maldonado- Torres points out in an article on religion, conquest, and race 
in the modern world that is broadly compatible with Anidjar’s study, “the 
Christian polemics and the discourse and practices surrounding the con-
cept of the ‘purity of the blood’ are, in a manner of speaking, the anteroom 
to the modern racist discourse and practices that would be initiated with 
the arrival of Columbus in the Américas.”65
For Anidjar, the implicit racial significance of religious diference be-
tween Christians on the one hand, and Jews and Muslims on the other, 
develops into the modern idea of  peoples who are racially distinguished 
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by their blood. Even if Anidjar exaggerates the significance of blood in the 
modern world, or his book downplays other ele ments, his examination is 
incredibly revealing, and it shows a deep connection between Chris tian ity 
and con temporary racism and capitalism. Blood is a material real ity as well 
as an object of po liti cal theology. Blood flows, out, during moments of 
exceptional vio lence, but our blood still  matters even when it is less obvious 
or vis i ble.
In his book, Anidjar reflects briefly on Shakespeare’s play. He writes that 
“if Merchant of Venice teaches us so much about economic theology, it is 
first of all  because it takes us to sea— war and commerce— while signal-
ling to us that along with, and in the realm of, money, our minds are ‘toss-
ing on the ocean,’ and merchants are ‘like signors and rich burghers on 
the flood.’ ”66 We are adrift on  these flows, and the most impor tant liquid 
 will turn out to be blood, and the equivocation between money and Chris-
tian blood. Shylock is figured in the play as “the economic  enemy whose 
association with blood and money is ultimately interrupted  because and 
by way of blood, and more precisely,  because and by way of Christian 
blood.”67 Anidjar ofers a critique of the play that is similar to that of 
Derrida, although Derrida does not single out the theme of blood in 
Merchant of Venice.
For Derrida, the phrase delivered by Portia, “When mercy seasons jus-
tice, then must the Jew be merciful,” is the most significant line of the play. 
For Anidjar, however, the key is Portia’s judgment:
Take then thy bond. Take thou they pound of flesh.
But in cutting it, if thou dost shed
One drop of Christian blood, thy lands and goods
Are by the law of Venice confiscate
Unto the state of Venice.68
Shylock protests that in forbidding him his bond, the state of Venice is de-
priving him of his life, and this becomes prophecy. Anidjar draws atten-
tion to the circulation of life, money, and blood in the play and in our 
political- theological economy.
Shylock cannot shed a drop of Christian blood, even though he has claim 
to a pound of Antonio’s flesh. This trap illustrates how Chris tian ity func-
tions  because, as a Jew, Shylock is screwed no  matter what he does. Derrida 
wants to avoid triggering the trap by opposing it directly; he wants to care-
fully explain it and if pos si ble disengage it with as  little bloodshed as pos si-
ble. Anidjar risks a more direct critique of Chris tian ity by focusing on its 
identification with blood and other liquids, including money. Anidjar ren-
ders Christian blood vis i ble in its sacrificial, racial, and genocidal vio lence.
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 Whether or not one is Christian,  there  will be blood, which means that 
straightforward re sis tance is ultimately futile. You have to mourn Chris-
tian ity, let it survive by  dying (which it has always already done, by means 
of the Cross) and let it die by surviving, which it inevitably  will, in its in-
finite translation. We  will not survive, even if we want to, as ourselves. We 
have time, but not too much time, not all the time, and in certain re spects 
we have no time. Space is available, and the “khôra of tomorrow . . . .  makes 
way perhaps, but without the slightest generosity, neither  human nor di-
vine.”69 This is Good News, and we should mourn it, even if we should 
mourn as if not mourning— “for the  whole frame of the world is passing 
away” (1 Cor 7: 30–31). This is the end of the world, but Derrida loves us 
and he is smiling.70 Whew!
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As we have already seen in previous chapters, in Miracle and Machine: 
Jacques Derrida and the Two Sources of Religion, Science, and the Media, 
 Michael Naas ofers a close reading of Jacques Derrida’s 1996 essay “Faith 
and Knowledge: The Two Sources of Religion at the Limits of Reason 
Alone.” Naas shows how  these two sources of religion, the miraculous and 
the machinic, constitute what Derrida calls “religion” as faith and as the 
sacred. Furthermore, Naas traces  these themes of miracle and machine 
across Derrida’s corpus and shows how  these questions related to religion 
animate Derrida’s philosophy from the beginning to the end of his life. 
In addition, Naas intersperses his readings of Derrida on religion with 
some extraordinary connections to and reflections on Don Delillo’s novel, 
Underworld.
I want to endorse Naas’s reading of Derrida on religion, and his insis-
tence on the two sources of Derrida’s thinking about religion, and the 
role of religion in the con temporary world. In some ways Derrida is a “reli-
gious” thinker, but his religiosity is not simply equivalent to any specific 
religion. Naas explains that Derrida uses words like “faith,” “God,” and 
“messianicity” “in ways that court misunderstanding,” but they are re-
lated to how Naas articulates the term “miracle” in his book. According 
to Naas, “Derrida says that we are called upon to believe  every testimony— 
every claim to truth,  every claim that one is telling the truth about what 
one knows, believes, or sees—as an ‘extraordinary story’ or a miracle.”1 
The prob lem with the miracle, however, is that  because of repetition it is 
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always caught up in a kind of machine. “Derrida says that the machine is 
simply another way of speaking about calculation and repetition,” argues 
Nass, “but about a calculation and repetition in relationship always to the 
incalculable and the unforeseeable.”2 This machinic repetition of the mir-
acle both ruins the singularly miraculous quality of the miracle and also at 
the same time paradoxically makes it pos si ble in the first place.
As soon as you have life, which is a miraculous event, you also have 
a kind of mechanics or what Arthur Bradley calls “originary technicity.”3 
Religion, like life, conjoins the two ele ments of a singular re spect for hu-
man existence with a kind of sacrificial repetition of this life that consti-
tutes a mechanics, or a sort of death- in- life. This mechanical repetition 
“reproduces, with the regularity of a technique, the instance of the non- 
living or, if you prefer, of the dead in the living.”4 As Steven Shakespeare 
explains,
The singular event requires an archive, if it is to survive and be read. 
This archive always has something “machinelike” about it: a capacity 
for iteration that exceeds or, rather, precedes the formation of conscious 
intentionality. This is the cut, the wounding of the pres ent that en-
sures the possibility of survival. A kind of thinking of the cut, of the 
absolute— and of God— because this machinelike structure that 
presupposes itself, that  causes itself, is strangely akin to God. Indeed 
Derrida understands the question of the technical as question of the 
theological.5
Religion in its two sources of the sacred and belief incorporates both the 
singular re spect of life and the regularity of a non- living technique, such 
that the mechanical and theological converge, as Shakespeare points out. 
In “Faith and Knowledge,” the theological machine is a “machine for mak-
ing gods,” as Derrida quotes Bergson from The Two Sources of Morality 
and Religion.6 And  these gods perpetrate miraculous acts, acts of sovereign 
exceptionality.
In amplifying Derrida’s work by re- turning to and opening up this pro-
foundly impor tant text on religion, Naas helps us assess not only Derrida’s 
philosophy but how it is that we can think and think about religion  today. 
In his conclusion, Naas borrows an image in the form of a specific billboard 
sign from Underworld and claims that in their inextricable intersection, 
faith and knowledge, or miracle and machine, compose a sign that reads: 
“Space Available.” Naas reads this sign as “an affirmation that, for the mo-
ment,  there is still time, and in the words of the sign itself, which can be 
read as the translation of  either a messianicity without messianism or 
khôra, still space available.”7
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In this chapter, I focus more explic itly on a theme that Naas raises 
over the course of a few pages but does not fully elaborate, which is that of 
sovereignty. Derrida’s religious writings are always connected to his po liti-
cal reflections, specifically the attempt to elaborate a “democracy to come” 
that would not be constituted in terms of sovereignty. According to Naas, 
the oneness or indivisibility of the sovereign is the legacy of par tic u lar 
religion— Chris tian ity— and a par tic u lar po liti cal history— Western Eu ro-
pean, that needs to be contested and deconstructed. As Naas says,
throughout the 1980s and 1990s and right up to his death, Derrida 
relentlessly pursued a kind of radical or originary secularism or sec-
ularity that constantly questions and criticizes the imposition of 
any par tic u lar religion or religious doctrine upon po liti cal concepts. 
Motivated in part by the analyses of Carl Schmitt, Derrida takes up 
the proj ect of demonstrating the ontotheological origins of what at 
first appear to be modern secular concepts such as popu lar sover-
eignty, democracy, and religious tolerance.8
On this reading, a Christian po liti cal theology, of which we caught a 
glimpse in the previous chapter in Derrida’s interpretation of Merchant of 
Venice, is entangled with sovereignty. Derrida appreciates the incisiveness 
of Schmitt’s analy sis of po liti cal theology in Po liti cal Theology, but he 
also criticizes and opposes Schmitt’s conception of politics, most explic itly 
in The Politics of Friendship. My argument is that Derrida is working to 
deconstruct or dismantle the sovereignty that undergirds the po liti cal 
theology of Carl Schmitt. At the same time, Derrida is attentive to the 
inextricability of something like a theology in  every politics, and the im-
possibility of completely separating questions of religion from questions of 
politics. Furthermore, I suggest that this thematic of the critique or de-
construction of sovereignty animates Derrida’s text on “Faith and Knowl-
edge,” even if it is less explic itly foregrounded in the essay.
Sovereignty is what interlaces the theological and the po liti cal for 
Schmitt, which is why Derrida takes his distance from any explicit form 
of po liti cal theology.9 The question of the deconstruction of sovereignty 
lies in what happens to the theological and the po liti cal if this link to sov-
ereignty is undone. The main prob lem with sovereignty lies in its insistence 
on the “One,” in Schmitt’s case the one who decides on the exception. This 
oneness draws the po liti cal and the theological together into an anti- 
democratic machine of domination. For Derrida,  there is no  simple “one” 
who decides.
In Two: The Machine of Po liti cal Theology and the Place of Thought, 
Roberto Esposito lays out his understanding of the machine of po liti cal 
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theology that encompasses the entire history of the West. According to 
Esposito, it is the specific relation of the two— the theological and the 
political— that constitutes a strange sort of unity. This unity or oneness is 
constituted by “a pro cess of exclusionary assimilation.” The Two are in-
cluded in the One is a way such that “the imposition of one . . .  seeks to 
eliminate the other.”10 Western humanity is caught within the workings 
of this machine. This machine of po liti cal theology is so efective and so 
inescapable  because it comes to define  human subjectivity, what it means 
to be a person. The dispositive of the person is constituted by the bond 
between subjectivity and subjugation, and this bond is internalized in the 
creation of  human persons.11 Esposito devotes his book to analyzing the 
history of the formation and development of this machine from ancient 
Rome and early Chris tian ity up through modernity, and to finding ways 
to undo or render inoperable this machine.
The po liti cal theological machine functions by means of “an exclusion-
ary se lection of what it absorbs.”12 The Two become One by an assimila-
tive exclusion of the other, which is never complete. This incompletion then 
drives the machine onward. In his book, despite its impressive scope, 
 Esposito fails to consider Derrida’s work in the context of his analy sis of 
po liti cal theology, but I think that Derrida’s thought is highly relevant 
to Esposito’s analy sis. Derrida attends to the deconstruction of the One into 
its constitutive Twoness, and opening up alternative ways of understanding 
and appropriating the history of Western Christian po liti cal theology.
In this chapter, I set up a context for Derrida’s  later work that stretches 
from The Politics of Friendship and includes Specters of Marx (and  really be-
gins with his 1989 essay “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of 
Authority”) to his  later book Rogues and his two- volume lecture course 
on The Beast and the Sovereign.  These works all can be seen to pivot around 
the idea of the deconstruction of sovereignty and the possibility of undo-
ing this “theologico- political” link.  Here I briefly reflect on Schmitt’s fa-
mous text, Po liti cal Theology, whose subtitle is “Four Chapters on the 
Concept of Sovereignty,” along with his The Concept of the Po liti cal, and 
then consider some relevant passages from Derrida’s texts mentioned ear-
lier. Derrida’s essay “Faith and Knowledge,” along with Naas’s reading of 
it, remains in the background.
I am claiming that the po liti cal emphasis of Derrida’s  later thought is 
consistent with the focus on religion in many of his works,  because both 
of  these make up what Esposito calls the machine of po liti cal theology. 
Derrida deconstructs sovereignty as a way to undermine the working of 
the machine, the paradoxical exclusionary inclusion of the Two in the One. 
Derrida does not explic itly treat the theme of po liti cal theology, but all of 
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his works are related in some re spect to this theme. This focus on the ma-
chine of po liti cal theology also opens up deconstruction from any literal 
association with writing. Religion and politics always interact and inter-
sect, in power ful and problematic ways, and they do so not only in writ-
ing but also in broader transformative ways.
Derrida’s philosophy has always been directed against the unity of the 
One. In his earlier work, his focus on dissemination is more literally a form 
of writing, a working against the presumed unity of speech. Dissemination 
involves a kind of double writing, as we can see in his essays “Dissemina-
tion” and “The Double Session” (Derrida’s interpretation of Mallarmé), 
both of which are included in the book Dissemination.13 Writing as dis-
semination exposes it to its otherness in a way that precludes gathering 
into a unity, and it punctures sovereign authority. But in his  later works, 
Derrida’s analyses are no longer configured specifically or generally in terms 
of writing.
In his  later writings, Derrida draws closer to technics, or the machinic, 
and its connection to belief as a kind of promise that implies ethical respon-
sibility as its condition of possibility and impossibility, as the under lying 
condition and context for thinking about the workings of religion and 
politics. In “Faith and Knowledge,” for example, the context for reflecting 
on the two sources of religion is a more biopo liti cal conception of auto- 
immunity. The nature and role of religion in the con temporary world, 
which is one of “globalatinization,” implies that we cannot simply dismiss 
or dispense with religion as a phenomenon. Religion constitutes a kind of 
auto- immune phenomenon that “is silently at work within  every commu-
nity, constituting it as such in its iterability, its heritage, its spectral tradi-
tion.”14 Religion is something intrinsic to community that threatens 
community with “a princi ple of self- destruction” in the form of violent fun-
damentalism. At the same time, this “self- contesting attestation keeps the 
auto- immune community alive, which is to say, open to something other 
and more than itself.”15  Here, religion is a form of auto- immunity that both 
protects and threatens the social body. Auto- immunity as a paradigm to 
think about religion invokes the machine, what constitutes the machinic, 
and what exceeds the machine as what makes it pos si ble, what makes life 
worth living in its excess, its dignity, and its faith. Community and auto- 
immunity are not figures of writing; they constitute an opening to another 
form of conceptuality that Malabou calls plasticity. We could say that in 
Derrida,  after writing recedes as a motor scheme, what comes to replace 
it can be viewed through the lens of technics and responsibility. I engage 
more with this theme in Chapter 7 by way of a more direct encounter with 
Malabou’s philosophy.
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My specific argument in this chapter is that, in his  later work, Derrida 
is trying to sketch out a kind of po liti cal theology without sovereignty that 
would  counter the po liti cal theology of Carl Schmitt, which is essentially 
tied to a form of sovereignty. Schmitt defines sovereignty in political- 
theological terms for Derrida, but Derrida wants to think about a radical 
politics of democracy that would not be defined as sovereign in Schmit-
tian terms. Derrida accepts Schmitt’s assertion that the po liti cal and the 
theological are both historically and structurally interrelated, but he imag-
ines a  future for po liti cal theory that is not tied to sovereignty.  Because he 
associates Schmitt’s conservative philosophy with the phrase “po liti cal the-
ology,” Derrida does not himself use this term. However, one way to read 
Derrida’s  later work is to see him as elaborating a po liti cal theology with-
out sovereignty.
According to Geofrey Bennington, a significant theme of Derrida’s  later 
work is “his call for an unconditionality without sovereignty.” Sovereignty 
involves the efort to immunize the subject or sovereign from the risk of 
death that comes with the uncontainable uncertainty of an event. But for 
Derrida this unconditionality that is quasi- religious “involves exposure to 
the absolutely unexpected event as a condition of anything like ‘life.’ ”16 
 Unconditionality without sovereignty draws attention to the ways in which 
both politics and religion attempt to immunize themselves in dangerous 
and problematic ways. Derrida points out where and how both are exposed 
to the possibility of an event, and how this exposure is what makes them 
expressions of a living community even as it exposes them to death, the 
death of a machinic repetition. Po liti cal theology is a machine that names 
the crossing of religion with politics in our “globalatinized” world, even 
as it exposes the working of that machine to another conditionality that 
Derrida calls unconditional.
In his groundbreaking book Po liti cal Theology, published in 1922, 
Schmitt famously claims that “all significant concepts of the modern the-
ory of the state are secularized theological concepts,” and this is not only 
due to their “historical development,” but also has to do with their “sys-
tematic structure.”17 This sentence opens the third chapter of the four chap-
ters on the concept of sovereignty, and  here Schmitt directly expresses the 
famous secularization hypothesis. In his analy sis, Schmitt argues for a so-
ciology of concepts, one that takes into account the genuine significance 
of ideas without simply arguing for or against one side or the other (secu-
lar vs. theological). He claims that during the modern period of Eu ro pean 
intellectual history, the  battle against God represents an attack on transcen-
dence for the sake of immanence, and this pro cess results in modern atheism. 
In their attack on liberal atheism, conservative counter- revolutionary 
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religious thinkers such as Donoso Cortés reveal what is importantly at 
stake in this transformation. It’s not simply theism vs. atheism; the prob-
lem for Schmitt is that liberal democracy represents an “onslaught against 
the po liti cal.”18
The revolt against God ends up destroying not only religion but poli-
tics as well. Why?  Because our understanding of God is tied to a modern 
conception of sovereignty, and the basis of sovereignty is its personalistic 
decision- making capacity. The first sentence of Po liti cal Theology reads: 
“Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.”19 A decision has to be a 
sovereign decision to be a true po liti cal decision. Schmitt criticizes the de-
generation of modern law and economics to the point where it attempts to 
eradicate the need for any decision. This elimination of the decision is both 
impossible and undesirable. At the end of the book, he argues that
Whereas, on the one hand, the po liti cal vanishes into the economic 
or technical- organizational, on the other hand the po liti cal dissolves 
into the everlasting discussion of cultural and philosophical- historical 
commonplaces, which, by aesthetic characterization, identify and 
accept an epoch as classical, romantic, or baroque. The core of the 
po liti cal idea, the exacting moral decision, is evaded in both.20
Sovereignty is tied to the possibility of a po liti cal decision, which is an ex-
acting moral decision. In overthrowing the sovereignty of God,  humans 
are attempting to get rid of sovereignty altogether. But this efort elimi-
nates all politics, which Schmitt wants to hold onto. Politics requires the 
sovereign decision in order to be morally exacting, and  there is always a 
residual structure of the theological in  every moral- political decision.
In a book written  later in the 1920s, The Concept of the Po liti cal, Schmitt 
further clarifies what he means by the po liti cal, which is the famous distinc-
tion between friend and  enemy.21 It is the ability to make such a distinction 
that renders an action po liti cal or morally exacting in its highest sense. 
And this ability to make such a clear and absolute distinction is precisely 
what Derrida contests in The Politics of Friendship. Derrida suggests that an 
opposition between friend and  enemy of the sort that Schmitt sets up neces-
sarily deconstructs.  There is an aporia in the event of a po liti cal decision that 
ruins sovereignty at the same time it upholds it. For Schmitt, politics de-
pends on the decision concerning who is a friend and who is an  enemy, and 
the  enemy is then the object of po liti cal hatred and war. But Derrida notes 
that “the fundamentally Christian politics” of Schmitt, is only pos si ble 
when thought  under a “Christian metaphysics of subjectivity.”22
According to Derrida, the sovereign decision is ruined from within by 
an aporia of responsibility. He argues that “a theory of the subject” such as 
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Schmitt’s “is incapable of accounting for the slightest decision.”23 This is 
 because  every active or autonomous decision is also exposed to a passive 
decision as its necessary condition. “The passive decision,” Derrida writes, as 
the “condition of the event, is always in me, structurally, another event, a 
rending decision as the decision of the other.”24 Schmitt’s po liti cal theology 
cannot account for this other decision that inhabits and wrecks the sover-
eign decision that decides on the exception. Derrida says that “the decision 
is not only always exceptional, it makes an exception of/for me.”25 The sover-
eign decision makes an exception for me, and I have the power to decide, 
but this decision “exonerates from no responsibility.” Responsibility, which 
lies at the heart of Derrida’s faith, as one of the two sources of religion, 
means that I am “responsible from myself before the other, I am first of all 
and also responsible for the other before the other.”26 The temptation is to read 
this responsibility as a moral exhortation, but for Derrida it is a much deeper 
and more structural situation that he develops from the philosophy of 
Levinas, and this responsibility constitutes the self as self. As the Indian phi-
los o pher Saitya Brata Das explains, Derrida “speaks of a messianic exception 
which for him is the true exception, and which is dif er ent from the excep-
tionality of the sovereign in re spect to law.”27 The true, messianic exception 
is the general case of exception that makes us responsible as subjects for an 
other. This exceptionality both constitutes and ruins responsibility  because 
it makes us responsible, but it also makes us irresponsible,  because we can 
never do justice to the other, not even to ourselves as other.
Derrida wants to avoid or overcome the Christian metaphysics and pol-
itics of Schmitt, but he understands that  there is an irreducible religious 
ele ment to all politics and all philosophy, so he adopts the term “messi-
anic,” or a messianicity without messianism as he articulates it in Specters 
of Marx. “The messianic appeal,” he writes, “belongs properly to a univer-
sal structure, to that irreducible movement of the historical opening to the 
 future, therefore to experience itself and to language.”28 This universal 
structure of messianicity is contrasted with any determinate messianism 
as religion. It is a “religion without religion,” as Derrida says in The Gift of 
Death. The  human being is marked by this exceptional messianicity and 
this unavoidable responsibility, divided and shared as she is between a pure 
animal and an absolute sovereign.
In his two- volume lecture course on The Beast and the Sovereign, Der-
rida tracks  these themes of sovereignty and animality through Western lit-
erary and philosophical discourse. In Volume I, he claims that he is 
working against Schmitt’s “cunning intensification of the po liti cal” that 
relies on a conception of evil by which to judge the po liti cal  enemy, but 
he affirms the necessity for “an other politicization” rather than a de- 
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politicization, “and therefore another concept of the po liti cal.”29 This other 
concept of the po liti cal is based on a deconstruction of sovereignty. For 
Derrida, sovereignty is not indivisible; it is divisible and divided. And “a 
divisible sovereignty is no longer a sovereignty, a sovereignty worthy of the 
name, i.e. pure and unconditional.”30 It’s not enough to simply change 
subjects or exchange sovereigns from God to monarch to  people: “the sov-
ereignty of the  people or of the nation merely inaugurates a new form of 
the same fundamental structure.”31 The deconstruction of sovereignty is-
sues not in a liberal democracy, however politicized. Derrida affirms a more 
radical form of democracy, a democracy to come.
Schmitt takes aim, along with many other conservative and radical crit-
ics, at liberal democracy. He ofers a scornful dismissal of liberalism in 
Po liti cal Theology to the efect that “liberalism . . .  existed . . .  only in that 
short period in which it was pos si ble to answer the question ‘Christ or 
Barabbas?’ with a proposal to adjourn or to appoint a commission of in-
vestigation.”32 In a similar vein, Alain Badiou rails against con temporary 
parliamentary democracies and their inability to recognize radical evil.33 
Derrida does not want to defend existing liberal or parliamentary democ-
racy, but he does want to save the name of democracy, and to inflect it in 
more futural terms.
In Rogues, Derrida shows how the question of democracy is still neces-
sarily caught up with the question of God, even if he wants to think both 
democracy and divinity without sovereignty. Most con temporary reflec-
tions on democracy see it as tied to a form of sovereignty. He says that “now, 
democracy would be precisely this, a force (kratos) a force in the form of a 
sovereign authority . . .  , and thus the power and ipseity of the  people 
(dēmos).”34 Is it pos si ble to have democracy without sovereignty, and if so, 
what would that mean?
The prob lem is that any sovereignty necessarily involves the One, the 
authority of the One who acts and decides,  whether the sovereign is God 
or King or  People. Even if demo cratic sovereignty relies on the sovereignty 
of the  people, it retains “the sovereignty of the One . . .  above and beyond 
the dispersion of the plural.”35 A state- form that relies on any form of sov-
ereignty is in some re spects a rogue state,  because the force of sovereign 
authority ultimately comes down to the “reason of the strongest.”36 For 
Derrida, an affirmation of democracy would have to mean a dispersal of 
the One, a sending of and away of sovereignty, which means that democ-
racy is never simply pres ent but always also futural, “to come.” This futu-
rity at the heart of the pres ent is also a kind of messianicity insofar as it is 
never fully pres ent, but also gestured  toward as in to the arrival of an ap-
parition, or a ghost.
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A post- sovereign democracy would have to be plural; it would have to 
pluralize and thus dislocate or deconstruct sovereignty, especially the sov-
ereignty of the One. Schmitt’s po liti cal theology affirms the sovereign act 
as a way to maintain the integrity and seriousness of politics. But Derrida 
attempts to think politics beyond or without sovereignty, without the sov-
ereign one that possesses the authority to make a genuine po liti cal deci-
sion. This attempt destroys realist power politics, but it remains a vital hope 
for any person or  people who strive for justice. A politics based on justice 
in the Derridean sense has to affirm democracy, not as an  actual state of 
afairs, but as Derrida explains, “the democracy to come would be like the 
khôra of the po liti cal.”37 Khôra is the space available for po liti cal negotiation, 
that resists the closing in on itself of a sovereign One.
Derrida won ders  whether his understanding of democracy and his ad-
vocating of a “democracy to- come” “might not lead back to or be reduc-
ible to some unavowed theologism.”38 Politics cannot be completely 
dissociated from religion, and  there is a religious messianicity that haunts 
all our politics, even if we can keep politics from degenerating into this or 
that messianism. He asks, “the democracy to come,  will this be a god to 
come? Or more than one?  Will this be the name to come of a god or of de-
mocracy? Utopia? Prayer? Pious wish? Oath? Or something  else altogether?”39 
Derrida suggests that democracy has some connection to Heidegger’s 
late thinking about God, as expressed in the posthumous interview, “Only 
a God Can Save Us,” even though Heidegger resists such a connection. By 
reflecting carefully about his own complicated relationship to Heidegger, 
Derrida concludes his essay by suggesting that his own (Derrida’s) under-
standing of democracy is tied to the idea “of a god without sovereignty,” 
even though “nothing is less sure than his coming, to be sure.”40 Nothing 
is less sure than a god who could save us, even if that is the only  thing that 
can save us now. And nothing is less sure than a democracy to come, even 
if that is the only hope for a responsible politics.41
Just as Derrida won ders  whether Heidegger can avoid writing a theol-
ogy, we are justified in asking  whether Derrida, in fact, has a po liti cal the-
ology. To be sure, he does not use that name, and I think that it mainly 
due to his desire to distance himself from Schmitt’s po liti cal theology. But 
the question remains: Is  there only one po liti cal theology, that of Schmitt, 
or is  there more than one? This is the question, and the promise, of Jef-
frey W. Robbins’s book Radical Democracy and Po liti cal Theology, which 
seeks to develop a po liti cal theology that would not be Schmittian. Robbins 
relies on the work of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri to articulate a po-
liti cal theology of the multitude that constitutes a radical form of democ-
racy rather than a unitary sovereign power.
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Robbins cites Derrida’s criticism of Schmitt in The Politics of Friendship, 
and claims that this encounter “leaves us with the question of  whether a 
po liti cal theology might provide the necessary supplement to con temporary 
demo cratic theory and practice without falling prey to the same exclusive 
logic as Schmitt.”42 I want to suggest that this is partly what Derrida is 
trying to do, but he avoids the phrase “po liti cal theology” for the same 
reason that so many theorists do,  because of the long shadow cast on 
 Eu ro pean radical thought by Carl Schmitt. According to Antonio Negri, 
whose philosophy Robbins draws upon heavi ly in his book,  there is only 
“just one po liti cal theology, the one at whose opposite ends stand Bodin 
and Stalin, with Carl Schmitt occupying a slot somewhere in between.”43 
If Negri is right, then Robbins is wrong, and  there is no possibility for any 
po liti cal theology without sovereignty  because sovereignty defines po liti-
cal theology.44
Derrida opposes po liti cal theology in name, but he also recognizes how 
religion cannot be exorcised from politics, from “Force of Law” to his last 
writings. Instead of po liti cal theology, he works with the quasi- religious 
category of messianicity, a messianicity without messianism,  because it is 
a “weaker,” or less sovereign, power. In a 1994 essay, “Taking a Stand for 
Algeria,” Derrida takes “a stand for the efective dissociation of the po liti-
cal and the theological.” He states that “our idea of democracy implies a 
separation between the state and the religious powers, that is, a radical re-
ligious neutrality and a faultless tolerance which would not only set the 
sense of belonging to religions, cults, and thus also cultures and languages, 
away from the reach of any terror . . .  but also protects the practices of faith, 
and, in this instance, the freedom of discussion and interpretation within 
each religion.”45 The religious power that the theological represents, when 
aligned with the po liti cal force of the state, produces terror.
Does po liti cal theology necessarily imply this sovereign power and there-
fore a rogue state with its concomitant vio lence and terror? Perhaps. But 
what if the theological itself could be weakened, or viewed as non- sovereign, 
as John D. Caputo has been insisting for years, following Derrida? In The 
Weakness of God, Caputo articulates a thinking of divinity without sov-
ereignty.  Here God names the unconditional solicitation of an event 
rather than
a being who is  there, an entity trapped in being, even a super- being 
up  there, up above the world, who physically powers and  causes it, 
who made it and occasionally intervenes upon its day- to- day activi-
ties to tweak  things for the better in response to a steady stream of 
solicitations from down below.46
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In his  later book The Insistence of God, Caputo argues for a theology of “per-
haps” that is tied to a weak non- sovereign force rather than traditional 
sovereign power. As he explains, “the ‘perhaps’ of which I speak  here does 
not belong to the ‘strong’ or sovereign order of presence, power, princi ple, 
essence, actuality, knowledge, or belief.”47 Perhaps means a way to say yes 
to the  future while affirming the “chance of the event,” the chance that 
the event might not happen as well as the chance that the event might 
not be what we want, or even good; it might be the worst. I  will return to 
Caputo’s interpretation of Derrida and the development of his own form 
of radical theology  later in chapter 6.
According to Derrida, as he argues in Rogues, sovereignty is a circular 
movement; he says that it forms a kind of merry- go- round, a rotary mo-
tion that draws power in  toward itself and then distributes this same power 
that it has appropriated for itself back out to the rest of us who are non- 
sovereign. Now,  today, much of this sovereignty has become invisible; we 
exist in what Deleuze calls a society of control where most of the time we 
consist of relay points for the distribution and re distribution of sovereignty. 
The focal point or center of sovereignty is invisible, it appears not to exist, 
but it functions all- the- more smoothly despite this inexistence. The center 
of sovereignty is everywhere and nowhere, and its operation seems ubiqui-
tous and invisible, like the spirit of God. How do we track down the mach-
inations of sovereignty so that we can understand and perhaps even 
disable it, render it inoperable?
Is what Derrida calls the unconditional or the messianic a new form of 
sovereignty, precisely  because it is undeconstructable? It is a pure force and 
it keeps us awaiting, expecting the unexpected and the unbelievable, like 
the end of the nation- state or the collapse of global capitalism. Is our faith 
in God or in democracy precisely what keeps us from resisting or is it what 
gives us the power to fight back, or is it instead what gives us the strength to 
resist actually the onslaught of actually existing corporate capitalism? 
 These questions are literally undecidable but nevertheless imperative to 
think and to think through.
Po liti cal theology reemerges as a discourse when modern liberalism en-
ters into a state of crisis, as foreshadowed by Schmitt. Con temporary po liti-
cal theology in the philosophy of Derrida and Giorgio Agamben attends to 
the fundamental crisis of sovereignty of the modern nation- state. Nations 
see their sovereignty superceded by flows of money, debt, and energy. In 
postcolonial terms, the challenge has been to track the emergence of “a 
global order of empire without colonies,” as Partha Chatterjee puts it.48 In 
his book The Black Hole of Empire, Chatterjee adopts Schmitt’s basic theory 
of sovereignty and applies it to imperial power. He says that “the imperial 
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prerogative as the power to declare the exception is useful” for making sense 
of the con temporary world order, not only in economic terms but also as a 
pedagogical proj ect.49 In a similar vein, Achille Mbembe recounts the poli-
cies during the 1980s and 1990s that have alienated the po liti cal sovereignty 
of African states and “created the conditions for a privatization of this sover-
eignty.”50 The deregulation and primacy of the market in neoliberal capital-
ism coincides with the proliferation and intensification of “private military, 
paramilitary, or jurisdictional organ izations.”51
As the economies of the United States and Eu rope have weakened over 
the past few years, Chatterjee now worries that “the asymmetry between 
the economic trou bles of the Western powers and their overwhelming mil-
itary superiority could well open the field for a populist resurgence of im-
perialism, not unlike what was seen in the late nineteenth  century.”52 
Furthermore, Thomas Picketty’s economic analy sis in Capital in the Twenty- 
First  Century has shown that the concentration of capital in Eu rope in the 
early twenty- first  century is very similar to that of the late nineteenth 
 century.53 We could call this situation a neo- liberalism that devolves into 
neo- imperialism, a drastic last resort to shore up the power of Western- style 
capitalism.
We do not need to endorse Schmitt’s conclusions to make use of his con-
cepts, as Derrida has shown. Po liti cal theology is not solely about religion, 
but it uses the situation of religion in the con temporary world as a way to 
think about sovereignty. Sovereignty for Schmitt and for Chatterjee means 
the ability to decide on the exception, but for Derrida, sovereignty decon-
structs. For Schmitt, sovereignty is based on a unity, a unified decision- 
making power.  Today, sovereignty is divided such that  there is no absolute 
sovereign, even if  there exist what appear to be sovereign decisions. 
 Monarchical sovereignty is essentially related to mono the ism, where the 
one king represents and decides in the place of the One God. For Derrida 
and other theorists, however, sovereignty is dispersed, divided, or shared 
such that  there is no One Decider. The question is then  whether  there re-
mains sovereignty. Who decides what  matters  today— the nation, the 
bank, the market, the army, the  people, the consumer? What about the 
sovereignty of the planet?
The terminal crisis of capitalism is the ecological limit to growth. Tech-
nological developments have allowed us to evade the consequences of 
over- population and over- exploitation of natu ral resources, but  these de-
velopments have taken place with and within the context of transforma-
tions of energy use. The extraordinary material achievements of  human 
civilization over the last  couple of centuries, however unevenly distributed, 
are based on cheap energy, primarily fossil fuels. Alternative energy sources 
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cannot provide the storage, scale, or EROEI that oil and gas, and to a cer-
tain extent coal, provide. In addition, we are reaching real limits to growth 
in terms of atmospheric absorption capacity, rare earth metals, arable farm 
land, and fresh  water. As Michael T. Klare explains in The Race for What’s 
Left, we face an extraordinary combination of  factors:
A lack of any unexplored resource reserves beyond  those now being 
eyed for development; the sudden emergence of rapacious new con-
sumers; technical and environmental limitations on the exploitation 
of new deposits; and the devastating efects of climate change. In 
many cases, the commodities procured during this new round of ex-
traction  will represent the final supplies of their type.54 (Klare, 18)
Capitalism requires growth, and since the 1970s, growth has slowed and 
resources have become more expensive. The transition to neo- liberalism and 
the increasing concentration of wealth is what happens when you cannot 
grow in absolute terms, but only in relative terms.
We need to think about capitalism and neoliberalism, religion and pol-
itics in an ecological context. We need to attend to the complex material 
flows of energy, power, food, climate, money, and blood, as seen in Gil Ani-
djar’s book Blood, considered in the previous chapter. Derrida’s philoso-
phy  matters in  these contexts, even if his work has been canalized into more 
textual discourses. In The Beast and the Sovereign, Derrida reflects on the 
location of the  human between the animal and the divine, and he attends 
to the limits of humanity insofar as humanity is implicated in animality 
and divinity. In modern liberalism, the normal  human being exists  under 
the sway of the law, but “sovereign and beast seem to have in common their 
being- outside- the- law.”55
Who makes an au then tic decision  today? God, the autonomous self, the 
anonymous media, the nation, the market, the brain, or the earth? And 
what criteria can be applied to determine  whether this decision is for the 
best, or at least for the better? Derrida’s faith is that  there are not only mul-
tiple decisions but always more than just one decider, and that this irre-
ducible plurality at the heart of decision prevents the worst concentration 
of power in the hands of the One. It’s the only hope for democracy, if  there 
is such a  thing.
What about the sovereignty of death? At the end of Volume II of The 
Beast and the Sovereign, Derrida returns to his decisive confrontation with 
Heidegger, armed with a phrase from a poem by Paul Celan and a sustained 
engagement with the novel Robinson Crusoe. The last line of Celan’s poem 
“Vast, Glowing Vault” is: “the world is gone, I must carry you.” Derrida reads 
this line and this poem carefully in his essay “Rams,” and I  will discuss 
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this in the following chapter.  Here I want to note how Derrida relates the 
carry ing or the bearing— the German word is tragen—to a kind of sover-
eignty in Heidegger.
Derrida says that it is not clear  whether the word tragen refers more to 
an experience of mourning the dead person, “or  toward the child to be born 
and still carried by its  mother or even  toward the poem and the poet him-
self.”56 Derrida tends to associate the notion of the world as gone ( fort in 
German) with death. Death is the end of the world, and  here the world 
itself is gone, but even in the fort of the world, ich muss dich tragen, I must 
bear or carry you. This thinking of tragen is related to a thinking of sov-
ereignty in Heidegger’s philosophy. Sovereignty in German is Souverän-
ität, but Derrida focuses on Heidegger’s word Walten, a word that means 
rule, reign, or governing. Derrida follows Heidegger in bringing together 
tragen and Walten around the experience of death.
Sovereignty has to do with the ontological diference, the diference be-
tween Being and beings. Being and beings are related in an Austrag, or 
conciliation, that attests to the sovereign force of diference.57 At the end 
of the seminar, Derrida asserts that Walten as ruling power refers to “the 
event, the origin, the power, the force, the source, the movement, the pro-
cess, the meaning, etc.— whatever you like—of the ontological diference.”58 
The relationship between Being and beings constitutes a world, but this 
world is decomposed in death. Heidegger says that animals cannot die in 
an au then tic manner; only Dasein can do so. Derrida questions this as-
sumption, as he deconstructs the opposition between beast and sovereign 
in his seminar. Derrida claims that “no one in the world  will deny, not 
even Heidegger, then, that both types of living being [beast and sover-
eign] cease living, find death.”59 One can always find death as a living 
being, and all living beings exist as cohabitants of a “common habitat, 
 whether one calls it the earth (including sky and sea) or  else the world as 
world of life- death.”60
We presuppose a common world as the envelope of this life- death that 
we cohabit, but this common world is also in a state of radical dissemina-
tion: “perhaps  there is no world.”61 Perhaps instead we share an archipel-
ago of islands that are radically un- shareable. “ There is no world,  there are 
only islands.”62 The radical un- shareability of worlds means that  there is 
no tenable diference between the beast and the sovereign, even if one makes 
himself like Robinson Crusoe the master of an island and subdues all the 
beasts.
In this final seminar, delivered shortly before his death, Derrida argues 
that despite a certain superficial similarity with Schmitt, Heidegger’s un-
derstanding of sovereignty is in fact radically dif er ent. Heidegger uses the 
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word Walten as a kind of sovereign force, but his usage indicates an “excess 
of sovereignty” that undoes “the limits of the theological- political. And the 
excess of sovereignty would nullify the meaning of sovereignty.”63 Derrida 
says that for Heidegger Dasein is gripped by, exposed to an originary 
vio lence. This vio lence is a kind of “efractive departure from self in order 
violently to break open, to capture, to tame” beings and to treat them as 
beings, “as sea, as earth, as animal.”64 This vio lence that is proper to the 
 human allows us to discover and make use of beings as such.
The vio lence of Dasein as it is constituted in and by the rift/accord/dif-
ference or Austrag between Being and beings gives humanity its sover-
eignty over the rest of the world. Derrida presses against the limits of this 
vio lence and the possibility of thinking about the world as a world, and I 
 will come back to this in the next  couple chapters.  Here, in a striking 
conclusion Derrida cites Heidegger’s argument that “ there is only one  thing 
against which all violence- doing, violent action, violent activity, immedi-
ately shatters,” and “it is death.”65 Death is an absolute limit that shatters 
the vio lence of  human sovereignty, even as it reigns in a hyper- sovereign way.
The question Derrida asks is, how do we know who can die? And this 
decision on death is a form of sovereignty, even though at the same time it 
exceeds any form of sovereignty that we know.  Here the sovereignty of 
death exceeds the sovereignty of any sovereign and deconstructs the link 
between the po liti cal and the theological. This is a genuine “gift of death.” 
Death is the limit of sovereign vio lence, even as it wields its own “sover-
eign” vio lence over life. Death removes the traditional sovereignty from 
po liti cal theology, the conjunction of the beast, and the sovereign that 
animates Western politics and metaphysics. This non- sovereign sovereignty 
of death delivers us to another scene of po liti cal theology. Our shared death 
is precisely un- shareable, but it is quintessentially demo cratic.
In the following chapter, I return to Derrida’s reading of Celan’s poem 
in connection to Heidegger as he discusses it in “Rams.” In “Rams,” Der-
rida reflects on Gadamer’s death and Gadamer’s hermeneutics, but he ends 
up as always with a consideration of and confrontation with Heidegger. 
The ram in the poem and in the biblical tradition, particularly the Aqe-
dah, becomes a figure of death as well as a figure of divinity.
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This chapter is a kind of interruption as well as a continuation of my read-
ings of Derrida and religion. We saw in the previous chapter how Derrida 
considers Celan’s phrase “The world is gone, I must carry you” along with 
his reflections on Robinson Crusoe and Heidegger in The Beast and the Sov-
ereign, Volume II. My understanding of Derrida’s reading of Celan  here 
is not a mere focus on poetics in the form of writing, but a much broader 
perspective on Derrida’s thought. Of course, this was always the concep-
tion of writing for Derrida, but it becomes more and more evident in his 
 later work. My argument is that Celan’s poetry gives Jacques Derrida some-
thing incredibly impor tant, which is a kind of writing and a kind of 
thinking that allows him to interrupt Martin Heidegger, who is the pre-
dominant philosophical voice in Derrida’s work.
The primal scene for this interruption at the source concerns the famous 
encounter between Celan and Heidegger at Heidegger’s home in Todtnau-
berg in 1967, which Celan memorialized in a poem with the same name. 
Heidegger attended a reading by Celan in Freiburg and invited him to his 
home in the Black Mountains of southern Germany where Celan signed his 
guestbook and they took a short walk,  after which Celan was driven back 
to Freiburg. Celan published his poem “Todtnauberg” in 1968, and it is 
an incredibly ambivalent testimony of this fraught encounter.1
The longest stanza of “Todtnauberg” references Heidegger’s guest book, 
which Celan signed, and he asks who signed the book before he did, be-
fore mentioning
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the line inscribed
in that book about
a hope,  today,




This “hope of a thinking man’s coming word in the heart” indicates 
Celan’s desire for Heidegger to acknowledge his Nazi activities in the 
1930s and take responsibility for his refusal to apologize for them  after 
the war. The poem indicates Celan’s disappointment, since on the drive 
back  there was
coarse stuf,  later, clear
in passing,3
on which the driver listened in. The end of the poem ofers an image of 
the walk Celan took with Heidegger, which ended up being a damp slog over 
half- trodden logs rather than a fresh stroll along a path into a clearing: “the 
half- / trodden fascine / walks over the high moors, / dampness, / much.”4 
The En glish translator Michael Hamburger translates Knüppel, which 
generally means sticks, as fascine, to indicate the connection with fascism 
as a bundle of sticks, although this might be a  little overdetermined. At the 
same time, the last line of the poem, “dampness, / much” (Feuchtes, / viel) 
does not suggest any sort of resolution or exhilaration, but rather a desul-
tory culmination of their encounter.
For Celan, this encounter was an unsatisfying one as expressed in the 
poem, although the German phi los o pher and student of Heidegger Hans- 
Georg Gadamer puts a much more positive spin on it, celebrating the fact 
that Celan and Heidegger could have this encounter despite their pasts, 
and revealing that Heidegger greatly enjoyed the poem “Todtnauberg” and 
had it framed. According to Gadamer, Celan was “among the pilgrims who 
made their way to Todtnauberg, and from his meeting with the thinker a 
poem came to be.”5 Gadamer reproduces the poem at the end of his re-
flections on Heidegger in his book Philosophical Apprenticeships. He men-
tions the line of hope, but ascribes it to Celan’s desire to have a meaningful 
encounter rather than an expectation of Heidegger to take responsibility, 
and Gadamer then says that they walked “across soft meadows, both alone, 
like the individually standing flowers— the orchis and the orchid.”6 It is 
then only on the way home that Celan realized that what Heidegger said 
still seemed crude, but the walk itself was an act of breathless daring. This 
interpretation follows the chronology of the meeting, but not the poem, 
Derrida Reads Celan ■ 61
which ends with the walk. And the walk was not a daring engagement be-
tween two solitary  people, a thinker and a poet, but rather a damp trudge 
that went nowhere. In the poem, the crudeness precedes the walk and leads 
up to it. In his text, Gadamer idealizes Celan’s poem as well as Celan’s 
encounter with Heidegger.7
Derrida clearly remembers Gadamer’s misunderstanding of Celan’s 
encounter with Heidegger when he is invited to say something about Ga-
damer  after Gadamer’s death in 2002. Derrida’s essay, published in French 
in 2003, is entitled “Rams: Uninterrupted Dialogue— Between Two In-
finities, the Poem.”8 In this power ful essay, one of Derrida’s last works be-
fore his own death in 2004, Derrida reflects on Gadamer’s life and thought, 
as well as Gadamer’s understanding of Celan. Derrida does not directly 
discuss “Todtnauberg,” although he does barely mention it at the end of 
the essay. Instead, he analyzes a poem by Celan called “Vast, Glowing 
Vault.” At the end of his essay, Derrida concludes with some reflections 
about Heidegger, as he so often does.
This is a complex encounter among four extraordinary thinkers: Der-
rida, Celan, Gadamer and Heidegger. In the background of Derrida’s 
essay lies another encounter, a broken- of or interrupted encounter be-
tween Derrida and Gadamer in Paris in 1981, where Derrida seemed to 
rudely refuse to engage Gadamer in dialogue.9 So Derrida is reflecting in 
“Rams” on his own previous non- encounter with Gadamer, Gadamer’s 
misunderstanding of Celan, and Celan’s ambivalent encounter with Hei-
degger. Furthermore,  there is Derrida’s own appreciative but complicated 
relationship with Celan, who taught German at the École Normal Supéri-
eure in the 1960s, and was introduced to Derrida by Peter Szondi in 1968. 
Derrida explains in an interview that “Celan’s presence was, like his  whole 
being and all his gestures, extremely discreet, elliptical, and self- efacing. 
This explains, at least in part, why  there was no exchange between us, al-
though for some years I was his colleague.”10 Even  after they met, Derrida 
says, “a series of meetings can be dated, always brief,  silent, on his part as 
on mine. The silence was his as much as mine.”11 This silence prevailed over 
any kind of dialogue, conversation, or interaction, and it was cut of in a 
way by Celan’s suicide in 1970, which prompted Derrida to work to re-
cover the significance of  these brief but power ful memories. He says that 
“with regard to Celan, the image that comes to mind is a meteor, an inter-
rupted blaze of light, a sort of caesura, a very brief moment leaving  behind 
a trail of sparks that I try to recover through his texts.”12
One of Derrida’s earlier essays also focuses on Celan, although I am not 
 going to analyze it  here except to acknowledge it in very general terms and 
to indicate one specific reference. In “Shibboleth: For Paul Celan,” Derrida 
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reads Celan’s poem by the same name and reflects on the concepts of cir-
cumcision, date, and language that “Shibboleth” raises in its reference to 
the month of February.  Here is the stanza Derrida focuses on:
Heart:
 here too reveal what you are,
 here, in the midst of the market.
Call the shibboleth, call it out
into your alien homeland:
February. No pasarán.
Derrida claims that the last line of this stanza refers to February 1936, when 
the Spanish Republicans won an electoral victory against fascism, a “no” 
to Franco, Mussolini, and Hitler. And three years  later, during the siege of 
Madrid, “no pasarán was a shibboleth for the Republican  people, for their 
allies, for the International Brigades.”13 In another poem, “As One,” Celan 
specifically mentions February 13, and Derrida suggests that one of the 
references  here is to February 13, 1962, and a massive march in Paris for 
the victims of a massacre near the end of the Algerian war.14 Derrida cites 
this second poem  because Celan repeats the same phrase from “Shibbo-
leth,” no pasarán, right  after he refers to the “Peuple de Paris.”  Here Der-
rida reads “Shibboleth” along with the poem “As One” in a meditation on 
the nature of language and the circumcision of language  because it is the 
mispronunciation of the word shibboleth as sibboleth that gives away the 
 enemy, and defines the border between nations and  peoples, originally in 
the encounter between the Ephraimites and the Gileadites as related in the 
Book of Judges.
As Derrida claims in his reading of Celan, “shibboleth is a circumcised 
word” that is an “unpronounceable name for some.”15  There is a sense in 
which all of Celan’s poetry functions as a kind of shibboleth  because it is 
so difficult to read and understand, despite Celan’s insistence that his work 
is “ganz und gar nicht hermetisch”— absolutely not hermetic.16 Another 
reason Derrida turns from the poem “Shibboleth” to the poem “As One” 
lies in the final line of the latter poem: “Freide den Hütten!” Peace to the cot-
tages or huts, a line “whose terrible irony must surely aim at someone.”17 So 
Heidegger, who ends up isolated in his hut in the Black Forest, appears, how-
ever indirectly, in Derrida’s substantial essay on Celan, “Shibboleth.” And 
he reappears, more explic itly, at the end of Derrida’s  later essay “Rams.”
At the center of “Rams” lies a poem by Celan, and Derrida’s subtitle 
suggests that the poem lies between two infinities. I  will come to the poem 
in a  little bit, but let me suggest that  these two infinities pro gress in a kind 
of parallel line, without meeting or touching along their trajectories. I  will 
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not hesitate to name  these two infinities for Derrida: One name is the in-
finite philosophical thought of being of Heidegger, and the other is the 
infinite ethical thought of Emmanuel Levinas, which takes place in some 
re spects “other wise than being.” Derrida has written and thought about 
Levinas and Heidegger more than all the  others, and much secondary work 
has been done on  these two power ful influences on his work. In fact, it 
could be argued that the most crucial essay of all of Derrida’s corpus is his 
incredible essay on “Vio lence and Metaphysics,” which appears in Writing 
and Difference and has the subtitle, “An Essay on the Thought of Emman-
uel Levinas.”18 Although Levinas does not appear directly in “Rams,” I 
think that Derrida’s theoretical reflection on Celan’s poetry essentially sub-
stitutes for Levinas’s philosophy, whereas Gadamer serves as a substitute 
for Heidegger early in the essay, only to give way to Heidegger himself at 
the end.
So the death of Gadamer is an interruption of an ongoing (or “uninter-
rupted”) dialogue between Gadamer and Derrida, and it substitutes for a 
number of other interrupted encounters, including Derrida’s and Celan’s, 
and Celan’s and Heidegger’s, as well as foreshadows Derrida’s own death. 
Derrida uses Celan’s poetry to think through  these fundamental issues of 
encounter, dialogue, hermeneutics, interruption, ethics, ontology, aesthet-
ics, and poetics.
Derrida views death, which we have seen as the ultimate sovereign in 
the previous chapter, as not simply the interruption of an uninterrupted 
dialogue, but as catastrophic: “death is nothing less than the end of the 
world.”19 The survivor, in this case Derrida in the wake of Gadamer’s death, 
remains alone “in the world outside the world and deprived of the world.”20 
Derrida says that  every friendship or dialogue is haunted by the anticipa-
tion of the certainty that one friend  will die before the other, bringing the 
dialogue to an end. At the same time, even though it comes to an end, 
the dialogue in some way continues, in the one who is still alive, beyond the 
death of the other. Death haunts  every friendship and interrupts  every dia-
logue, and yet this very mortality makes dialogue and friendship pos si ble.
 After a few pages reflecting on the death of Gadamer, as well as death 
and dialogue in more general terms, Derrida interrupts his discussion to 
introduce Celan’s poem “Vast, Glowing Vault.” He says that like Gadamer, 
he shares an appreciation and a friendship with Celan, even though Celan 
is (also) dead. First Derrida quotes the final line, and then he reproduces 
the entire poem. The last line reads: “The World is gone, I must carry you.”21
One of the reasons that Derrida wants to read this poem is to repeat 
Gadamer’s hermeneutical eforts to read Celan’s poetry, and  here Derrida 
explains how Gadamer understands another poem by Celan, “Paths in the 
64 ■ Derrida Reads Celan
Shadow Rock.” In Gadamer’s reading of Celan’s poetry, which takes place 
primarily in the short book Who Am I and Who are You?, Gadamer declares 
that the final line seems to encapsulate the meaning of many of Celan’s 
enigmatic poems. Gadamer does not analyze the poem “Vast, Glowing 
Vault,” but he does affirm that Celan’s poetry sets up a dialogical relation-
ship between an I and a You, a speaker and a recipient, that occurs in the 
poem and does not require any external knowledge on the part of the 
reader to participate in this encounter. Gadamer states that “I fully 
agree with the poet that every thing is found in the text, and that all 
biographical- occasional moments belong to the private sphere.”22 Gadamer 
resists the idea that Celan’s poetry requires an esoteric or inside knowledge 
in order to be read and understood, and primarily contests the interpreta-
tions of Otto Pöggeler to the contrary.
One of the poems that Gadamer analyzes in Who Am I and Who Are 
You? is “Paths in the Shadow Rock,” and Derrida follows this interpreta-
tion, opening it up and attending to the interruptions that Gadamer sees 
in the poem. The key phase is “Out of the four- finger- furrow / I grub for 
myself the / petrified blessing.” Derrida shows how Gadamer appreciates the 
fact that the blessing is withheld, it is petrified, and the speaker, the I, grubs 
for it out of the closed hand, which is the hand of God. Gadamer responds 
to the withdrawal or petrification of the blessing, but he also subverts and 
reverses this reading. According to Gadamer, “the beneficial hand is in-
verted boldly into the hand where palm- reading can reveal a message of 
beneficent hope.”23
Despite Gadamer’s attempt to read Celan’s poem as a message of be-
neficent hope, he concludes his interpretation with questions about this 
blessing, including  whether it is in fact a blessing. Derrida, who is suspi-
cious of the reversal, says that he admires the re spect Gadamer shows for 
the “indecision” of  these final questions.24 Derrida affirms, both with and 
against Gadamer’s reading, the unreadability and untranslatability of the 
poem, which also refers to an unreadability of the world: “Even where the 
poem names unreadability, its own unreadability, it also declares the un-
readability of the world.”25 The poem constitutes an abandoned trace of 
the unreadability of the world to which it attests. Gadamer makes the poem 
more readable  because he has faith that the world is readable in light of an 
ongoing, potentially infinite hermeneutical pro cess.
Derrida affirms his appreciation of Gadamer, but his affirmation of 
Gadamer’s philosophy is also ambivalent  because, for Derrida,  every poem 
harbors “an irreducible remainder or excess” that “escapes any gathering 
in a hermeneutic.” Rather, “the hermeneutic is made necessary, and also 
pos si ble, by the excess.”26 Over the next few pages of “Rams,” Derrida ofers 
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his own interpretation of Celan’s poetry by reading “Vast, Glowing Vault.” 
He subjects the poem first to a kind of formal analy sis and then opens up 
onto a broader perspective on the issues raised by the poem.
“Vast, Glowing Vault” is an incredibly rich poem, as all of Celan’s 
poems are, and Derrida helps us read this poem in “Rams.” The first 
stanza gives us a cosmological and celestial backdrop, which Derrida calls 
a tableau. Derrida says that “the black, star- spangled swarm carries the 
poem away in a hurried, hurrying, headlong movement of properly plane-
tary errancy.”27 The stars themselves are black and they swarm away; they 
scatter apart. Although Derrida does not mention this, we could also think 
of the scientific discovery in 1998 of dark energy, an unknown force that 
is accelerating the expansion of the universe and  may eventually pull all 
 matter apart.
The stars have an astrological reference in the poem and invoke the zo-
diac, especially once the ram is introduced in the second stanza. Derrida 
claims that the planetary movement is also an animal movement precisely 
 because a ram “ will soon bound into the poem: sacrificial animal, batter-
ing ram, the bellicose ram whose rush breaks down the doors or breaks 
through the high walls of fortified  castles.”28 The second stanza is the lon-
gest and most complex of the poem. “Onto a ram’s silicified forehead / I 
brand this image, between / the horns,” an image sealed between the coiled 
horns of the ram. Derrida suggests that this image branded onto the ram’s 
silicified (or petrified) forehead could be the poem itself. And its reso-
nances are multiple. For one  thing, the ram’s horn in the Jewish tradition 
becomes the shofar, “the instrument with which  music prolongs breath 
and carries voice.”29 Furthermore, the ram recalls the scene in the Bible 
where Abraham goes to sacrifice Isaac and his hand is stayed at the last 
moment. Isaac survives, and a ram is substituted and sacrificed in his place.
This scene is impor tant to Derrida, and he published a book called The 
Gift of Death that was in part a reading and commentary on Kierkegaard’s 
Fear and Trembling, which considers this enormous sacrificial event.  Here 
is a longer passage by Derrida from “Rams” that evokes this famous scene:
Between the most animalistic life, which is named more than once, 
and the death or mourning that haunts the last line . . .  , the ram, its 
horns and the burning, recall and revive, no doubt, the moment of a 
sacrificial scene in the landscape of the Old Testament. More than 
one holocaust. Substitution of the ram. Burning. The binding of Isaac 
(Genesis 22).  After having said a second time, “ Here I am,” when the 
angel sent by God suspends the knife Abraham had raised to slit 
Isaac’s throat, Abraham turns around and sees a ram caught by its 
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horns in a bush. He ofers it as a holocaust in the place of his son. 
God then promises to bless him and multiply his seed like the stars 
of heaven, perhaps also like the stars of the first stanza. They can also 
become, in the poem, terrible yellow stars. And it is again a ram, in 
addition to a young bull, that God, speaking to Moses  after the death 
of Aaron’s two sons, commands Aaron to ofer as a holocaust in the 
course of a  grand scene of atonement for the impurities, infamies, 
and sins of Israel (Leviticus 16).30
Derrida draws out and makes explicit some of the resonances of Celan’s 
stanza, dealing with sacrifice, substitution, atonement, and holocaust, above 
all that of the Jewish  people as a  whole.
The third stanza of the poem asks a question: “In- / to what / does he not 
charge?” The charge refers to the charge of the ram, that hurls itself about, 
charging into anything and every thing, “in all directions, as if blinded by 
pain.”31 The sacrificial ram resists the very logic of sacrifice, or sacrificial 
atonement, just as Celan resists the sacrificial interpretation implicit in the 
name Shoah. The charge is both a charging and a ramming, but it is also 
an accusation, as in the charging of someone with a crime. According to 
Derrida, the charge of the ram suggests “the violent rebellion of all scape-
goats, all substitutes.”32 The lamb is the meek animal who goes willingly 
to meet its sacrificial death, whereas the ram thrashes about, at least in 
the poem. Derrida imagines that Celan’s ram indicts the entire world, 
 because  there is nowhere or nothing that he does not charge into: “no one 
in the world is innocent, not even the world itself.”33 The ethical force of 
Celan’s poetry calls into question the entire world.
 Here at this moment in Derrida’s reading of Celan’s poem I want to 
pause, to interrupt and to insert another ram from another context and 
another language. In Chinese, the word for beauty or beautiful is translit-
erated as měi, and the word měi (美) is composed of two images, one for 
large (大) and one for ram (羊). According to most scholars, beginning with 
the late Han lexicographer Xu Shen (ca.55– ca.149), the etymology is culi-
nary  because a large ram is not only beautiful but delicious. Xu writes in 
his dictionary: “when a ram is large, it is beautiful.”34 And so the aesthetic 
as well as gustatory feeling of the feast provides the origin of the word 
beauty in Chinese.
Of course, we should have learned from reading Heidegger not to fully 
trust etymologies, and from Derrida to be suspicious of any claims to origins. 
In this context, it is in ter est ing that a con temporary Chinese phi los o pher, Li 
Zehou, suggests an alternative meaning for the term. In his book on The 
Chinese Aesthetic Tradition, Li argues instead for a ritual meaning of měi, 
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where a large ram headdress sits on top of a person, and the ram is a kind of 
totem.  Here beauty coincides with what is good in a ritualistic context. “The 
character for ‘beauty,’ then, with the man on the bottom and the ram on the 
top, is the manifestation in the written language of this type of animal role 
or shamanistic totem,” according to Li.35 The point is not to choose between 
 these two proposed origins or etymologies, but to think about their shared 
resonance with each other, and with Celan’s ram. In ancient China, as in 
ancient Israel, the ram has both a ritual and a culinary function that is con-
nected to sacrifice. Into what culture does he not charge?36
 There is then an interruption of the ram, but also in the poem an inter-
ruption that takes place  after the charge of the ram, the ram that charges 
into and charges against the world. This interruption is a pause, an Atem-
wende, where we catch our breath before the sentence of the last line. The 
last line stands alone. “It stands,” Derrida states, “it supports itself, it car-
ries itself all alone, on a line between two abysses.”37 Now the world is no 
longer  here, it is gone: “Die Welt ist fort.” Derrida explains that the world 
recedes and, in efect, goes away precisely  because  there is an ethical obli-
gation. He says that “as soon as I am obliged, from the instant when I am 
obliged to you, when I owe, when I owe it to you, owe it to myself to carry 
you, as soon as I speak to you and am responsible to you, or before you,  there 
can no longer, essentially, be any world.”38 The world is the mediating 
ground of the ethical encounter between you and I, but in the singularity 
of the encounter the world is gone. We are alone in our encounter, you 
and I, absolutely alone without world. And yet,  there is an obligation. I 
must carry you, which is an unbearable obligation.
Derrida breaks of his discussion and summarizes five concluding points, 
dealing with the some of the resonances of the German words tragen, which 
“also refers to the experience of carry ing a child prior to its birth,” and Welt, 
or world.39 I only want to focus on the last few paragraphs, where Derrida 
invokes Heidegger’s three  theses from his 1929–1930 lecture course, which 
was published as The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. According to 
Heidegger, the fundamental concepts are: world, finitude, and solitude. In 
order to elucidate the first question, the question of world, Heidegger in-
troduces three guiding  theses: “the stone is worldless, the animal is poor 
in world, man is world- forming.”40 Understanding the sense in which a 
non- living rock is without world and an animal has a world but only in an 
impoverished and tightly limited sense whereas  humans are capable of con-
structing worlds, sheds light on the fundamental question “What is a 
world?” for Heidegger.
According to Derrida, Heidegger is above all a thinker of the concept 
of world, and Derrida strug gles powerfully in his  later years with and 
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against Heidegger’s three  theses, in works such as Of Spirit and The Ani-
mal That I Therefore Am. For Derrida,  there is problematic invidious dif-
ference to this unfolding, this dispersal of being as weltlos to nonliving 
stone, weltarm to living animal, and weltbildend to  human being. Each of 
 these beings has its ownmost possibility of being. However, the worlding 
of the world takes place providentially in and for Dasein, the being who 
has language and can ask the question of being.
One of major themes of Derrida’s  later work, most explic itly in The Ani-
mal That I Therefore Am, is the exploration and contestation of this pov-
erty that is attributed to the non- human animal, which is something not 
only Heidegger but the entire Western philosophical tradition presupposes, 
including Levinas and in some re spects even Celan.41 Drawing on Jacob 
von Uexküll’s influential studies of animal be hav ior, Heidegger claims that 
the animal is poor in world  because it is captivated by its instinctual drives 
in “an intrinsic self- encirclement.”42 This encirclement is tightly drawn 
around the animal like a bee or a tick such that it opens up a very limited 
sphere of be hav ior beyond with the animal cannot experience. According 
to Heidegger, “the life of the animal is precisely the strug gle to maintain 
this encircling ring or sphere within which a quite specifically articulated 
manifold of dispositions can arise.”43 The animal has no awareness of a 
world beyond this encircling ring.
On the one hand, Derrida points out that Heidegger claims that the 
animal does not die  because it does not have a relation to being that takes 
the form of an “as such.”44 It cannot die  because it cannot be related to 
death as such as its ownmost possibility of being. But on the other hand, 
as Derrida explains, Heidegger admits that what distinguishes the animal 
from the stone is the fact that it can die  because it is a living being. It pos-
sesses “the living character of a living being,” which is fundamentally re-
lated to the possibility of  dying.45 So the animal sort of lives and sort of 
does not fully live. According to Derrida, Heidegger fails to confront or 
fully engage with the animality of Dasein as a living being  because “Da-
sein is explic itly described by Heidegger as a being that is not, essentially, 
a ‘living’ being.”46
Derrida wants to undermine the identification of the essence of Dasein 
as a world- builder, one who creates worlds with language and participates 
in the worlding of the world that being (Sein or Seyn) accomplishes. Ac-
cording to Heidegger, the “poverty in world” that characterizes the ani-
mal “implies a deprivation of world.”47 But in Celan’s poetry, Derrida finds 
a provocative deprivation of world for  human being.  Here Celan’s poetry, 
and in par tic u lar this poem with its power ful final line, interrupts and 
breaks this secure pro cess of world formation at work in the implicit pro-
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gression from stone to animal to  human. Derrida claims at the end of 
“Rams” that “for reasons I cannot develop  here, nothing appears to me 
more problematic than  these three  theses.”48 For reasons he elaborates on 
more explic itly in The Animal That I Therefore Am, therefore, nothing ap-
pears more problematic than Heidegger’s  theses about stone, animal, and 
world.
Derrida asks about the being- gone (Fort- sein) of the world in Celan’s 
poem, and suggests that it proceeds according to a completely dif er ent 
logic than Heidegger’s. If the world is gone  here, for  human beings, at the 
heart of the asymmetrical ethical relationship with the other, then “ isn’t it 
the very thought of the world that we would have to rethink, from this 
fort, and this fort itself from the ‘ich muß dich tragen’ ”?49 This, Derrida 
says, is one of the questions that he would like to pose to Gadamer, “appeal-
ing to him for help,” “in the course of an interminable conversation.” This 
conversation, of course, has been interrupted by death, but it is always al-
ready interrupted by death, and this death and this interruption are what 
make conversation and dialogue pos si ble in the first place. Gadamer’s 
death is the end of the world, and so is Derrida’s, and so is Celan’s. We 
who live bear witness to the end of the world.
This is Derrida’s faith, although it is not a conventional faith. As I have 
already considered in vari ous ways, in “Faith and Knowledge,” Derrida 
claims that what we call religion always has two sources, one of which is 
the sacred or holy, and the other is faith or the experience of belief.  These 
two sources conflict and contaminate each other, preventing any certain 
assurance or indemnification. As Michael Naas explains in Miracle and Ma-
chine, which I have also discussed, Derrida prefers the second source of reli-
gion, faith, as an experience of social trust or belief, over the source of the 
sacred as the unscathed. At the same time, Naas points out that “Derrida 
is quite clear about the disruptive nature of this faith.”50 Derrida’s faith, like 
that of Celan, is disruptive rather than constructive; belief undermines the 
machinic nature of religion even as it functions as an expression of it. 
 These two sources can be distinguished but not fully separated, and they 
work in nature and in natures in the world, not simply in language.
Being and world, like the poem, exist only insofar as they are in a state 
of being gone, a gone- ness that as interruption gives the possibility for ethi-
cal relation. A poem is also a kind of machine, infected and inflected with 
an originary technicity. This technicity exceeds any  simple mechanical 
understanding of a machine  because it incorporates both the machinic 
repetition and the exceptional miracle that exceeds it.
Worldlessness is a kind of original possibility for a world to be, to exist. 
The world is not absolutely dis appeared for Derrida, but it withdraws in 
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order to foreground the ethical relation, ungrounded from any literal writ-
ing. In a disruptive way that attests to the worldlessness of world, Celan’s 
silence, cryptic poetry, and even suicide ofer interruptive breaks that are 
the basis for ethical relations  today. Derrida profoundly appreciates the eth-
ical force of Levinas’s Other wise than Being, and this is the same Levinas 
who asks of Celan: “does not he suggest a modality other wise than being?”51 
According to Levinas, Celan’s poetry represents an “insomnia in the bed 
of being, the impossibility of curling up and forgetting oneself. Expulsion 
out of the worldliness of the world . . .”52
Despite his affinity for Levinas, however, Derrida wants to hold on to 
just a thread of being, a threading of worlds, like the thread- suns or Faden-
sonnen of Celan: “ there are / still songs to be sung on the other side / of 
mankind.”53 But  there are no more songs for us when the world is gone. 
 Every death is the end of the world, which is dif er ent and unique  every 
time. And in the absence or withdrawal of world, which hangs only by 
a thread, I must carry, I must bear (tragen) you, even if I cannot bear you. 
 There is no other way.  Every world is an island separated by an unshare-
able abyss that constitutes an almost unimaginable archipelago, as Derrida 
suggests in the second volume of The Beast and the Sovereign.54 This con-
clusion is just one of the rich threads of Celan’s disturbing and power ful 
work that Derrida brings to bear. And in the next chapter, I  will further 
reflect on the theme of the end of the world in Derrida as it relate to the 
object- oriented ontology of Timothy Morton and other speculative 
realists.
But first, wait, I want to pause and insert into this potentially infinite 
conversation another ram from the Bible. This one is not from the Aqe-
dah, but from the book of Daniel, chapter 8, verses 3–7:
I raised my eyes and  there I saw a ram with two horns standing be-
tween me and the stream. The two horns  were long, the one longer 
than the other, growing up  behind. I watched the ram butting west 
and north and south. No beasts could stand before it, no one could 
rescue from its power. It did what it liked, making a display of its 
strength. While I pondered this, suddenly a he- goat came from the 
west skimming over the  whole earth without touching the ground; 
it had a prominent horn before its eyes. It approached the two- horned 
ram which I had seen standing between me and the stream and rushed 
at it with impetuous force. I saw it advance on the ram, working 
 itself into a fury against it, then strike the ram and break its two 
horns; the ram had no strength to resist. The he- goat flung it to the 
ground and trampled on it, and  there was no one to save the ram.
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Is this ram in Daniel similar to the ram that Abraham substituted for Isaac 
in Genesis? What if the ram is not just a sacrificial animal but, in fact, a 
name of God? According to Jacques Lacan, the ram is an Elohim, as well 
as a Name- of- the- Father. For Lacan, and I suggest also for Derrida, our 
discourses about animality, especially in its sacrificial ele ment, are caught 
up in our theological understandings about divinity.
In November 1963, two days prior to John F. Kennedy’s brutal as-
sassination in Dallas, Lacan delivered his final seminar at the Hôpital 
Sainte- Anne. This seminar was to focus during 1963–64 on “The Names- 
of- the- Father,” which was announced at the end of his previous seminar, 
Seminar X, on Anxiety. Unfortunately, the po liti cal expulsion of Lacan as 
a training analyst by the French Psychoanalytic Society terminated his 
Seminar at Saint- Anne just before it began, and Lacan only gave one lec-
ture, an “Introduction to the Names- of- the- Father” on November 20, 1963. 
His seminar was interrupted, and it would reconvene  later at the École 
Normale Supérieure, at the invitation of Louis Althusser, in early 1964, but 
Lacan never returned to or completed his seminar on “The Names- of- the- 
Father.” Instead he taught his famous seminar XI on “The Four Fundamen-
tal Concepts of Psychoanalysis.”
The lecture from November 20, 1963 was not published  until 2005 by 
Jacques- Alain Miller. In it, Lacan reflects on the scene of the Aqedah, as 
expressed by Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, Caravaggio’s paintings of 
The Sacrifice of Isaac, and the medieval French rabbinical commentator 
Rashi. Caravaggio paints two distinct canvases of this primary scene, fea-
turing Abraham, Isaac, an angel, and a ram. Lacan points out that in 
one of  these paintings, “ there is one in which the ram is on the right and 
where you see the head that I introduced last year, invisibly, in the form of 
the shofar— the ram’s horn. This horn has indisputably been ripped of 
of him.”55
In Seminar X on Anxiety from the year before, Lacan discusses the sho-
far as an instantiation of the objet petit a, the object cause of desire. The 
object a encapsulates desire and focuses it on an object, but in such a way 
that the object expresses the infinite nature of desire. The object a substi-
tutes for any and all objects of desire in a metonymic way. The first object 
a for Lacan is the breast  because the breast represents all of  human nour-
ishment, care, vitality, and sexuality for the infant.
In Seminar X, Lacan says that  there are five stages of the object a, and 
the shofar expresses the fifth stage, the object of desire at the level of the 
ear, the voice or sound. The shofar encapsulates and represents the voice of 
Yahweh for the Israelites. Lacan relates that “the horn is generally, though 
not always, a ram’s horn.”56 The shofar is an object that gives voice to the 
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voice of God. The object a expresses an ele ment of the Real  because it rep-
resents something that exceeds the symbolic order. And  every god, in-
cluding Yahweh, is “an ele ment of the real,  whether we like it or not, even 
if we no longer have anything more to do with them.”57
According to Lacan, any time one encounters a God, “a God is encoun-
tered in the real.”58 The God of the Israelites is made manifest in and through 
the shofar, which produces the sound or voice of God. Lacan says that 
according to Rashi, the Jewish commentator, “the ram in question [at the 
sacrificial scene of Abraham and Issac] is the primal Ram.” This ram “was 
 there, writes Rashi, right from the seven days of creation, which desig-
nates the ram as what he is: an Elohim.”59 If the ram is an Elohim, a God, 
then the sacrifice of the ram is more than a  simple animal sacrifice.
The ram does not simply substitute for the  human son, Isaac; he substi-
tutes for Yahweh as another form of God. The ram rushes onto the scene of 
sacrifice on Mount Moriah and is caught in a thicket.60 Lacan claims that 
“the one whose Name is unpronounceable [Yahweh] designates him to be 
sacrificed by Abraham in his son’s stead. This ram is his eponymous an-
cestor, the God of his line.”61 The primal Ram is sent to be a sacrifice, who 
justifies the sacrificial death of all other rams. The ram is the sacrificial 
animal par excellence, which is why it is an Elohim and a name of God.
Lacan argues that this situation, this charging of the ram onto the sac-
rificial scene, shows “the sharp divide between God’s jouissance and what, 
in this tradition, is presented as His desire.”62 Ordinary desire is what 
we want, or what God wants in a  simple or direct way. Jouissance, for 
Lacan, represents desire taken to its limit, beyond any reasonable bounds. 
Jouissance manifests a death drive  because it operates beyond the plea sure 
princi ple for the subject.  Here Lacan, in psychoanalytic terms, considers 
how  humans think about and represent the desire of God, which always 
threatens to go crazy, beyond all limits.
This gap between desire and jouissance at the level of God is filled by 
the ram, a symbolic substitute whose meaning is more than symbolic, and 
whose death allows the Israelites to affirm their lineage to Abraham de-
spite the separation indicated by Isaac’s symbolic death. Israelite geneal-
ogy is wholly symbolic, not real,  because this (non-)sacrifice accomplishes 
the task of diminishing “the importance of biological origin.”63 This di-
minishment of biological origin is especially relevant insofar as the figure 
of Isaac serves to stitch the cycle of stories associated with Abraham to the 
cycle of stories associated with Jacob. Many biblical scholars, in fact, ques-
tion the historical existence of Isaac.
In his lecture “On the Names- of- the- Father,” Lacan complicates the re-
lationship among humanity, animality, and divinity. In his work, Derrida 
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pursues the limits of the  human being as it exists in a state of tension be-
tween animality and divinity. The  human is connected at the animal level 
to the beast, and at the divine level to God as Sovereign, and incorporates 
both ele ments in a discordant accord. Each of  these figures of animal, 
 human, and God is caught in the tension between the miraculous singu-
larity of life and the deathly repetition of the machine.
 Here we can see how the figure of the ram from Celan’s poem as well 
as the ram in the story of the binding of Isaac, not to mention the deso-
lated ram mentioned in Daniel, animate  these questions about the nature 
and scope of Heidegger’s philosophy, including his three  theses about 
the stone, the animal, and the  human being. Much of Derrida’s  later work 
 focuses on the animal, contesting Heidegger’s claim that the animal is 
poor in world, and showing how the theoretical discourse on the funda-
mental distinction between the animal and the  human from Descartes 
through Levinas, including that of Lacan, deconstructs. We cannot sim-
ply maintain a strict boundary between the  human animal and the non- 
human animal.64
In the next chapter, I consider further the situation of the inanimate 
object, in Heidegger’s case the stone. Although Derrida does not pursue 
this line of thinking, we can think about how his questioning of Heidegger’s 
threefold typology implies a challenge to the claim that the stone is sim-
ply without world in the way that animals possess a world poorly, and 
that  humans compose worlds for themselves with the help of being. In 
Volume II of The Beast and the Sovereign, Derrida points out that Heidegger 
ofers the stone as a par tic u lar example of an inanimate object, while for 
the other two kinds of  things, he “says in a general way, with no examples, 
‘the animal’ and ‘man.’ ”65 Derrida takes this example of a stone as a kind 
of stumbling block for Heidegger’s thinking but then fails to pursue it fur-
ther in connection to a stone or another inanimate object. This line of 
thinking, however, brings Derrida up against a newer philosophy that 
usually is seen as incompatible with Derrida’s thought, an object- oriented 
ontology, as we  will see in the next chapter in the context of con temporary 
philosophy of religion.
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Jacques Derrida (along with Levinas) is the major point of reference for 
the formation of a Continental philosophy of religion that took shape in 
the 1990s around the work of John D. Caputo, Richard Kearney, Edith 
Wyschogrod, Kevin Hart, and Merold Westphal. Unfortunately, much of 
what passes for philosophy of religion  today,  whether analytic or continen-
tal, is disconnected from the pressing realities of lived existence, caught 
up in conceptual arguments and juridical formulations about non- existing 
entities. Why should we care about philosophy of religion, much less in-
vest in the efort to rethink it?1 In this chapter, I reflect briefly on the his-
tory and pres ent situation of philosophy of religion, and then suggest an 
ecological becoming of philosophy of religion in both generic and techni-
cal terms, in relation to the thought of Derrida and Lacan.
This thinking about philosophy of religion takes place at the edge of 
the world, perhaps on the precipice of a biological catastrophe that Richard 
Leakey, Elizabeth Kolbert, and  others call “the sixth extinction.”2 All of 
our thinking in this  century has to grapple with the urgency of our ecologi-
cal situation, which includes resource depletion, global climate change, 
over- population, ocean warming and acidification, and mass extinction of 
many species of birds and mammals. I  will return to this catastrophic 
horizon at the end of the chapter, by way of an engagement with Timothy 
Morton’s ecological thinking in Hyperobjects.
In this chapter, I engage Derrida’s philosophy with the newer viewpoint 
of “object- oriented ontology” (OOO) the idea that we need to shift our 
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 There is a world within the world.
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attention from subjective to more objective modes of understanding. 
 Morton provides an impressive reading of an object- oriented ontology in 
Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecol ogy  after the End of the World, and I  will 
engage directly with Morton’s book shortly, using Derrida and Lacan to 
help us think more carefully about what an object is. OOO, a phrase coined 
by Levi Bryant, is also associated with the object- oriented philosophy of 
Graham Harmon and a philosophical movement called Speculative Realism 
that has emerged in the first de cade of the twenty- first  century.3
A power ful influence on Speculative Realism, as well as a strong impe-
tus  toward this OOO is supplied by the French phi los o pher Quentin Mei-
llassoux in his book  After Finitude. In this influential book, Meillassoux 
critiques and tries to get out of the subjectivist trap of correlationism, in 
which any knowledge of an object has to be correlated with a thinking sub-
ject. Correlation, he writes, “consists in disqualifying the claim that it is 
pos si ble to consider the realms of subjectivity and objectivity in de pen dently 
of one another.”4 Speculative Realism wants to efect a turn away from the 
subjectivism that pervades post- Kantian Continental philosophy, and turn 
our attention  toward the strange and complex be hav iors of objects. In so 
 doing, they also bring about a re- engagement with some of the perspec-
tives and observations of the natu ral sciences and mathe matics.
In Hyperobjects, Timothy Morton cites Derrida a number of times with 
approval, but many writers associate Derrida’s philosophy with an irreduc-
ible subjectivism if not a hopeless linguistic idealism. For Harman and 
Meillassoux, Derrida’s work is caught in the trap of post- Kantian correlation-
ism, where any object necessarily has to be correlated with a thinking sub-
ject.5 Modern correlationism begins with Kant’s Copernican Revolution, 
that claims that objects rotate around  human categories of intuition and 
understanding. This correlationism persists all the way through most Con-
tinental philosophies of post- structuralism, including Derrida’s philosophy.6
As a way to help us think beyond the impasse of correlationism, Meil-
lassoux introduces the notion of the arch- fossil. An arch- fossil names an 
object that bears traces of “the existence of an ancestral real ity” that is “an-
terior to terrestrial life.”7An arch- fossil is an object of thought that signi-
fies something that occurs before any  human thinking exists. Meillassoux 
claims that the arch- fossil is a natu ral artifact that testifies to a limit of 
 human experience, but instead of drawing a conclusion about  human fini-
tude, he exploits the notion of an arch- fossil to push beyond the correla-
tionist circle. The way that he does this is to radicalize the contingency 
inherent in correlationism.
Even if every thing is contingent, including any object and any subject, 
Meillassoux argues for the necessity of contingency  because it is the 
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“factiality” or contingency of the correlation itself that is absolute, rather 
than any par tic u lar entity.8 The arch- fossil exhibits an absolutization of 
facticity that Meillassoux calls factiality,  because it indicates a kind of 
givenness of being that is anterior to any thinking of givenness. Meillassoux 
discovers a method of radicalizing correlationism itself to escape the cor-
relationist circle  because he claims that we cannot presuppose that any 
necessary being exists, but we can in fact claim that it is necessary and 
absolute to hold that any being might not exist.  Every being is contingent: 
“the absolute is the absolute impossibility of a necessary being.”9
From this princi ple of unreason, or refusal of any princi ple of sufficient 
reason, Meillassoux addresses the appearance of stable laws in our world 
and how they can exist in a universe of radical contingency. Taking his 
cue from David Hume, Meillassoux argues that despite all scientific laws 
being contingent, nevertheless their chaotic flux constructs an apparent sta-
bility. Meillassoux calls this “Hume’s Prob lem,” which concerns how our 
understanding of causality presupposes the uniformity of the laws of na-
ture. In Part VIII of his Dialogues Concerning Natu ral Religion, Hume spec-
ulates about the possibility that a finite number of particles undergoing a 
finite number of transpositions over an indefinite period of time would gen-
erate an eternal repetition of the same situations. This scenario foreshad-
ows Nietz sche’s articulation of the idea of eternal recurrence. If  matter is 
put into ceaseless motion by its originating force, then this ongoing dyna-
mism produces “a continued succession of chaos and disorder.” But Hume 
has his character Philo suggest that in this very situation, “is it not pos si-
ble that it may  settle at last, so as not to lose its motion and force . . .  yet 
so as to preserve a uniformity of appearance, amidst the continual motion 
and fluctuation of the parts?”10
Meillassoux adopts a similar solution in  After Finitude, but he pres ents 
it in mathematical set- theoretical terms, an area where he is influenced by 
Badiou’s philosophy in Being and Event. Meillassoux claims that Georg 
Cantor’s notion of a transfinite set of numbers (basically multiple sets of 
infinite numbers) demonstrates that “the (quantifiable) totality of the think-
able is unthinkable.”11 Cantor’s set theory mathe matics allows one to 
compare infinite sets, and to say that one infinite set is larger than another, 
even if both are infinite. But this series of infinite sets is unthinkable in a 
total sense; the series of transfinite cardinal numbers cannot be totalized 
 because they are based on sets whose members are infinite. For Meillas-
soux, the possibility of a non- totalizing (in a specific quantifiable sense) pos-
sibility as exhibited in transfinite sets (sets of infinite sets) allows him to 
posit a certain stability of experience without the necessity of under lying 
laws. This is a complex technical argument, but Meillassoux is relying on 
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Badiou’s work to claim that real ity is essentially formalizable in mathemat-
ical terms with set theory, and Cantor’s work suggests that we cannot to-
talize all possibilities, which means that  there is a sense in which our laws 
are contingent but nonetheless stable. Meillassoux claims that all of our 
laws of reason and nature are contingent and potentially chaotic, but “it is 
precisely this super- immensity of the chaotic virtual that allows the im-
peccable stability of the vis i ble world.”12
Much of the impetus  behind Meillassoux’s critique of correlationism 
concerns how it sustains postmodern views of religion. For Meillassoux, 
correlationism ends up with an irresolvable aporia between what we can 
know about ourselves and what we can know about the world. This leaves 
open the door for fideism, famously affirmed by Kant in the Preface to the 
Second Edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant says that “I have there-
fore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for 
faith.”13 This faith is the real target of Meillassoux’s critique of correlation-
ism  because in correlationism the idea of the absolute is “reduced to a mere 
belief, and hence to a religion, albeit of the nihilist kind.”14 Correlation-
ism reaches an impasse of knowledge  because it equivocates between our 
objective knowledge and its necessity to be correlated with the subjective 
pro cesses of our knowing. We cannot know anything about the objective 
or real world, so we are forced to the state of mere belief.  Because we lack 
any objective vantage point to think the absolute, philosophy reverts to a 
form of weak piety. “On this point,” Meillassoux concludes, “the con-
temporary phi los o pher has completely capitulated to the man of faith.”15
Meillassoux does not name Derrida  here, but his critique is certainly 
concerned with the turn to religion on the part of many Continental phi-
los o phers. Derrida does not reduce knowledge to faith, but  there is this 
aporia or equivocation in Derrida’s thought between faith and knowledge 
that trou bles Meillassoux and many other Speculative Realists. However, 
as Steven Shakespeare points out, “Meillassoux’s position comes with a 
price. Having set out to establish the validity of scientific statements about 
an ancestral past, we are left with a world of chaos in which  there is no 
reason for anything to happen or not happen. The fossil dissolves into ab-
stract possibility.”16 In his efort to avoid the indeterminacy of subjectiv-
ism, Meillassoux cannot evade the paradox of objective contingency. The 
only way he can escape correlationism is to radicalize contingency, but the 
radicalization of contingency introduces an objective equivocation that is 
no less disturbing.
In his opposition to con temporary philosophical fideism and its weak 
form of religion, Meillassoux introduces a strange return of God. In The 
Divine Inexistence, Meillassoux claims that even though he is a strict atheist, 
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and God does not exist in any  actual or potential sense in this world, it is 
conceivable that God could exist in virtual terms if a new world came into 
existence that provided the conditions for the advent of justice. Meillas-
soux claims that we have experienced three fundamental advents of 
something entirely new, or “three  orders that mark the essential ruptures 
of becoming:  matter, life, and thought.”17  Human value and morality de-
sires another new order, one of justice, but that order does not exist, and 
cannot exist without the restoration and resurrection of  humans who have 
already died. Even though this just situation is potentially impossible in 
any way in our own world with its current laws, Meillassoux can imagine a 
virtual world where such a rupture could occur that would bring about 
a world in which justice exists, and Meillassoux suggests that we have a 
messianic imperative to think and proclaim such a virtual real ity.
To claim that God exists is blasphemous  because it affirms our pres ent 
order of injustice, but atheism goes too far in its giving up of any possibil-
ity of God. Meillassoux uses the word God to name the possibility (or vir-
tuality) of a world in which justice is pos si ble in a strong sense, which 
includes some kind of resurrection of the dead and involves a Christ- like 
 human mediator who abandons power for the sake of justice. Meillassoux 
claims that au then tic philosophical faith, in contrast to religious faith, con-
sists of “believing in God  because he does not exist,” and this is an option 
that has not yet been seriously considered.18
Meillassoux’s conclusion about the inexistence of God appears incred-
ible and bizarre in ontological terms, even if it is a provocative speculation. 
Why this God specifically, and why should it conform so closely with more 
conventional mono the istic and even Christian notions of God? Meillas-
soux’s God is very much a God of the phi los o phers, and stems from a very 
Eu ro pean Enlightenment approach to the situation of  human moral exis-
tence. We may and should resonate with his deeply felt moral desire for 
justice, possibly even to the point of a messianic hope for an entirely new 
advent. Meillassoux bases his messianic hope on an affirmation of the 
 ultimate value of the  human. This humanism seems naïve, however, not only 
from the perspective of the deconstruction of humanism of poststructur-
alist Continental philosophy, but also from the ontological and cosmologi-
cal perspective of the universe that emerges from post- humanist versions 
of technology and natu ral science. Speculative realism and speculative ma-
terialism has many invigorating aspects, but some of  these conclusions 
appear escapist and sufused with a kind of wishful thinking, despite the 
brilliance of Meillassoux’s thinking and writing.
In our postmodern as in our modern world, then, we seem to not be 
able to have done with the question of religion, despite our best eforts to 
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be atheists. Genuine atheism is difficult, as Christopher Watkin insists, al-
though perhaps we need to stop trying quite so hard to eliminate reli-
gion.19 In the modern world, philosophy of religion stems from Kant and 
Hegel, which makes it intrinsically correlationist in terms of Speculative 
Realism. In a negative sense, Kant determines the limits of a philosophi-
cal understanding of religion  because he excludes it as a legitimate object 
of critique. Reason cannot critique religion in its pure or practical role 
 because religion does not occupy an autonomous realm of knowledge. For 
Kant, a purified rational religion is a supplement to ethics, which is the 
realm of practical reason that corresponds to the question: “What should 
we do?”
In a Kantian sense,  there persists a tension intrinsic to philosophy of 
religion  because philosophy is the rational and critical function that de-
fines the state and stakes of the situation, while religion indicates an ob-
ject that in some ways resists rational and critical explanation. Philosophy 
of religion tries to explain what cannot be entirely explained by philoso-
phy. Hegel, on the other hand, gives philosophy of religion a positive func-
tion  because he argues in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion that 
religion possesses content in the form of Vorstellungen, or images, that can 
then be spelled out in conceptual forms according to the dynamic devel-
opment of the Concept, or Begriff.20 For Hegel, philosophy of religion is 
the penultimate stage of the outworking of absolute Spirit, the point where 
Spirit as Subject recognizes its intrinsic form in images and then elabo-
rates their conceptual content.
For Hegel, religion has importance, but it is only penultimate signifi-
cance, and philosophy must supply its conceptual content for Spirit to 
become all in all. Philosophy of religion is a spiritual pro cess that evolves 
the conceptual Truth that emerges from religious forms. Stereotyping very 
broadly, we could suggest that Anglo- American analytic philosophies of 
religion conform more closely to the Kantian model of religion,  whether 
they want to redeem or repudiate religion in critical terms. In a comple-
mentary way, most Continental philosophies of religion can be viewed as 
Hegelian  because they are more interested in elaborating religious ideas 
and then re- describing them in other ways, even if they are seen as post- 
Kantian in terms of their correlation to subjective modes of knowing. 
Sometimes this redescription is affirmative of religious phenomena and 
sometimes it is dismissive, but it is the pro cess of conceptual elaboration 
that is impor tant.
 Whether seen as more Hegelian or more Kantian, Continental or Ana-
lytic, philosophy of religion is fairly specialized as a subset of academic 
scholarship that is increasingly marginalized in our con temporary corporate 
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university. Professional philosophy itself is so alienated from popu lar dis-
course that it is difficult to translate  these ideas into language that can be 
understood by, let alone evaluated by, a broader public. At the same time, 
philosophy more generally strug gles to justify itself before an academic 
tribunal that is engorged by administrative functions, and demands disci-
plinary currency that can be calculated ultimately in quantitative, mone-
tary terms.  These prob lems afect con temporary philosophy and philosophy 
of religion  whether or not they are criticized as intrinsically correlationist.
For scholars of religion, religion is an object of academic study that is 
at least partly “the creation of the scholar’s study,” as Jonathan Z. Smith 
affirms.21 I disagree with Smith, however, when he claims that religion 
is “solely” the creation of the scholar’s study  because I think that goes too 
far in its academicism. The philosophical viewpoints of OOO and Specu-
lative Realism assert that such a position reflects the inherent subjectivism 
in the modern and con temporary acad emy, which they are attempting to 
dislodge.  There are objects of and for religion. But what sort of objects are 
they? I  will consider this question  after briefly considering how religion is 
seen as contributing to a worldview and the constitution of a world.
Scholars like to explain a word’s meaning by appealing to etymology, 
and the word “religion” can be traced back to the Latin religio. Religio has 
two competing etymologies, and scholars have been unable to fi nally de-
cide on which one is correct. The most popu lar meaning is re- ligare, meaning 
to re- bind or bind back. This suggests that religion is a form of re- binding 
of a social fabric that has been torn or broken. The prob lem with this un-
derstanding is that it presupposes an original harmony or unity that comes 
undone,  after which the role of religion is to put it back together.
The other, competing, etymology of religio is re- legere, which means to 
re- collect or re- read. I like this meaning  because it suggests a kind of rep-
etition, and this repetition does not necessarily mean that what is re- read 
is the same text or the same practice. Furthermore, we could reread the 
first meaning of religio as re- ligare in terms of what Caputo calls “a bind-
ing to the unbound,” where life is unbound from anything other than or 
transcendent to life. I  will return to consider Caputo’s reading of Derrida 
on religion more explic itly in the next chapter.  Here, if this binding back 
is to what is originally bound, then it suggests an originary purpose or 
meaning to existence. But if religion is binding to the unbound, this  frees 
up religion for other meanings, practices, and bindings.
What ever religion as an object of study is, it has famously returned over 
the last few de cades, and this return has falsified or at least severely prob-
lematized the so- called “secularization hypothesis.” The secularization hy-
pothesis suggests that religion is becoming less significant for  human society 
Derrida, Lacan, and Object-Oriented Ontology ■ 81
and meaningful practices, and its role is being replaced by other  things. 
The return of religion in philosophy, politics, and culture attests to a limit 
of this hypothesis.
Of course, religion does not simply return  because it never went away. 
What happens, as sociologists such as José Casanova explain, is that religion 
has become deprivatized.22 During the period of Eu ro pean modernity, reli-
gion was seen as a private  matter of belief, in contrast to public secular reason. 
Religion could not be kept completely private, but the idea that it could be 
informs the ideology of secularism and fuels the secularist hypothesis. I 
argue that the return of religion indicates a postsecularism, where the  simple 
opposition between religious and secular deconstructs. At the same time, I 
want to resist the postsecular narrative advocated by Radical Orthodoxy 
and other religious apologists, which sees religion as replacing the secular in 
a triumphalist way. I prefer the more nuanced approach of Talal Asad, who 
argues that religion and politics are both implicated in the constitution or 
formation of the secular. Asad concludes that “if the secularization thesis no 
longer carries the conviction it once did, this is  because the categories of 
‘politics’ and ‘religion’ turn out to implicate each other more profoundly 
than we thought, a discovery that has accompanied our growing under-
standing of the powers of the modern nation- state.”23
Derrida has been one of the primary theoreticians of this intertwining 
of religion and politics, as we saw in Chapter 3. His analy sis of religion in 
“Faith and Knowledge” demonstrates a kind of auto- immunity at work in 
the po liti cal return of religion,  because adherents of po liti cal forms of re-
ligion desire to ward of attacks to the social and po liti cal body, but  these 
eforts to protect and indemnify society end up harming it. In Rogues, Der-
rida says that  there exists a “perverse and autoimmune” efect not only 
of religion, but even of democracy, whereby demo cratic states must “inter-
rupt a normal electoral pro cess in order to save a democracy threatened by 
the sworn enemies of democracy.”24 This occurs in Algeria in 1991 when 
the government intervened to halt an election that gave Islamists po liti cal 
power, and in the United States  after 9/11, when the United States Patriot 
Act restricted citizens’ rights in the name of protecting them from  future 
terrorist attacks.
The religious, the po liti cal, and the secular are all constituents in the 
composition of a world. According to Martin Heidegger,  human beings 
are world- making beings. In his Fundamental Prob lems of Metaphysics, as 
we saw in the previous chapter, Heidegger examines three ideas: world, fini-
tude, and solitude. In order to elucidate the first question, the question of 
world, Heidegger introduces three guiding  theses: “the stone is worldless, 
the animal is poor in world, man is world- forming.”25 For Heidegger, man 
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is Dasein, the ‘ there’ of being who is capable of asking the question of be-
ing. Stones lack any ability to ask questions, and animals are locked into 
their worlds, at best only dimly aware of their existence in a world. Leav-
ing aside for the moment the question of  whether Heidegger is unfair to 
animals and rocks, we can see how this conception of world is impor tant 
for Heidegger.
In his  later work, he argues that rather than  humans intentionally con-
structing worlds, it is being itself that allows worlds to be created in and 
through  human language and activity. In his essay on “The Origin of the 
Work of Art,” Heidegger claims that setting up a work of art such as a 
 temple opens up a world. “Towering up within itself, the work opens up a 
world, and keeps it abidingly in force.”26 A world is not simply what lies at 
hand, how we understand our perspective on or repre sen ta tion of the world. 
As disclosed in a genuine work of art, “the world worlds, and is more fully 
in being than the tangible and perceptible realm in which we believe our-
selves to be at home.”27 Stones, plants, and animals do not possess a world 
 because they cannot wield language or create a work of art. According to 
Heidegger, “a peasant  woman, on the other hand, has a world  because she 
dwells in the overtness of beings.” A  human person possesses the capacity 
to experience a world as a world, in the becoming or worlding of this world, 
in which “all  things gain their lingering and hastening, their remoteness 
and nearness, their scope and limits.”28 Setting up a work of art means set-
ting forth a world.
To be  human or to be able to ask the question of being is to participate 
in the creation of a world. And we are only able to take part in this world- 
creation insofar as we are finite beings, aware of our own mortality or what 
Heidegger calls “being- unto- death.” A world is temporary and finite, but 
it opens up and discloses itself to contemplative  humans who let the world 
emerge into being. I think that part of what it means to be religious is to 
be oriented within a world, that religion as a work of creation provides a 
sense of orientation— the scope and limits of all  things— even as it also 
allows for and creates a certain amount of disorientation. This orientation 
is provided abruptly and crudely in movie previews that invariably begin: 
“In a World . . .”.
A world anticipates its own demise. But what if the end of a world be-
comes so gigantic and extreme that it calls into question not only its own 
existence but the existence of any pos si ble world? This disturbing question 
is what Morton’s book Hyperobjects forces us to think. What is a hyperob-
ject? It is a special kind of object, and it attests to the popularity as well 
as the limits of this newer philosophy of OOO. OOO, as we have seen, 
wants to shift philosophy’s focus from language and subjectivity to objects. 
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Proponents of OOO want to think about objects without their being tied 
to the conditions of repre sen ta tion given by a  human subject, as laid out 
in Kant’s critical philosophy.
Morton embraces this object- oriented- ontology, but he expands the def-
inition of an object to include what he calls hyperobjects. A hyperobject is 
something that is “massively distributed in time and space relative to 
 humans.”29 As examples of hyperobjects, Morton lists the Solar System, a 
black hole, an oil field, the Florida Everglades, and the biosphere, but his 
main example is global warming. For Morton, hyperobjects come into view 
when we abandon an anthropocentric perspective and adopt a more ob-
jective realism in our philosophy. What is ironic is that it is precisely in the 
era that is being called the Anthropocene where we come to appreciate 
the extent to which  humans have transformed the planet, that we can see 
this shift in orientation. According to Morton, the transformation of Earth 
from a natu ral world to one where we cannot escape our responsibility for 
transforming nature is tied to the end of the world.
Hyperobjects emerge at the end of the world, and the end of the (natu-
ral) world has already occurred. The first instance of the end of the world 
happens in 1784, with the patenting of the steam engine, “an act that com-
menced the depositing of carbon in Earth’s crust,” which marks “the in-
ception of humanity as a geophysical force on a planetary scale.”30 This 
end of the world is repeated in 1945, with the testing of the first atomic 
bomb in Trinity, New Mexico. Morton says that
what comes into view for  humans at this moment is precisely the end 
of the world, brought about by the encroachment of hyperobject, one 
which is as suredly Earth itself, and its geological cycles demand a 
 geophilosophy that  doesn’t think simply in terms of  human events and 
 human significance.31
Again, I want to underline the paradoxical nature of Morton’s analy sis  here: 
It is the recognition of irreducible  human efects on the Earth that ushers 
in the Anthropocene and ends any  simple understanding of Nature as a 
sphere apart from  human activity that at the same time creates the possi-
bility of thinking about objects in a non- anthropocentric way. In addition, 
hyperobjects are very strange sorts of objects, and resemble something that 
could also be called systems or even pro cesses.
I note Morton’s insistence that the emergence of hyperobjects inaugu-
rates a pres ent and a  future “ after the end of the world,”  because we can 
no longer experience a world without  human beings being at the center of 
it. Hyperobjects bring about a quake in being that shakes us out of our 
sense of who and what we are when confronted with such tremendous 
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entities. Morton focuses mainly on very large hyperobjects in his book, 
and perhaps he can be accused of gigantomachy in his OOO, his desire to 
prioritize the very large over the very small. But what’s in ter est ing about 
his analy sis is his elaboration of the stakes of a flat ontology, where  there is 
no container or horizon within which objects fit. This is the specific sense 
in which hyperobjects proclaim the end of the world. The expansion of 
our ecological awareness taken to its end brings about the realization that 
we no longer live in a closed environment. This means that the more we 
become aware of the interconnectedness of  things, “the more it becomes 
impossible to posit some entity existing beyond or  behind the interrelated 
beings.”32  These interrelated beings cannot be fitted into a container or 
“umbrella that unifies them, such as world, environment, ecosystem, or 
even, astonishingly, Earth.”33
Morton argues that hyperobjects bring about the end of the world, 
 because they make it impossible to conceive a world as a container for the 
set of objects that resides in it. No container, no world. Earth is one object 
among other objects, and all of  these objects exist on the same flat plane 
of immanence. Hyperobjects are special objects  because in their vastness 
they dwarf what we normally consider objects. But they are still objects 
for Morton, and so they contribute to an OOO.
I want to back away slightly from the extreme philosophical situation 
that Morton depicts. Or rather, I want to generalize it. For me, all objects 
are hyperobjects, which can also be called systems. The prob lem with ob-
jects is that they have no natu ral  simple bound aries. And rather than ac-
cept Morton’s claim that at some determinate moment or moments in 
history, we experience a qualitative change that signifies the end of the 
world, I suggest that we already live at the end of the world. The subtitle 
of Morton’s book is “Philosophy and Ecol ogy  After the End of the World,” 
whereas I want to think ecologically about philosophy and religion “at the 
end of the world” using Derrida as a resource.
According to Derrida, Heidegger’s three  theses about the world— the 
stone is without world, the animal is poor in world, and the  human being 
is a world- builder— are extremely suspect. Derrida says that for him, “noth-
ing appears to me to be more problematic than  these  theses.”34 In his  later 
philosophy, including The Animal That I Therefore Am, Derrida takes up 
the question of the animal to challenge Heidegger’s view that animals are 
poor in world while  human beings are builders of worlds. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, in “Rams,” Derrida reflects on the recent death of 
Hans- Georg Gadamer, and considers the poem by Paul Celan called “Vast, 
Glowing Vault.”  Here, the ram is a sacrificial animal that substitutes for 
Isaac in the famous account of the aqedah or binding, as narrated in Genesis 
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22 and then famously dramatized by Soren Kierkegaard in Fear and 
Trembling. In the poem by Celan, the ram charges, and the question is in-
verted: Into what  doesn’t the ram charge? Fi nally, the last power ful line 
reads: “The World is gone, I must carry you.”
In his reading of Celan, Derrida challenges Heidegger, suggesting that 
the direct relation between the I and the you occurs precisely when the 
world is gone, in German fort. Die Welt ist fort. The world is gone. Derrida 
says that “as soon as I am obliged, from the instant when I am obliged to 
you, when I owe, which I owe it to you, owe it to myself to carry you, as 
soon as I speak to you and am responsible for you, or before you,  there can 
no longer, essentially, be any world.”35 The immediate ethical relationship 
of responsibility to the Other means that the world is gone, it goes away, 
it becomes fort. And this responsibility is not restricted to  human beings, 
as it often appears to be in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. We can 
be directly and ethically related to an animal, such as a ram.
But what about a stone? Heidegger says that a stone is without world; it 
simply does not and cannot possess a world. Furthermore, Derrida does 
not consider stones specifically in his attempt to complicate and refute 
Heidegger’s three  theses. But Derrida does say that nothing seems more 
problematic than  these  theses, and he does not specify that he only dis-
agrees with the first two. Is the pure lack of world that Heidegger accords a 
stone similar to the gone- ness of world that Derrida finds in Celan? It would 
seem not, but at the same time it would seem strange to disallow deconstruc-
tion to work on stones if it can work on and with animals. Can anyone be 
responsible to a stone? Can a stone be an Other in the technical poststruc-
turalist sense? What kind of object would a stone have to be for deconstruc-
tive ethics to apply to it? According to Jefrey Jerome Cohen, Heidegger 
assigns to stone only “agentless perdurance, a blank materiality,” but medieval 
perspectives, and newer philosophies of OOO along with Bruno Latour’s 
actor network theory, allow us to overcome the duality between nature and 
society.  Here, stone “supports, defeats, fosters, yields, impels, risks, resists.”36 
This agential nature of lithic and other objects involves relations, and there-
fore broadly speaking ethical relations. Fi nally, would an object that entails, 
or even demands, such relations be called a hyperobject?
This is the nature of hyperobjects in Morton’s philosophy. They make a 
demand on us, and it is an ethical demand, even if the nature of their 
demand and our inability to respond adequately to them makes us hypo-
crites. Morton argues that hyperobjects introduce an asymmetry in rela-
tion to us, that we end up being confronted by hyperobjects as opposed to 
confronting them as objects that we can impose our  will on and dispose 
of however we like. According to Morton, “hyperobjects make hypocrites 
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of us all”  because anything we do is never commensurate with them and 
their threat.37 In the case of global warming, what ever we do only salves 
our conscience; buying ecological “green” products does not actually change 
the dynamic of consumer capitalism and the burning of carbon emissions. 
We do  things to make ourselves feel better, like driving a hybrid car, but 
we are actually hypocrites  because at some deep level we know that that is 
not  going to solve the prob lem. Derrida similarly touches on the unavoid-
able structural hy poc risy of ethics in The Gift of Death when he says that
As soon as I enter into a relation with the other, with the gaze, look, 
request, love, command, or call of the other, I know that I can re-
spond only be sacrificing ethics, that is, by sacrificing what ever obliges 
me to also respond, in the same way, to all the  others.38
I am  doing two  things with Morton and Derrida and their relation to 
Heidegger. First, I am suggesting that Derrida’s critique of Heidegger is 
similar to Morton’s rejection of Heidegger’s notion of world insofar as 
Derrida argues that in an ethical relationship, the world dis appears, it is 
gone. And this gone- ness of the world is what allows any ethical relation 
to occur. Second, I suggest that Morton’s focus on hyperobjects and ecol-
ogy allows us to extend Derrida’s deconstruction of the opposition be-
tween  human and animal to that between living and nonliving beings. By 
questioning Heidegger’s thesis about stones being poor in world, we can 
think about a theme that Derrida himself does not develop, but one that 
is developed by an object- oriented- ontology. What Derrida preserves is 
the explicit ethical responsibility that needs to be a part of our ecologi-
cal relationships to objects and hyperobjects. And what OOO accentuates 
is the impossibility of restricting responsible encounters to other  human 
beings or, at most, other conscious animals.
We live at the end of the world, always, not simply  after the end of the 
world. This is  because at the end of the world, the world is gone. And this 
gone- ness of world is the disappearance of a world that allows any genuine 
ethical encounter to occur. As Derrida argues, death is the end of the world, 
and mourning constitutes “a world  after the end of the world.”39 Death is 
not just the end of a world, but the end of the world, which is each time or 
life unique and irreplaceable. For Derrida,
Death marks each time, each time in defiance of arithmetic, the ab-
solute end of the one and only world, of that which each opens as a 
one and only world, the end of the unique world, the end of the to-
tality of what is or can be presented as the origin of the world for 
any uniquely living being, be it  human or not.40
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Whoever survives is alone and without world, “in a world without world, 
as if without earth beyond the end of the world.”41  There are endless worlds, 
and we live at the end of the world each time, all the time, insofar as we are 
exposed to death and  going to die, and at the same time insofar as we have 
survived  others’ deaths and have not yet died.
The question is how far we can extend life and death to inorganic ob-
jects, and  whether the boundary of life marks a limit of genuine relation-
ship. Morton suggests that hyperobjects force us to relate to them diferently 
than we are used to relating to objects, and I am suggesting that an exten-
sion of Derrida’s thought to Heidegger’s first thesis of world provides us a 
dif er ent way of thinking about objects and worlds. If the world is gone in 
 every perishing of an object, then a hyperobject is at once the force field 
around an object or set of objects that replaces what we used to call an 
ordered world, and at the same time, what a discrete object becomes at the 
end of the world.
Religion, understood in Morton’s terms, is a massive, complex, and dis-
tributed hyperobject. And God, too, is a hyperobject. God does not sim-
ply exist in the way that most objects do, or even most hyperobjects that 
Morton describes. But God inheres or insists at the end of the world  because 
the end of the world allows a dif er ent relationship to God as a non ex is-
tent object. This is an alternative relationship of responsibility  because 
 hyperobjects, like nuclear waste and global warming, doom us in a way 
similar to the way that God damns us or judges us in more traditional 
terms. If objects can be understood as hyperobjects, then I  don’t see how 
any object can fail to be a hyperobject in technical terms, despite Morton’s 
preference for large- scale, massive objects in comparison to  human beings. 
Con temporary cosmology considers objects and pro cesses at intergalactic 
scales and over billions of years, as well as miniscule objects at the sub-
atomic level, including particles that blink into existence for tiny fractions 
of a second.
I want to supplement this consideration of objects, including hyperob-
jects, with Lacan’s thinking about the object. According to Lacan, whose 
seminar lecture “On the Names- of- the- Father” I discussed at the end of 
the previous chapter,  human beings are implicated in three realms, or reg-
isters, of existence— the real, the symbolic, and the imaginary. The real is 
first the brute pre- linguistic realm of nonsense that confronts us prior to 
the advent of language, although  later Lacan comes to think about the Real 
as that which disrupts the symbolic order. The symbolic is  shaped primar-
ily by the structure of language, and the structure of language shapes 
 human understanding and desire to such an extent that Lacan argues that 
our desires are not our own; they are always the desire of the Other. The 
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Other is a crystallization or concrescence of the symbolic field into a par-
tic u lar site. The Other is an abstraction, but it is necessary for us to under-
stand how symbolic language works. Furthermore, Lacan reads Freud via 
Saussure’s structural linguistics to argue that the unconscious is a broad, 
intersubjective phenomenon that shapes the symbolic order rather than an 
individual possession. Fi nally, the imaginary exists  because we always 
 mistake the symbolic for the Real, and this naiveté marks our existence to 
such an extent that we are always fundamentally mistaking the nature and 
meaning of our desires.
As Lacan develops his dense idiosyncratic terminology, he suggests that 
at the level of the imaginary, the big Other that designates the symbolic 
register is concentrated into a  little other, or what he calls in French objet 
petit a, the  little other object. The  little other is the crystallization of the 
symbolic big Other that forms a knot around which our imagination gets 
fixed. The Freudian object petit a is the  mother’s breast, which is the entire 
existence for the infant baby  until she learns to separate the breast from 
her own body. The  little other instantiates the field of  human desire at the 
level of a par tic u lar object that warps the entire social field in such a way 
as to distort it. In his  later work, Lacan comes to attach more and more 
significance to this  little other object.
Why this detour into Lacan? Well, I think that we need the idea of the 
objet petit a to  really make sense of OOO, and I would like to suggest that 
it be reformulated as a- O- O instead of OOO, or object a- oriented ontol-
ogy. It is impor tant to note that, for Lacan, an object is never a  simple ob-
ject; it is always a strange object, and it confronts us with the limitations 
of our own symbolic meaning- making as well as implicates us in the Real 
beyond or within the symbolic.  There is a trait that connects us to the ob-
ject, and this trait goes from the object to us and distorts our perception 
and understanding in power ful ways.
So in a way, Lacan is already a theorist of OOO before the letter, the 
first letter, which is a for autre, or other. Despite his emphasis on language 
and the symbolic order, Lacan does not propose a linguistic subjectivism 
any more than Derrida does. His psychoanalytic theory ofers profound 
reflections on the nature of an object, which should inform  these newer 
object- oriented realisms.
In an essay called “ Towards a Politics of Singularity,” the phi los o pher 
Sam Weber reflects on an essay by Walter Benjamin from 1919 called “Des-
tiny and Character.” Weber’s essay is very complex, but what is in ter est ing 
is how he draws a connection from Benjamin to Lacan around the notion 
of the word “trait,” or drive, in German Zug. According to Weber, this word 
Zug has a dynamic dimension that “tends to be lost in the usual En glish 
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translation, trait,  unless one remembers that  every trait has to be traced 
and describes therefore not a static trajectory but a movement away from 
something and  toward something  else.”42 For Weber, this trait is a dynamic 
character trait, a drive from the destiny of a person to her character, con-
stituting her singularity as a person.43 The genius of a person is derived from 
her Zug, the drive or trait that connects her to her destiny. This is what 
makes a person unique, according to Benjamin.
In Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory, this Zug becomes a singular trait (trait 
unaire) that defines a subject, situating her both in relation to and in some 
sense outside of the symbolic order.  Here, a singular trait is what Lacan 
calls a signifier, where
the subject of the signifier, represented by a subject to another signi-
fier, thus inscribed the notion of the trait unaire in a network of sig-
nification that paradoxically defined singularity as a diferential but 
fully relational notion, a trait or trace, as Derrida would  later call it, 
to stress its temporal relation to what had gone before and what would 
be coming  after.44
The signifier indicates the trait or trace of what connects and disconnects 
a subject to her symbolic language. The key to this notion of the trait is 
that it proceeds from the object to the subject. It works in the reverse di-
rection from that of ste reo typical subjectivism. The object a is a strange 
 little object, not simply in its size, but in its ability to establish a trait of 
character in a subject. This reversal of direction undercuts the correlation-
ism with which Speculative Realism and OOO is so obsessed.
By considering the a as a strange object, Lacan helps reverse the rela-
tion that appears to go in one unitary direction, from character to destiny 
or from subject to signification. By closely attending to Benjamin, Weber 
shows how our character is  shaped by our destiny, and the trait or Zug de-
rives from this fate. OOO wants to turn around our relationship to ob-
jects, but Lacan has already in some ways accomplished this.  Here the 
object petit a indicates a dynamic directionality from the objet petit a to 
the subject. The Zug or drive is the trait that is traced from the object a to 
the  human subject.  Every object is potentially an object a. And  every autre 
( little a) is  every Autre (big A), according to Derrida—he affirms in The 
Gift of Death that tout autre est tout autre, or “ every other (one) is  every 
(bit) other.45  Every object a is  every other object, including a hyperobject 
in Morton’s sense.
According to Morton, we should not reduce objects to the pro cesses 
that make them up. He says that “a pro cess is just a real object, but one that 
occupies higher dimension than objects to which we are accustomed.”46 
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 There is a sense in which a pro cess, a system, and an object or hyperobject 
can be seen in similar terms, although each has to be qualified to fit into 
the  others. Furthermore, I do not want to pass judgment in ultimate terms 
and say that an object is a good or bad way to describe real ity, although 
as already explained I do think that  these objects are also what Lacan calls 
objets petit a. In any case, if we want to retain this term, we need to see 
objects as dynamic and changing rather than static and permanent, even 
if hyperobjects are more stable than we are. For me, energy can be viewed 
as an object, but that drastically transforms our understanding of objects 
in the same way that for Morton hyperobjects distort and change what we 
mean by objects.
For Morton, fate or destiny is named doom, and this doom is delivered 
to us by hyperobjects. In their ending of the world, hyperobjects deliver 
doom, where “doom is a decree or an ordinance: a directive.” Doom is a 
kind of judgment as well as discernment, and it can also mean “fate, des-
tiny, and in a stronger sense, death.”47 Our character is determined by the 
doom of the hyperobject, and according to Morton, this character now con-
sists of hy poc risy. Hy poc risy is “a ‘secret doom,’ ” a pretense or an act. “But 
it is also simply hidden doom, a message sent from somewhere obscure.”48 
As Morton explains, the word “hy poc risy” comes from the Greek term for 
delivery. And this delivery is the singular trait whereby our doom shapes 
us and renders us hypocrites in relation to  these strange objects. Hyperob-
jects are also objects a, and Morton is a  little too obsessed with very big 
objects to notice how  great a diference this  little a makes. He approaches 
an object a- oriented ontology, but does not quite arrive. We can witness 
the hy poc risy of OOO, but do not simply dismiss it  because as Morton 
affirms, we are all hypocrites. Or as Lacan claims, the non- duped are the 
ones who are most likely to err (“les non- dupes errant”).49
Hyperobjects confront us at the end of the world, and they force us to 
reconsider what nature and ecol ogy could possibly mean.  Human beings 
as a species have lived and flourished during a relatively stable climate 
pattern, but as Michael S. Northcott suggests in A Po liti cal Theology of 
Climate Change, “on the current trajectory of green house gas emissions 
growth, by the end of the pres ent  century . . .  the planet  will be a ‘new 
creation,’ but not by the making of God or evolution.”50 The apocalyptic 
threat of the destruction of  human civilization and possibly even extinc-
tion of ourselves along with many other animals provides con temporary 
ecological thinking with a religious or spiritual edge, insofar as we assign 
spiritual value to living beings. It’s unlikely that we could cause the ex-
tinction of life on Earth, but  human activity can certainly drive, and in 
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fact is driving, many forms of life out of existence. So  there is a sense in 
which we are playing God, wittingly or unwittingly.
I think that to change our fate and avoid our doom we would need to 
change our nature, which may well be impossible. But we desperately need 
the impossible. In Religion, Politics, and the Earth, Jefrey W. Robbins and 
I imagine an impossible synthesis between Hegel, for whom Earth is a sub-
stance that becomes subject, and Deleuze, who posits along with Félix 
Guattari a “geology of morals” in which we are forced to ask “Who does 
the Earth think it is?”51 We need to think from the Earth, not just to it, and 
we need to think Earth itself as a hyperobject without simply assuming 
that we can remove  human self- consciousness from this picture. Morton 
asserts that Deleuze, like Alfred North Whitehead, is guilty of a “pro cess 
relationalism” that “conceive[s] time as the liquid in which the image melts 
and flows.”52 This is an extremely weak reading of Deleuze, who views time 
in a much more complicated way than as a river in which objects dissolve. 
I  will not discuss Deleuze’s understanding of time  here, which is treated 
most explic itly in Difference and Repetition and in Cinema 2: The Time Im-
age, but I think that  there is a real prob lem with how to think about time 
in OOO, and  there are significant attempts in some of the theorists of 
OOO to deny and evade the real ity of time in order to grant objects a cer-
tain timelessness.53
Time is entropy, and entropy gives time a directionality to what we 
 understand as time, even though time is not linear. We cannot escape or 
avoid entropy, although we do need better ways to understand it.54 The first 
law of thermodynamics is the conservation of energy. The second law says 
that all systems or entities tend  toward an increase of entropy, mea sured 
statistically. This seems to imply an irreversible movement from order to 
disorder, but then where does the original low entropy state come from? 
Energy is infinite, it is material, and it is entropic, at universal, physical, 
biological as well as psychical and metaphysical levels. We are emergent 
objects (a) of entropic- energetic pro cesses, and Earth  will survive our 
deaths, even though Earth  will not last forever as a planetary object. We 
are at the end of the world, and we always have been.
In this chapter, I am reflecting on the current status of Continental phi-
losophy of religion, as well as bringing Derrida’s philosophy into closer 
relation to new materialism and OOO. Much of the time, OOO and spec-
ulative realism, as well as some forms of new materialism, represent them-
selves as opposing what they see as the subjectivism in Derrida and other 
postmodern philosophies. I am more interested in seeing how some of the 
poststructuralist theorists like Derrida, Deleuze, and Lacan, who along 
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with Foucault  were previously seen as promoting the death of the subject, 
help us to think about objects and pro cesses in dif er ent ways, even as the 
renewed attention to objects and the discourses of the natu ral sciences 
forces us to reconsider the work of Derrida and  others.
My guiding thread is to think more deeply about the resonances and 
the connections of Derrida’s famous phrase “tout autre est tout autre.” If 
 every other is  every other, that does not simply mean all  human  others who 
exist in Kantian terms as rational moral beings. Derrida’s late work, in par-
tic u lar, has the purpose of questioning the status of the  human and its 
relation to nonhuman  others, in a way that has not always been fully ac-
knowledged. Catherine Malabou, whose work I  will consider more explic-
itly in Chapter 7, engages Derrida and deconstruction with a new materialist 
biological and neurological paradigm. Karen Barad theorizes quantum 
physics, particularly quantum field theory, with the help of Levinas and 
Derrida, as I  will consider in Chapter 8. But first I  will return to Caputo 
and analyze his understanding of Derrida more fully in the context of 
 Caputo’s own philosophy and radical theology.
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In this chapter, I focus on Caputo’s interpretation of Derrida to show how 
his attention to the event in religious and then theological terms helps liber-
ate Derrida’s philosophy from a specific context of writing. Part of the sig-
nificance of Derrida’s so- called religious turn, which is not  really a turn, is 
an ability to read Derrida’s philosophy beyond a straightforward paradigm 
of writing, and more broadly in religious, ethical, and po liti cal ways.  Here 
is the significance of the  later Derrida, for better or worse, and we  will see 
how Catherine Malabou understands this in the next chapter. It’s not that 
Derrida himself abandons writing, but that the Anglo- American reading of 
Derrida is able to loosen up a stricter understanding of Derrida’s relation 
to writing and language. And Caputo’s The Prayers and Tears of Jacques 
Derrida is a crucial text for opening up our thinking about Derrida.
It seems a very long time ago now, but Caputo’s book, The Prayers and 
Tears of Jacques Derrida, published in 1997, inaugurated a sea change in 
Anglo- American readings of Derrida.  There had already been many readers 
asking questions about the relationship between Derrida and religion, and 
as discussed in Chapter 1, many of  these questions concerned the connec-
tion between deconstruction and negative theology, following Derrida’s 
Jerusalem address, “How to Avoid Speaking: Denials.” In terms of philoso-
phy of religion, theoretical religious studies, and postmodern theology, 
however,  these relations invariably took the form of a kind of analogy. 
Derrida was asking similar questions to  those of religion and theology, but 
he was not himself a religious phi los o pher or a theologian.
Radical Theology and the Event
Caputo’s Derridean Gospel
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The work of Mark C. Taylor dominated the reception of Derrida in re-
lation to religion in the 1980s and early 1990s. Taylor’s Erring: A Postmod-
ern A/theology provides an agenda for postmodern theology, with its themes 
of the death of God, the disappearance of the Self, the end of History, and 
the closure of the Book. For Taylor, deconstructive writing is a/theologi-
cal, neither simply theological nor atheological, but in some ways neither 
and both. Deconstruction subverts theological systems and concepts, al-
though at the same time “the survival of this parasitic discourse presup-
poses the continuing existence of its host.”1 Theology is the site for Taylor 
that hosts deconstructive criticism, and deconstruction is a form of “writ-
ing that attempts to trace the border and retrace the margin,” which “can, 
therefore, be described as erring.”2 For Taylor, then, theology is a form of 
writing, and Derridean deconstruction is a second- order operation upon 
writing that traces and retraces the margin of writing, the texts of theol-
ogy, philosophy, lit er a ture, and so on.
As another postmodern theologian, Charles E. Winquist, puts it in his 
1986 Epiphanies of Darkness, “theology is writing,” which means that  there 
is the possibility of a deconstructive theology just as  there exists a decon-
structive writing.3 Fi nally, Carl A. Raschke draws the ultimate conclusion 
of deconstructive theology when he states that “deconstruction, which must 
be considered the interior drive of twentieth- century theology rather than 
an alien agenda, is in the final analy sis the death of God put into writing, 
the subsumption of the ‘Word’ by the ‘flesh,’ the deluge of immanence.”4 
For American postmodern theology, Derridean deconstruction instanti-
ates the death of God in writing. This marginal form of theology is influ-
enced by deconstruction along with the earlier American death of God 
theology, primarily in the form of Thomas  J. J. Altizer’s theological 
writings.
Postmodern theology in the United States elaborates a form of death of 
God theology along the lines of hermeneutics and then deconstruction as 
a form of writing, and this is the dominant religio- theological reading of 
Derrida in the  middle 1980s  until the  middle 1990s. Caputo’s book on The 
Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida blows this understanding of decon-
struction and theology apart, even if it has led to confusion about both 
Caputo’s and Derrida’s relation to religion and theology, and this situation 
eventually forced Caputo to develop his own understanding of radical the-
ology in the first de cade of the twenty- first  century.
According to Taylor, by the  middle of the 1990s, deconstruction had 
run its course, and Taylor then turned back to Hegel and forward to an 
interest in networks, technology, and virtual real ity. Hegel’s philosophy is 
a better resource, for Taylor, to “think what poststructuralism leaves un-
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thought by showing how nontotalizing structures, which nevertheless 
act as a  whole, are beginning to emerge in the tangled networks and webs 
through which real ity is virtualized and virtuality is realized.”5 Post-
structuralism, deconstruction, or the philosophy of diference, on the con-
trary, “cannot conceive of a structure that does not totalize and is not 
repressive,” while its insistence on diference “has issued in a politics of 
identity” in which “it is our diferences that increasingly are tearing us 
apart.”6 Taylor’s break with Derrida and deconstruction concerns a num-
ber of philosophical issues, but it also breaks with a conception of writing 
in Taylor’s shift to thinking networks as non- totalizing holistic structures.
Prior to reading The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, Winquist had 
agreed with Taylor about the exhaustion of deconstruction as a cultural 
force. However, in his response to Caputo’s book on Derrida, Winquist 
claims that what is crucial to Caputo’s understanding of Derrida, and also 
Derrida’s understanding of religion, is the notion of religion without reli-
gion. Winquist says that “Derrida’s claim that he has been read less and 
less well over twenty years can be understood in the failure to understand 
his religion without religion.”7 Following Caputo, Winquist distinguishes 
between Jacques, the phi los o pher, and Jackie, which is Derrida’s  actual 
given name. “Maybe saving the name of Jackie, a task accepted by Jack 
Caputo, is also a saving of the text that is more than a scholarly exercise 
sanctioned by professional phi los o phers,” Winquist suggests.8 What Win-
quist hears in this work is a new Derrida, an understanding of Derrida’s 
faith as a form of deconstruction beyond writing. Derrida’s work is not 
limited to writing. According to Winquist, what Caputo “has the capacity 
to hear, when he reads Derrida, [is] that  there is always something more or 
other than the text.”9 And it is the liberation of this “something more or other 
than the text” in Derrida’s work that Caputo’s book accomplishes for 
English- speaking readers who “have been misreading Derrida for twenty 
years.”10
This liberation of Derrida’s religion without religion as something irre-
ducible to writing marks the significance of Caputo’s text. Before turning 
to The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, I want to briefly consider 
 Caputo’s earlier philosophy of religion, primarily his breakthrough work 
Radical Hermeneutics, published in 1987. Caputo’s early work was on 
Thomas Aquinas, Martin Heidegger, and Meister Eckhart, and his 1978 
book The Mystical Ele ment in Heidegger’s Thought demonstrates the affinities 
of Heidegger’s philosophy with Eckhart. Radical Hermeneutics, however, 
is Caputo’s breakthrough book, where he begins to  really philosophize in 
his own voice. And it is this growing influence of Derrida on his thought 
that enables him to do this.
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In Radical Hermeneutics, Caputo sides with Heidegger and Derrida 
against Hans- Georg Gadamer, but he keeps the Gadamerian term herme-
neutics. Caputo saves the name of hermeneutics in this book, but he radi-
calizes it. As he explains,  here “Derrida is the turning point for radical 
hermeneutics, the point where hermeneutics is pushed to the brink.”11 
 Although Caputo turns  toward Derrida, he maintains a productive ten-
sion between Derrida and Heidegger that he  later gives up in Prayers and 
Tears. According to Caputo, “radical hermeneutics situates itself in the 
space which is opened up by the exchange between Heidegger and Der-
rida, an exchange which generates a more radical reading of Heidegger and 
another, more hermeneutic reading of Derrida.”12 The juxtaposition of 
Derrida with Heidegger produces a “cold hermeneutics,” a shiver that also 
incorporates Kierkegaard and Nietz sche in restoring “the difficulty both 
to life and to intentionality.”13 This difficulty is the necessary precondition 
for the production of something new, or a repetition into the  future.
In Radical Hermeneutics, surprisingly, it is Derrida who is too affirma-
tive, too quick to leave  behind this “shudder, this trembling,” in which Ca-
puto “locate[s] a cold and comfortless hermeneutics which I think it is the 
special virtue of Heidegger and Kierkegaard to have expounded.”14 Accord-
ing to Caputo, Derrida, in his emphasis on undecidability, fails to fully 
open himself to the “mystery” that Eckhart and Heidegger enable us to 
experience. In the final chapter, Caputo invokes Levinas concerning the 
face of sufering with which we are encountered, and this experience of 
the face contributes to “the notion of a more chastened, postmetaphysical 
notion of religious faith.”15 Attention to sufering alerts us to “the vulner-
ability of  human existence, its lack of defence against the play of the flux,” 
and thus leads us to a religious hermeneutic.16 Religion is a protest against 
sufering, although Caputo strips religion of the transcendent power to 
eliminate sufering.  There is a tragic ele ment to  human existence, but 
 Caputo does not want this tragic consciousness to be the last word. He 
wants to dwell upon the importance of laughter as a response to this tragic 
situation, not as avoidance, but precisely as an affirmation of the difficulty 
of life. And it is this laughter, humor, and wit that Heidegger misses in his 
readings of Kierkegaard and Nietz sche.
Caputo affirms a vital significance to the  human being. He says that 
the reason “why I refused to give up on the word hermeneutics” is  because 
of his attempt to “find some way of confronting this question,” the question 
of what it means to be  human in a world that does not always comfort or 
make sense.17  Later, Caputo does give up the word “hermeneutics,” or 
rather, he replaces the word “hermeneutics” with the word “theology,” so 
that radical hermeneutics becomes radical theology. And with this transi-
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tion, the mutuality between Heidegger and Derrida that marks Radical 
Hermeneutics tips over into a full- throated affirmation of Derrida. The 
Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida is an extraordinary re- reading of 
Derrida, but it is also a transitional book for Caputo in his becoming- 
theological, a pro cess that culminates in The Weakness of God and The 
 Insistence of God.
My claim is that Caputo reads Derrida at first more  under the influ-
ence of a kind of writing, which is why he needs Heidegger, Kierkegaard, 
and Nietz sche to supplement Derrida’s philosophy with a more existential 
affirmation of life. But what he sees as he continues to read and think about 
Derrida is how this existential affirmation is already pres ent in Derrida, 
even as it becomes more explicit in Derrida’s work in the 1990s. Caputo is 
the keenest reader and interpreter of Derrida in En glish who is sensitive to 
this shift and its implications.
In writing about Derrida’s prayers and tears, Caputo above all appeals 
to deconstruction as a passion. Passion is not simply writing, a linguistic 
efect, but more an afect or a force that attests to an otherness of language, 
writing, and speaking. As Caputo states, “deconstruction is a passion for 
transgression, a passion for trespassing the horizons of possibility, which 
Derrida calls, following Blanchot, the passion of the pas, the pas of passion.”18 
Deconstruction is “a passion and a prayer for the impossible,” for what 
seems impossible or absurd given current standards of logic and norms.19 
We can reasonably expect what is pos si ble, but  there is something in de-
construction that desires what is not pos si ble. What deconstruction ad-
dresses is what happens, which is both strictly speaking pos si ble and 
impossible in terms of logical conditions of possibility. In his critical phi-
losophy, Immanuel Kant investigates the conditions of possibility for our 
knowledge of an object. According to Derrida,  these conditions of impos-
sibility of knowing something are at the same time conditions of impossibil-
ity  because our knowing always exceeds  these very conditions that make 
it pos si ble. Deconstruction attends to the impossibility of our knowing and 
desiring, not just their possibility.
The impossibility at the heart of the pos si ble is a quasi- religious phenom-
enon. Our desire is for the impossible, for justice, which is not simply or 
fully pos si ble given the state of the world and its possibilities. This desire 
for the impossible is never separated from our pos si ble, worldly existence, 
but in fact it makes existence itself pos si ble, which is a kind of logical para-
dox or aporia. Derrida coins the neologism différance to indicate this dy-
namic im/possibility at the heart of language and experience that animates 
deconstruction. Caputo makes it clear, however, that we should not think 
of différance as God, or try to baptize deconstruction as a form of negative 
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theology. Deconstruction, like negative theology, manifests a desire for 
the wholly other, the tout autre, but unlike negative theology, deconstruc-
tion understands that the tout autre is never found outside of our experi-
ence of ordinary  others.20
Caputo seizes on Derrida’s phrase in The Gift of Death, where Derrida 
claims that in certain re spects Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard and Heidegger 
all “belong to this tradition that consists of proposing a nondogmatic dou-
blet of dogma, a philosophical and metaphysical doublet, in any case a 
thinking that ‘repeats’ the possibility of religion without religion.”21 Der-
rida both affirms and distances himself from this specific doublet of reli-
gion without religion, but Caputo takes it up and shows how deconstruction 
is also a religion without religion. For Caputo, deconstruction “repeats non-
dogmatically the religious structure of experience, the category of the 
religious.”22 There is a religious structure of experience that deconstruction 
repeats. This religious structure is not that of this or that determinate reli-
gion, but attests to a religion without religion.
The passion of Derrida’s thinking and writing, his prayers and tears to 
which Caputo attends, marks deconstruction as a more- than- linguistic phe-
nomenon, which does not mean that it is simply non- linguistic. Caputo 
 attacks the stupid, reductionist readings of Derrida that proceed by taking 
literally the translation of Derrida’s ofhand remark that “ there is nothing 
outside the text” (il n’y a pas de hors texte), “as if  there is nothing other than 
words and texts.”23 Caputo explains, correctly, that “while  there is nothing 
which, for Derrida, would escape the constraints of textuality, it is no less 
true that every thing that Derrida has written has been directed  toward the 
other of language,  toward the alterity by which language is claimed.”24
In The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, Caputo carefully unpacks 
many of Derrida’s texts from the 1990s, including “Circumfession,” Apo-
rias, Specters of Marx, The Gift of Death, Archive Fever, and his famous 
 Capri essay on “Faith and Knowledge,” to demonstrate where and how 
deconstruction becomes thoroughly entangled with religion. Caputo pro-
vocatively suggests that Derrida pres ents in  these texts his own thinking 
of a religion without religion, which consists of a messianicity without mes-
sianism, a desire for the Messiah or the wholly other that never gets ful-
filled. Caputo says that “Derrida too is trying to ofer us a work of thought 
that thinks the structural possibility of the religious, of a certain radical 
messianic structure, without the dangerous liaisons of the par tic u lar reli-
gions, without the dogma, without the determinate messianic faiths that 
divide humanity into warring parties.”25 Caputo isolates, emphasizes, and 
mobilizes Derrida’s religion without religion that comes to the fore in  these 
more recent texts.
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Even though this religious reading of Derrida has become much more 
common, if not commonplace, we should not forget how groundbreaking 
it was for many English- speaking readers in 1997. Caputo reflects on 
the historical context of reading Derrida, saying that “in the 1960s dif-
férance makes a more Nietz schean than Levinasian impression upon us, 
différance looks like the  free play of forces, not a way of making ready 
the coming of the tout autre; and one does not detect anything of the 
prayers and tears of Jacques Derrida or of his religion, about which no-
body knew anything.”26 In the 1960s, we did not know how to read or to 
think Derrida’s religion, about which he only  later becomes more expres-
sive and more confessional. For Caputo, as for Derrida, religion is a pas-
sion for God, but the passion for God is translatable or substitutable with 
other passions, including a passion for justice, but also a secret for which 
 there is no name.
Caputo concludes that
Derrida seems to say that “God” is the name of the absolute secret, 
a placeholder for the secret that  there is no secret truth, the blank 
truth in virtue of which we are always already exposed to multiple 
interpretations. “God” is a name for the inexpungeable textuality of 
his life and work, the split in his life that severs him from truth, so 
that it is up to  others to read him (who then know more than him), 
a limit structure.27
God is not a proper name or a master word, but a way to name this un-
namable secret. This secret, that  there is no ultimate or absolute secret but 
this lack of an ultimate secret does not thereby eliminate secrecy as such, 
is the source not only of thinking and writing, but of passion, of prayers 
and tears.
In Caputo’s thought, his reading of Derrida’s religion without religion 
becomes the hinge for Caputo’s own development of a radical theology, 
first explic itly expressed in The Weakness of God. In The Prayers and Tears 
of Jacques Derrida, Caputo imagines the possibility of such a Derridean 
theology when he says: “I have in mind a point at which theology, open-
ing itself to translatability, opens the wound of its own kenosis and sufers 
from its passion for the impossible.”28 This theology would no longer be 
able to save God or the name of God from translatability or change, and 
its desire for God would “fluctuate . . .  undecidably with atheism,” while 
its faith “must be faith without faith, without the assurances of faith.”29 
This promissory note gets cashed out in The Weakness of God.
In the Introduction to The Weakness of God, Caputo confesses his weak-
ness for theology. Although he mostly avoids endorsing the term in his 
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previous work,  after his move from Villanova University to Syracuse Uni-
versity in 2004, he comes to embrace a weak theology that in The Insis-
tence of God becomes a radical theology. Caputo says that he “freely own[s] 
up  here to a certain theological gesture, to a theological desire . . .  which 
is undeniably a desire for God, for something astir in the name of God, a 
desire for something I know not what, for which I pray night and day.”30 
The desire for God is a desire for “something astir in the name of God,” 
which is an event. Caputo proposes that “the name of God is an event, or 
rather that it harbors an event, and that theology is the hermeneutics of 
that event, its task being to release what is happening in that name.”31  Here 
theology names the hermeneutics of the event that is sheltered within the 
name of God, and weak theology attends to this event. Weak theology 
releases the event that is contained in and by the name of God.
For Caputo, the name of God is not a literal name; “the name can never 
be taken with literal force.”32 The name of God is deconstructible and de-
constructed, to allow for the event that it contains to be exposed. Weak 
theology deliteralizes the name of God, while at the same time it does not 
banish the name of God or prohibit it. Names are translatable, substitut-
able and deconstructible, but the event is undeconstructible. Why?  Because 
it is not a  thing;  there is nothing substantial to deconstruct. The event is a 
happening, but it is not simply what happens in an obvious or literal way. 
As Caputo paraphrases Gilles Deleuze, the event is what is  going on in 
what is happening. The event is a singularity, it is a diference that makes a 
diference, and it is a fundamental transformation or metamorphosis of a 
situation.
Caputo seizes on the significance of the concept of event for poststruc-
turalism, mainly Derrida and Deleuze, and he develops first a hermeneu-
tics and  later a theology that would be responsive to and expressive of the 
event. The event is not just an event of writing, a linguistic event; it is no 
less a religious and theological event. Caputo says that “the event that is 
promised by a given name is what Derrida calls ‘the undeconstructible.’ 
The event is always undeconstructible  because it is always promised or 
called for, always to come, whereas what actually arrives has arrived  under 
pres ent conditions and is always deconstructible.”33 What Caputo recog-
nizes is that the name of justice in Derrida’s essay “Force of Law” is an 
event, and that is what makes it undeconstructible. The event is the mes-
sianic horizon of  every action and being, but the event is also the surpris-
ing and unexpected aspect of experience that breaks with  every horizon 
and exposes any action or being to what it is not and what it never 
expected.
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Caputo contrasts his weak theology with a strong theology that holds 
fast to a literal name and understanding of God. “In a strong theology,” 
he writes, “God is the overarching governor of the universe, but in what 
follows I  will endeavor to show that the weak force of God  settles down 
below in the hidden interstices of being.”34 We have to be careful not to 
simply oppose weak to strong, as if they  were opposites. Weakness is not 
lack of strength; it is nothing at all relative to strong theology. Or rather, 
it is only something insofar as it is a call or a promise, a provocation or a 
charge. From the standpoint of determinate religion, God or god is a strong 
force, a power to do something substantial in the world. Caputo is not in-
vested in this traditional form of God. He is interested in thinking about 
God from the perspective of religion without religion, which means that 
God is not a  thing, a person, or a power. God is that name that names for 
certain religious  people something transformative, and it expresses an event, 
even while covering up the phenomenon of the event to a certain extent. 
Caputo is not interested in God as such; he is interested in the event that 
the name of God shelters. Just as Caputo liberates Derrida’s deconstruc-
tion from its textuality by demonstrating its religious passion, in The Weak-
ness of God, Caputo applies deconstruction to theology in order to liberate 
the event from its secure place within what we sometimes call God.
In The Weakness of God, Caputo proposes a God without sovereignty, 
in line with my perspective in Chapter 3 that Derrida’s philosophy implies 
a po liti cal theology without sovereignty. God is without sovereignty, and 
God is without being in any traditional sense. When we read Caputo’s the-
ology, the danger is to read it in conventional theological terms,  whether 
we are atheists or believers, and think that God must be some sort of hyper- 
being. This is the  whole point of Caputo’s appropriation of Derrida, how-
ever. It is absolutely not the case that deconstruction purifies God for us 
so that we can affirm a God beyond being in the way that Jean- Luc Marion 
does.35 No, God is not something, somewhere transcendent. God is not 
anything, but the word God names a call, a promise, that is the event of 
justice. The call of God as the event astir in the name of God keeps the 
world from closing in on itself, not  because it is opened up by some tran-
scendent other, but  because it is an immanent dynamic of constitution and 
in- constitution that Derrida names différance, and then khōra.
Caputo spells out what he does not mean by “God” very clearly in The 
Weakness of God:
By “God,” on the other hand, I do not mean a being who is  there, an 
entity trapped in being, even as a super- being up  there, up above the 
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world, who physically powers and  causes it, who made it and occa-
sionally intervenes upon its day- to- day activities to tweak  things for 
the better . . .  That I consider an essentially magical view of the 
world . . .  I mean a call that solicits and disturbs what is  there, an 
event that adds a level of signification and meaning, of provocation 
and solicitation to what is  there, that makes it impossible for the world, 
for what is  there, to  settle solidly in place, to consolidate, to close in 
on itself.36
The name of God contains a promise, a call to fashion the world other-
wise than it is, and an invitation to participate in this ongoing creation of 
signification and meaning.
The Weakness of God explores biblical narratives and themes with an eye 
to transforming them according to another “logic of sense” than the one that 
they have been given by strong theologies. Caputo asks the question about 
 these influential texts: “What event do  these stories harbor? What do  these 
stories mean? Hermeneutics is all. All  things flow in a river of meaning.”37 
In his book, he defamiliarizes  these stories by reading them through De-
leuze’s reflections on the paradoxes of Lewis Carroll in his book The Logic 
of Sense.38 This alternative logic of sense takes place in what Jesus calls the 
kingdom of God, but the kingdom is not a literal spatial reference. The 
kingdom, as expressed by and through Jesus, “is the locus of divine trans-
formation” where “ things are remade, refashioned in accord with their 
origin and congenital goodness.”39 Caputo distinguishes between miracle 
and magic, where magic refers to the literal coming back to life of Lazarus 
or Jesus, while a miracle is a theological term that “harbors an event of a 
deeply incarnate kind.”40 Salvation and resurrection are not magical fan-
tastical occurrences, but genuinely transformative experiences that testify 
to the event that Jesus released in his preaching of the kingdom of God.
Caputo argues that “salvation is situated, not in a heavenly plea sure but 
in the pain of the pres ent, ‘the very instant of pain.’ ”41 Citing Levinas, 
Caputo says that messianic hope is not simply for the  future, but for the 
 future in the pres ent, for the new beginning of what is taking place right 
now. The solitary ego imagines its own afterlife as an immortal existence 
into the indefinite time of the  future. But that’s not what salvation and 
resurrection mean, at least not in terms of an event. We want to preserve our 
own being from the full consequences of the event, the fact that we are 
not who we are, and cannot fully close in on ourselves in a gesture of auto- 
immunity: “Neither time nor salvation, neither rebirth nor resurrection, is 
pos si ble in the solitary ego.”42 For Caputo and for Levinas, messianic time 
refers to the coming of the other, which means the hope for more time and 
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for forgiveness  because we are not just ourselves but are already other. The 
relief of sufering is not simply the end of sufering. It is “just this sufering 
for which nothing can compensate that constitutes the ‘torsion’ and ‘exi-
gency’ of the moment” and what “gives it the force or energy to ‘unleash 
the  future,’ to open up the  future and make a new beginning pos si ble.”43
The Weakness of God elaborates a theology of the event. It does not re-
fuse the name of God, but it refuses to be tethered to what this name or-
dinarily means. The weakness of the title is not a weakness that could 
be contrasted with strength on any linear continuum, but a twisting  free 
from strong theology and strong religion. Weakening theology involves 
deconstructing theology, but deconstruction is not a negative procedure. 
Deconstruction is an affirmation, as Derrida claims and Caputo well 
knows, and it releases the event from its name without thereby abolishing 
the name.
Another way to speak of God is to say that God does not exist, but 
rather God insists. In The Insistence of God, Caputo develops a theology of 
“perhaps,” which is a term that Derrida often uses. The insistence on the 
word “perhaps” underlines the undecidability that is irreducible to religion, 
faith, and God for Caputo. He says that “something is calling, or rather 
something is getting itself called, in and  under the name of God, of 
‘God— perhaps,’ inasmuch as the caller in the call is structurally inac-
cessible, unidentifiable.”44 The event that Caputo associates with the name 
of God is a call to justice, ethical action, and responsibility. God is not a 
 thing or a being who could exist; God is the inscrutable name that indi-
cates the source of this call to responsible action. God’s call insists upon 
our lives.
Caputo explains that his faith “is placed in what is  going on in the name 
(of) ‘God’ and of ‘theology,’ which is the insistence of the event, or the 
chance of the event, and the corresponding faith that God can happen any-
where.”45 His faith is not simply faith in any determinate person or con-
cept of God, but “a deep and structural faith” in the possibility of an event 
that can transform us and make us better. The “perhaps,” however, is the 
fundamental acknowledgement that an event might not be good or make 
us good. It might be awful and terrible; it might constitute a disaster. Or 
we might ignore the call and cling to our comfortable habits and living 
and thinking. Following Derrida, Caputo affirms a radical hospitality, 
where hospitality “is a figure of the event” that signifies a welcoming of 
the other, while acknowledging that the in- coming of the other might not 
be a good  thing.
Caputo spends less time in this book on biblical stories than he does in 
The Weakness of God, but he does draw out a contrast between Mary and 
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Martha as two orientations to the world and the possibility of an event. In 
Luke 10:38–42, Jesus visits the home of Martha and Mary, and praises 
Mary for devoting her attention to his teachings while implicitly chastising 
Martha for complaining that she is not getting any assistance with her 
domestic work. Caputo follows Meister Eckhart’s reversal of the traditional 
reading of this passage that  favors Mary’s spiritual contemplation over Mar-
tha’s worldly action. For Caputo, “Martha is an emblem for me, a figure in 
whom all the dynamics of the event, of the insistence of the event, are con-
tracted.” Martha is emblematic  because Martha does not simply attend to 
the spiritual needs of Jesus and  others but she is primarily focused on meet-
ing material  human and animal needs in her per for mance of hospitality.46
According to Caputo, radical theology affirms the insistence of God over 
the existence of God, pays attention to the radical demand of hospitality, 
and stays with the ambiguity of the “perhaps” all the way. Radical theology 
in this book names what Caputo calls “weak theology” in The Weakness of 
God and “radical hermeneutics” in Radical Hermeneutics. Radical theology 
is derived from more orthodox, traditional, and confessional theologies, 
but it distorts and deforms them by being more faithful to the insistence 
of the event and the irreducibility of the perhaps. “The confessional the-
ologies are the only theologies that exist,” he writes, “while radical theol-
ogy, which does not exist, insists or haunts the confessional theologies.”47 
Radical theology breaks with the bound aries and authorities that circum-
scribe confessional theologies. Radical theology “reserves the right to ask 
any question, without regard to  whether it fractures or divides the com-
munity or  causes schismatic conflict and confessional breaks or engages 
in revisionist readings of classical scriptures.”48 Radical theology is radical 
all the way down to the roots, and it answers not to this or that par tic u lar 
institution or authority, but affirms a “hermeneutic universality” that strives 
“to talk to anyone, anywhere, anytime.”49
Caputo contrasts a species of postmodern theology or philosophy of reli-
gion derived from Kant that tries to limit the bounds of reason to make 
room for faith, with a more radical form of postmodern theology/philosophy 
of religion that is influenced by Hegel. The post- Kantian form of philoso-
phy of religion is more epistemological and apol o getic, striving to defend a 
realm of faith freed from the attacks of modernist rationalism, secularism, 
and atheism. This is a valid endeavor, but it ultimately tames postmodern 
philosophical and theological thinking  because it contains it. The Kantian 
version of postmodernism is more of “an abridged postmodernism” that 
tempers the absolutism of religious believers and atheist nonbelievers alike.50 
“In the version that descends from Hegel,” however, “postmodern theology is 
neither an epistemology nor an apol o getics but a genuinely radical theology 
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which mounts a heartier critique of confessional two- worlds theory.”51  There 
remains a residue of implicit dualism in Kantian and post- Kantian philoso-
phies of religion due to the distinction Kant makes between the noumenal 
(the  thing in itself, which is transcendent) and the phenomenal (the  thing as 
it appears to us, which is immanent) in his work.
Hegel overcomes what he perceives as a Kantian dualism, and Caputo 
affirms this aspect of Hegelian thought, despite his reservations about where 
Hegel ends up, which is an affirmation of absolute Spirit conceptualized 
in terms of the Concept or Notion, Begriff. Caputo explains that he affirms 
a heretical Hegelianism that disavows the teleology of philosophical Be-
griff and the progression of absolute Spirit that dominates Hegel’s philoso-
phy. Caputo says that “what I am calling a theology of the insistence of 
the event is a heretical version of Hegel, a variant postmodern Hegelian-
ism, a kind of hybrid or even headless Hegelianism without the Concept.”52 
Caputo asserts that Hegel rather than Kant is the true  father of radical 
theology, and he affirms Hegelianism in its heterodox form.
 Later in the book Caputo distinguishes his Hegelianism, still strongly 
influenced by Derrida, from the Hegelianism of Catherine Malabou and 
Slavoj Žižek. He also ofers some insightful engagements with the newer 
philosophy of Speculative Realism. One question about Hegel is just how 
orthodox Žižek’s and Malabou’s interpretations are, and if they are also 
heretical, how much they are similar to or divergent from that of Caputo. 
I think that they are closer than many readers would suspect. By way of a 
conclusion to this chapter, as well as a transition to the next chapter that 
 will focus on Malabou’s relationship to Derrida, I want to focus in more 
closely on Caputo’s critique of Malabou’s understanding of Hegel.
In Chapter 6 of The Insistence of God, a short but incredibly profound 
engagement with the philosophy of Catherine Malabou and her reading 
of Hegel, Caputo drops a bomb. The chapter title, “Is  There an Event in 
Hegel?,” attests to the significance of Caputo’s reevaluation of Hegel in the 
 middle of this book, which as we have seen is an affirmation and appro-
priation of Hegel for a radical theology of “perhaps.” This affirmation, how-
ever, can only go so far, and thus Caputo is forced to clarify and delimit 
his interpretation of Hegel in relation to  those of Malabou and Žižek (he 
criticizes Žižek in a  later chapter).
So the answer to the question of  whether  there is an event in Hegel is a 
kind of “perhaps,” which  here for Caputo does not mean undecidable; it 
means yes, up to a point, but ultimately no, not a radical enough event of 
the sort elaborated by Derrida and affirmed by Caputo. And this chapter 
gets at the heart of what’s at stake between radical theology and con-
temporary Continental philosophy in relation to the readings of Hegel, 
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Heidegger, and Derrida. Caputo advocates a heretical Hegelianism, and 
he claims that Malabou’s Hegel is also heretical but she is perhaps not explicit 
enough about this heresy, insofar as she reads Hegel through Heidegger 
but fails to admit it. Caputo says that Malabou’s speculative hermeneutics 
concerns the plasticity of “the auto- transforming life of the Absolute in 
time.”53 The Absolute is another name for Spirit, which is the subject of 
Hegel’s philosophical narrative. And the stakes are to what extent Malabou 
can read a radical contingency or accident into the necessity of essential 
Spirit.
On the one hand, Caputo argues that  there is contingency in Hegel’s 
dialectic of Spirit; it does not know how it  will unfold in time. We cannot 
see what is to come. On the other hand, Caputo claims that at the end of 
the day, at dusk, we can see what has come, what has happened, and can 
declare a retroactive necessity. Caputo’s central “claim is this: nothing is 
 going to happen that does not fulfill the destination of Spirit. If ‘eventu-
ally’ the Spirit can see  these unforeseeables coming, this undoes the 
‘event.’ ”54  Because Malabou’s argument depends on Hegel’s, Caputo can 
only go so far with Malabou. Malabou’s plasticity is tied to Hegel’s, and 
this limits the chance of the unforeseen event. An event can surprise us 
within a certain range or framework, but it cannot explode the framework 
itself. Caputo concludes that “ there is no absolute errancy in Hegel, no ab-
solute waste, no errancy that reaches as far as the absolute itself.”55
I have to confess that I do not know  whether or not this is a correct 
reading of Hegel, to the extent that it would supersede or render incorrect 
 these impor tant con temporary readings of Hegel by Malabou and Žižek, 
as well as that of Katrin Pahl in her impor tant book Tropes of Transport: 
Hegel and Emotion.56 I am not an expert or confident enough reader of 
Hegel to declare or decide that Caputo is right and Malabou is wrong, or 
vice versa. It’s pos si ble that Malabou’s reading of Hegel is impossible (and 
it is certainly only pos si ble via Heidegger), but I  don’t think it simply con-
forms to the strictures of Caputo’s understanding and pre sen ta tion of 
Hegel in his chapter.
Caputo lays out and endorses Derrida’s reservations about Malabou’s 
Hegel, and they are the same reservations that Derrida articulates in his 
Preface to Malabou’s book The  Future of Hegel. Derrida’s Preface is called 
“A Time for Farewells.”57 Caputo focuses on Derrida’s question about the 
death of God, and how radical it is in Hegel’s philosophy. As Caputo says, 
“could God, unawares, step on an explosive? Could God be blown to bits 
without so much as knowing what hit him?”58 Such an event would be 
an accident, and Derrida suggests that Hegel’s philosophy cannot make 
room for an absolute accident that would explode Spirit itself. In his Preface, 
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Derrida says that Hegel could never subscribe to a history in which God 
or Spirit could accidentally blow up:
A God who would have, without ever seeing it come, let an infinite 
bomb explode in his hands, a God dead by some hopeless accident, 
hopeless of any salvation or redemption, without essentializing sub-
lation, without any work of mourning and without any pos si ble re-
turn or refund, would that be the condition of a  future, if  there must 
be such a  thing called the  future?59
In Hegel’s dialectic, according to Derrida and Caputo,  there is no chance 
that God could be blown apart by an infinite bomb, and this is a delimita-
tion of the event as well as a limit of plasticity in Hegel.
I want to make two points  here in response to Caputo’s channeling of 
Derrida’s questioning of Malabou’s Hegel. First, my reading of Malabou 
and Malabou’s philosophy as she develops it  after The  Future of Hegel, partly 
in response to Derrida’s critique, suggests that plasticity is an event insofar 
as explosive plasticity is articulated along with the other two characteris-
tics of plasticity, the ability to give form and the capacity to receive form. 
 There is an event of plasticity in Malabou, and this becomes clear in her 
work on brain plasticity as well as her power ful readings of Freud in The 
New Wounded and Heidegger in The Heidegger Change. Just as Caputo sug-
gests that  there cannot be a thinking of accident without the notion of 
essence, so  there cannot be the idea of force without form, and further-
more, we do not know what it means to have or think an event except in 
contrast to some sort of being or structure.
I think that Malabou suggests that for Hegel, Spirit is this errancy and 
waste, that it is not a circular pro cess of Spirit becoming itself but an origi-
nary metamorphic change that we call Spirit afterward, in hindsight. It’s 
not that Spirit cannot die or that  there is any limit to what can happen to 
Spirit by accident; it’s that what ever happens can only be affirmed or 
 imagined to be Spirit essentially so long as  there is subjectivity to think it. 
So the question is, can Spirit die? Of course it can, it does all the time, 
and this explosivity of and to Spirit constitutes Spirit; it “makes” Spirit in 
us, it makes us inspire and expire. Spirit is change, exchange, metamor-
phosis. Death is not something that occurs in the  future, just as for Derrida 
the  future is not simply the indefinite extension of the pres ent. Accord-
ing to Caputo, in Hegel “the essential form does not mutate,” but in 
Malabou mutation is the “essence” of form.60 For Malabou, Derrida’s mes-
sianicity of the event threatens to swallow up form and induce a passivity 
into philosophy that she turns to Hegel and to brain plasticity to undo. 
Plasticity would be this forming of a  future that we cannot fully form, 
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but we can take responsibility for participating in and shaping it. I  don’t 
think  there is a teleology inherent in plasticity, although I do strug gle 
with the apparent teleology in Hegel at the level of his writings.
My second point is to emphasize just how explosive Caputo’s theology 
is  here in this chapter and generally. According to Caputo,
for  there to be a  future for God, God would have to be exposed to 
the final and uttermost risk of death, where death would be something 
more than a moment in a metaphysical transition, more than the 
plasticity of transformability, but the possibility of extinction, of en-
tropic dissipation, of a thermal equilibrium overtaking the divine 
fire, where  there would be neither form nor transformation, where 
the logic of the dialectic would be exploded by the logic of death and 
utter irreversible extinction.61
If  there is an absolute and irreversible extinction as speculated by Ray 
Brassier in his provocative book Nihil Unbound,  there is not only no more 
God, but no more form, and therefore no extinction of form. Caputo does 
not deny Brassier’s challenge; he acknowledges the “logic of death and ir-
reversible extinction.” This understanding operates dialectically in Capu-
to’s theology, to give rise to further forms of thought and practices of life 
for Mary, for Martha and for us.
Caputo says that Hegel and the theologians are on the same side in op-
posing this logic of death and irreversible extinction, and I want to under-
score the radicality of this thought, this radical theological thought of the 
death of God at the heart of The Insistence of God. This thought is explo-
sive, and it breaks with most recognizable forms of theology. The question 
is  whether this explosive theological thinking is, in fact, plastic, in Mala-
bou’s sense, and also  whether in some sense Malabou and Caputo are on 
the same “side.” Malabou is not a theologian. She does not want to hold 
onto the life of God, or save God from risk of death. Perhaps plasticity is 
incompatible with a weak theology of the event, at least from the view-
point of conventional philosophy and confessional theology. But for “a 
new species of theologians,” it might not be pos si ble or necessary—or 
even in the last instance accidental—to choose between plasticity and the 
event, between Caputo and Malabou, or between two  futures of Derrida.
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As we saw in the previous chapter in Caputo’s critique of Malabou, Derrida 
expresses his reservations about Malabou’s understanding of the plasticity 
of Hegelian Spirit in his Preface to her first book, The  Future of Hegel. Der-
rida’s Preface is called “A Time for Farewells,” and he asks  whether one 
could ever fi nally bid farewell to Spirit, or would it necessarily always 
return?1 In this chapter, I explore Malabou’s development of the destructive 
plasticity of being, form, or Spirit, partly in response to Derrida’s critique. 
Malabou’s understanding of plasticity accomplishes two  things: First, she 
argues that plasticity replaces writing as a motor scheme, and second, she 
advocates a biological materialism that remains faithful in some re spects 
to the legacy of deconstruction.
Although Caputo and Malabou are faithful to Derrida in very dif er ent 
ways, I am suggesting that they are both reading Derrida from beyond the 
vantage point of writing as a motor scheme. Malabou does not share 
 Caputo’s Derridean faith, and she is much more critical of Derrida’s  later 
work, but she does so out of an efort to graft plasticity onto writing as the 
shift from an earlier to a  later Derrida. Caputo, as we have seen, attends to 
this religious or messianic passion to which Derrida increasingly gives voice, 
and he situates religion without religion in the context of a broader econ-
omy than other En glish speaking readers. Caputo over- reads Derrida’s 
religious passion, perhaps, but he is right to see, to celebrate, and to liberate 
it. Malabou does not share this religious passion, but her desire for plastic-
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As already mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, I do not think 
that Malabou’s notion of plasticity simply fits into Caputo’s critique, which 
follows Derrida’s response to her interpretation of Hegel. At the same time, 
I think that Malabou develops the negative or destructive aspect of plas-
ticity partly in response to Derrida’s critical questions in his preface to her 
Hegel book about  whether Spirit could explode.  Here again I want to dis-
tance my interpretations of Caputo, Malabou, and Derrida from any ex-
egetical questions about Hegel’s texts. First, I  will focus on Malabou’s 
contrast between plasticity and writing as a motor scheme, and then I turn 
to her elaboration of the destructive ele ments of plasticity. Fi nally, I  will 
show how Malabou’s interest in biological plasticity generates a new 
materialism.
In her book Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing, Malabou reflects on the 
philosophical trajectory of her entanglement with Derrida, Heidegger, and 
Hegel to her breakthrough work in theorizing the brain sciences. She says 
that Derrida’s concept of “arche- writing” represents an enlargement and a 
modification of writing, and that this enlarged conception of writing func-
tions for Derrida and other phi los o phers as a motor scheme. This scheme 
is connected in an impor tant way to temporality and history. Malabou says 
that “all thought needs a scheme, that is, a motive, produced by a rational 
imagination, enabling it to force open the door to an epoch and open up 
exegetical perspectives suited to it.”2 Writing for Derrida becomes a gener-
alized motor scheme, sufficient to explain and justify deconstructive 
readings of texts.
Arche- writing is the object of a new science of grammatology that lib-
erates writing from language and linguistics in any narrow sense. Writing 
attends to “the general movement of the trace, the original breach without 
which speech would be impossible.”3 So writing is never simply what we 
literally think of as writing  because it becomes much more generalized. 
Malabou argues that plasticity can be seen at first as yet another modifica-
tion of writing, including by Derrida himself in his Preface to The  Future 
of Hegel, but she comes to view plasticity as an alternative and successive 
motor scheme. In her book on Heidegger, The Heidegger Change, Mala-
bou understands Heideggerian ontological diference as change or meta-
morphosis. Change is fundamental, and the presupposition for thinking 
anything at all. Plasticity then becomes a change or modification of writ-
ing, but one that is radical rather than derivative. Plasticity is not simply a 
modification of writing, but a transformation of writing into plasticity as 
a new motor scheme.
Malabou states that “a motor scheme, the pure image of a thought— 
plasticity, time, writing—is a type of tool capable of garnering the great-
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est quantity of energy and information in the text of an epoch.” This pure 
image of thought, a Deleuzian term originally from Difference and Repeti-
tion, names what Deleuze calls a plane of immanence in his and Guattari’s 
work. Writing can be seen and named as a pure image of thought in its 
time now that that time is passing; it is at dusk, “the dusk of written form.”4
If plasticity is now the motor scheme that replaces writing, it is  because 
“the concept of plasticity is becoming both the dominant formal motif of 
interpretation and the most productive exegetical and heuristic tool of our 
time.”5 Plasticity is more adequate to the biological and neurological sci-
ences of our time than writing is. Writing became a motor scheme during 
an epoch “that began with structuralism and found its mooring in lin-
guistics, ge ne tics, and cybernetics.”6 In the twenty- first  century, the preva-
lence of the brain sciences changes how we think about thinking  because 
we no longer operate with a  simple opposition between form on the one 
hand and gap or trace on the other. All of  these concepts transform them-
selves in relation to what we are able to learn and discover about ce re bral 
plasticity, such that we no longer work with graphic meta phors but rather 
“assemblies, forms, or neuronal populations.”7 Writing cannot explain how 
the brain works, but plasticity can and does.
Writing contains a graphic ele ment that is irreducible, and the notion 
of writing as a motor scheme necessarily implies an absent/non- absent trace. 
The trace defines writing as a motor- scheme  because writing consists of 
leaving and then interpreting traces. Traces are always traces of something. 
The incompleteness of traces is what is changed in the transformation of 
writing into plasticity. Plastic traces are not signs of something  else, but 
forms- in- formation, including transformation and annihilation of form it-
self. In another essay, “Grammatology and Plasticity,” included in her 
book Changing Difference, Malabou elaborates on this delimitation of Der-
rida. She explains how grammatology is not a strict science, but it takes on 
a certain scientific form, the impossibility of a “science of writing,” to il-
lustrate what she calls in Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing a motor scheme.
Derrida names arche- writing as “the original trace, the deferment of 
presence and of living speech” to suggest a “generalized writing that ‘cov-
ers the entire field of linguistic signs,’ in other words, the entire field of 
 human activity.”8 Malabou argues that this modification of writing is still 
a re- writing, and takes place  under the sign of writing in general. But what 
happens if and when writing comes to an end? Plasticity is what happens 
“ after” writing for Malabou. She asserts that “it is clear  today that writing, 
as motor scheme, is no longer pregnant in the real.”9 In Plasticity at the 
Dusk of Writing, Malabou claims that “plasticity is the systemic law of the 
deconstructed real, a mode of organ ization of the real that comes  after 
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metaphysics and that is appearing  today in all the dif er ent domains of 
 human activity.”10 The real as a locus of the motor scheme has a Lacanian 
resonance, and we can also recall that Alain Badiou characterizes the 
twentieth  century as having a passion for the real.11
Deconstruction always relates to the real, what ever its motor scheme, 
and Malabou philosophizes beyond Derrida and beyond deconstruction 
 because she questions writing as a motor scheme. Malabou replaces writ-
ing with plasticity as a substitute motor scheme, and I am not arguing that 
she is simply right or wrong, although her work is extremely convincing 
that plasticity is a new motor scheme, even if it is not entirely clear  whether 
or not it is the motor scheme, or  whether  there can be only one at any given 
time. I am suggesting that something changes, and Malabou is attuned to 
this transformation, and she attempts to think Derrida’s philosophy in this 
new mode. Furthermore, even if Derrida himself refuses plasticity as a motor 
scheme, my argument is that this transformation is what drives Derrida to 
think and write deconstruction diferently  after 1989.
 After 1989, Derrida comes to express his ideas more explic itly in terms 
of a paradoxical relationship between technics or the machinic, and a kind 
of ethical responsibility as openness to the other, including the other in 
me. The context for this twofold reflection is less writing in any explicit or 
even general sense, and more ungrounded. Malabou ofers a ground, or at 
least a scheme, for us to help think through and beyond Derrida’s own phi-
losophy. In constituting her understanding of a motor scheme by means 
of neurological plasticity, she wants to close the gap between technics and 
responsibility that Derrida wants to hold open. Derrida works with and 
through the paradoxical tension between the machinic repetition and the 
singular dignity of life as ethical responsibility to the other, whereas Mal-
abou wants to unify both in her conception of plasticity. Derrida’s  later 
work thus appears more ungrounded, and he would resist adopting Mala-
bou’s characterization of this new motor scheme, but her idea of plasticity 
gives us a vantage point from which to make Derrida’s philosophy more 
coherent, even if it betrays some of the letter of his writings.
Malabou does not follow the religious implications of Derrida, as Caputo 
does, but both are attentive to something that perhaps Derrida was not 
fully aware of, that at a certain moment in time deconstruction twists  free 
of writing. This liberation has religious implications, but it also has po liti-
cal, scientific, and other implications,  whether we want to follow or en-
dorse them or not. The question that drives this book is  whether Derrida’s 
philosophy has a  future, and its tentative suggestion is that this answer 
depends on the extent to which it can be released from writing. Accord-
ing to Malabou, “the choice seems  simple:  either we recognize that decon-
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struction is dead and repeat that this is the case, or we accept the new 
change in modification, in other words, a change of diference.”12 This 
change of diference names the exchange of plasticity for writing, and it 
names a  future for deconstruction and for Derrida, at least for Malabou.
Much of the possibility of envisioning plasticity in the wake of writing 
lies in plasticity’s destructive power. According to Malabou, plasticity in-
volves both the capacity to receive form and the capacity to give form, from 
the Greek word plassein.  These two complementary aspects of plasticity in 
a classical sense are supplemented by the third capacity of plasticity, “the 
capacity to annihilate the very form it is able to receive or create.”13 This 
explosive quality of plasticity involves the auto- annihilation of form. This 
explosive annihilation of form is necessary for repair, for healing, and for 
growth of neuroplastic cells, according to Malabou. In What Should We Do 
with Our Brain?, she argues that “the sculpture of the self is born from the 
deflagration of an original biological matrix, which does not mean that 
this matrix is disowned or forgotten but that it cancels itself.”14 Plasticity 
takes place between shaping of form and destruction of that form itself. 
Destruction of form is an intrinsic part of the pro cess of formation.
In The New Wounded, Malabou develops a critique of Freud by suggest-
ing that the sexuality of the unconscious mind is changeable but not de-
structible. The limits of a psychoanalytic understanding of the person lie 
not in emotional  mental trauma, which can always be recuperated into the 
existing self, but in brain injury. Brain injury changes the person so pro-
foundly that we cannot simply say that it is the same person. Malabou’s 
careful reading and delimitation of psychoanalysis should not be seen as a 
crude biological reductionism, but a way to challenge the presuppositions 
and limits of Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis itself.
The New Wounded is impor tant for many reasons, but primarily for the 
distinction Malabou makes between the psychoanalytic notion of sexual-
ity and the neurological idea of ce re bralité; that is, the understanding of 
how the brain works changes how we conceive of an event. The ce re bral 
event radically transforms subjectivity, while the sexual event is always as-
similated into or appropriated by the subject. What Malabou is interested 
in  here is the destructive plasticity represented by brain wounds,  whether 
caused by trauma as in post- traumatic stress disorder or diseases such as 
Alzheimer’s. This destructive ability of brain wounds to profoundly and 
irrevocably alter the self makes it entirely dif er ent from Freudian psycho-
analysis, which always incorporates external events into internal, psychic 
and sexual pro cesses,  whether conscious or unconscious. She claims that 
“the re sis tance of ce re brality to sexuality, in the final instance, pertains to 
the manner in which the ce re bral self belongs to the other without alienation 
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or specularity.”15 Neurological discoveries expose the contingency and 
fragility of identity, which Malabou then draws upon to show how  these 
pro cesses change how we have to think about Freud.
Malabou draws on current neurological research and con temporary psy-
choanalytic works and applies them to a careful, penetrating and convincing 
reading of Freud’s primary texts, in order to fashion her original inter-
pretation. She claims that Freud ultimately fails to get beyond the plea sure 
princi ple, despite his  later intentions,  because he always reduces events to 
internal sexual  causes, and he cannot truly think the possibility of external 
chance or accidental events. The psychic or sexual event is the appropria-
tion of any event whatsoever into the psyche, and this linkage forms a to-
tality in Freud’s thought. On the other hand, Freud cannot think a purely 
ce re bral event, one that comes from outside and cannot be mentally con-
nected or assimilated into a subject’s psychic pro cesses. What is so in ter-
est ing and ironic, of course, is the fact that the brain is seen as “internal” in 
bodily terms, but its wounding or alteration is inassimilable into psychic 
relationships. Brain wounds so radically alter personality that someone can 
become someone  else, and this is a loss so total that it precludes mourning, 
except by  others.
At the end of The New Wounded, Malabou rewrites the Freudian death 
drive in ce re bral or neurological terms. The death drive is beyond love and 
hate, sadism and masochism,  because it is associated with the ce re bral 
event, the destructive annihilation of personality by means of a wounding 
trauma. The death drive is the augur of a new materialism, a materialism 
that is completely outside the psychic subject, and the subject is exposed to a 
vulnerability that she cannot control or assimilate. She claims that “only 
profound reflection upon destruction, death, and the negativity of the wound 
 will make pos si ble a truly efficacious and pertinent approach to the neuro-
psychoanalytic clinic.”16 Although her reading is a critical reading, Malabou 
does not simply dismiss Freud’s work and significance, or claim that neuro-
logical research makes it obsolete in a straightforward scientific or positivistic 
way. By re- writing the death drive from the standpoint of the ce re bral event, 
she forces readers to confront and engage with Freud and post- Freudian, in-
cluding Lacanian, thought in a dif er ent and impor tant manner.
In Self and Emotional Life, coauthored with Adrian Johnston, Malabou 
further reflects on the theme of destructive plasticity that she has elabo-
rated in The New Wounded. In her contribution to this collaboration, she 
focuses on the question of afect, and engages what Derrida calls “hetero-
afection.” Afect for Derrida is always heteroafection, and deconstruction 
shares with psychoanalysis a focus on afect as predominantly related to 
the subject, and loss of afect as alienation. In this model, “the loss of af-
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fects is . . .  the subject’s total disconnection from her afects.”17 In her con-
tribution in Self and Emotional Life, “Go Won der,” Malabou focuses 
mainly on Descartes and Spinoza, and she also considers the writings of 
the neurologist Antonio Damasio. She ties this reading, as she does so much 
of her work, to a critique of deconstruction. Malabou explains that “one 
of the major points of discussion between philosophy, psychoanalysis, and 
neurobiology concerns not only the possibility of heteroafection, but the 
possibility of a hetero- heteroafection.”18 Heteroafection is still an afect, 
but hetero- heteroafection breaks with any sense of afect and destroys the 
foundation of our sense of what it means to be a self.
Hetero- heteroafection in “Go Won der” plays a role similar to ce re brality 
and the possibility of brain injury in The New Wounded. Her argument 
with Derrida in “Go Won der” parallels her critique of psychoanalysis in 
The New Wounded. She turns to Damasio for a thinking of the self that 
does not presuppose a baseline psyche. “The neurobiological approach to 
emotions,” Malabou suggests, “allows us to think a strangeness or estrange-
ment of the self to its own affects.”19 The self can only be thought, as it can 
only be fashioned, in negative terms, according to this destructive plastic-
ity, which “forms and sculpts a new identity.”20 According to Malabou, 
destructive plasticity does not simply destroy. It’s also forms something 
new, even if this something or someone is so radically dif er ent as to make 
recognition impossible. The result of destructive plasticity in the form of a 
serious brain injury “is the formation of ‘someone  else,’ a new self, a self 
that is not able to recognize itself.”21
Destructive plasticity marks an extreme limit of plasticity in its nega-
tive form, but it still manages to contribute to a new formation. Destruc-
tive plasticity incorporates what Derrida analyzes as the machinic repetition 
of technics in “Faith and Knowledge” and elsewhere. The productive prom-
ise of plasticity also generates a kind of ethical responsibility, even as it 
denies the transcendence that is usually associated with Derrida’s and Levi-
nas’s ethics. How does this work? In an essay from Changing Difference, 
“The Phoenix, the Spider, and the Salamander,” Malabou responds more 
explic itly to Derrida’s critique in “A Time for Farewells” by ofering an in-
terpretation of Hegel’s sentence from the Phenomenology of Spirit: “The 
wounds of the Spirit heal and leave no scars  behind.”22 We can read and 
interpret this sentence in at least three ways: dialectically in a conventional 
sense, deconstructively in a Derridean sense, or post- deconstructively, 
which is the reading that Malabou wants to suggest. She fastens on the 
example of the salamander, which heals its amputated tail without leaving 
a scar due to specialized trans- diferentiated stem cells. “When a salaman-
der or lizard’s tail grows back,” she explains, “we do indeed have an instance 
116 ■ Malabou’s Biological Materialism
of healing without a scar. The member reconstitutes itself without the 
amputation leaving any trace.”23 This example is crucial for Malabou be-
cause  here destructive plasticity works to regenerate without leaving a scar 
or a trace. Plasticity works in a way that deconstruction, according to the 
scheme of writing, does not.
Plasticity is destructive, but this destructive nature of plasticity is not 
simply negative. It is also metamorphic. The third ele ment of plasticity, its 
explosive aspect, changes radically, so radically that our presumptions of 
identity may no longer hold. But this radical plasticity is also a form of 
regeneration and freedom  because it is “only in making explosives does life 
give shape to its own freedom, that is, turn away from pure ge ne tic deter-
minism.”24 An energetic explosion is the idea of nature, a Hegelian Idea in 
nature but not one that has to overcome itself in sublation to become self- 
conscious. Rather, the idea is the explosion of itself, and spirit is a bomb. As 
Malabou acknowledges that, “If we  didn’t explode at each transition, if we 
 didn’t destroy ourselves a bit, we could not live. Identity resists its own oc-
currence to the very extent that it forms it.”25 At the extreme, this destruc-
tive plasticity is so radical that we can no longer recognize who we are, but 
this is the case even when we think we do recognize ourselves and each 
other. Or as Malabou expresses it in The New Wounded, “What scorches the 
symbolic is the material destruction of the  Thing.”26 And this material char-
acter of destructive plasticity identifies plasticity as other than writing.
A healing that leaves a scar or a trace works according to the model of 
writing  because we can always read the traces that the injury shows. On 
the other hand, regeneration operates according to a dif er ent model, that 
of cloning. For Malabou, “when a lizard’s tail grows back, it leaves no trace 
of the amputation at all.”27 This finite reconstitution of an organ is for Mal-
abou “a regeneration of diference.”28 What she calls the paradigm of the 
salamander permanently erases writing by means of this replication, which 
is a change of diference. Diference changes, it changes form, and it does 
so without leaving any trace. The change in form that leaves no trace is also 
for Malabou a response, and to the extent that we recognize it becomes our 
responsibility. This is the responsibility that she invokes in her question 
and title “What Should We Do with Our Brain?”
In her essay, Malabou says that plasticity is “the re sis tance of différance 
to its graphic reduction.”29 Writing is a non- present / non- absent absence, 
where traces manifest what they can never fully pres ent. But according to 
Malabou, Derrida himself  later abandoned his eforts to deconstruct pres-
ence, primarily with the shift in focus to the “undeconstructible.” The un-
deconstructible, “that Derrida outlined in his late work  under the names 
of ‘justice’ or ‘democracy,’ ” is a name for something that comes back and 
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regenerates like a salamander.30 “The un- deconstructible is not of the 
 order of presence,” Malabou claims, “but it is just as much a form of re sis-
tance to the text.”31 This means that Derrida himself grappled with the 
metamorphosis of writing in the name of the undeconstructible, and we 
have translated this change into religious, ethical, and po liti cal categories. 
Malabou’s philosophy helps us to understand how and why Derrida’s phi-
losophy changes, even if it does not simply turn. And she helps us read 
deconstruction as a form of materialism.
For Malabou, the brain is the locus of the self, as well as the place where 
history, biology, and politics happen. It is also where deconstruction hap-
pens, if  there is such a  thing. She charges Derrida with failing to thoroughly 
think deconstruction’s implication in the sciences, including neurology and 
biology. Based on her work on plasticity, she thinks that “the time has come 
to elaborate a new materialism, which would determine a new position of 
Continental philosophy vis- à- vis the humanities and biological sciences.”32 
What is this new materialism?
New Materialism (sometimes called neo- materialism by Rosi Braidotti) 
is a name that emerges in the 1990s, centered around interpretations of 
Merleau- Ponty, Deleuze and Irigaray by theorists such as Braidotti, Jane 
Bennett, William Connolly, Manuel Delanda, and Isabelle Stengers. The 
New Materialism ofers resources to think about materialism other wise than 
as a reductionist and determinist atomistic materialism, in concert with 
systems theory, chaos theory, and complexity theory.  Here, being is not 
reduced to its smallest components or building blocks, but it is always in 
dynamic transformation. Malabou picks up on the phrase “new material-
ism” as a way to situate her work on plasticity, despite her focus on Hegel, 
Heidegger, and Derrida.
Influenced by Sartre and Bergson, Derrida resists the philosophy of 
materialism, seeing it as a  simple deterministic and mechanistic theory of 
the world. His early work on Husserl showed the aporias that Husserl’s 
philosophy kept coming up against as he tried to steer between a transcen-
dental logicism and a phenomenological empiricism.  These aporias afect 
not only philosophy and epistemology but also science and mathe matics.33 
As his philosophy developed, Derrida was less and less explic itly engaged 
with the natu ral sciences, and Malabou has shifted to paradigms of neurol-
ogy and biology to ofer a corrective to this limit of Derrida’s philosophy.
What con temporary research in brain sciences shows is how this divide 
between mechanism and spirit comes undone. The brain is fully material 
and it is fully spiritual at the same time, provided we understand spirit 
in non- teleological terms. Malabou states that “we persist in thinking of 
the brain as a centralized, rigidified, mechanical organ ization, and of the 
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mechanical itself as a brain reduced to the work of calculation.”34 But this 
understanding is precisely what plasticity undermines  because “plasticity 
perhaps designates nothing but the eventlike dimension of the mechani-
cal.”35 Plasticity allows us to see the event in the mechanism, the “spirit” 
in the material, without it thereby ceasing to be material.
For Malabou, plasticity “is able to momentarily characterize the material 
organ ization of thought and being,” which is why “we should certainly be 
engaging deconstruction in a new materialism.”36 The new materialism is 
a biological materialism of form, the plasticity of form. In an essay on Dar-
win and natu ral se lection, Malabou affirms the plasticity of biological 
evolution: “Indeed, plasticity situates itself efectively at the heart of the 
theory of evolution.”37 Natu ral se lection reveals the plasticity of the organ-
ization and structure of the organism at the level of both species and indi-
vidual. The organism’s variability indicates a pro cess of transformation and 
se lection, and this system that evolution constitutes “hinges on plasticity 
understood as the flexibility and fluidity of structures on the one hand and 
plasticity understood as a natu ral decision of  viable, durable forms likely 
to constitute a legacy or lineage.”38 Natu ral se lection is not teleological, but 
it works  because of its inherent plasticity.
Malabou focuses on the key role of plasticity in Darwinian evolution, 
which is affirmed by Darwin himself. She argues that we need a social un-
derstanding of se lection that is closer to this biological model, which is 
provided by Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietz sche’s eternal return. Mala-
bou says that, for Deleuze, “se lection is a return, but a return that is not 
the same. It is productive repetition of diference, we read in Difference and 
Repetition; and the eternal return signifies that being is se lection.”39 
Deleuze’s idea of se lection works in the same way that biological se lection 
does—in a plastic manner. Malabou also appeals to con temporary neu-
rology for a biological understanding that implicitly incorporates this logic 
of social se lection along with natu ral se lection. She focuses on the theories 
of Jean- Pierre Changeux, Philippe Courrége, and Antoine Danchin who 
develop a “ mental Darwinism,” which constitutes a form of “epigenesis by 
the selective stabilization of synapses.”40 Ge ne tics comprises the data for 
cells and organisms, while epige ne tic modifications introduce “variability 
that depends for an essential part on environmental influence, on educa-
tion, and on experience which Darwin greatly helps us to think.”41
Epigenet ics is a new frontier in biological evolution and neurology. 
Epigenet ics does not replace ge ne tics, but it shows how specific actualiza-
tions and modifications of genes occur.42 The ge ne tic data comprises the 
envelope within which se lection occurs, but epigenet ics concerns the ac-
tualization of this data, or the se lection of a par tic u lar history. Malabou’s 
Malabou’s Biological Materialism ■ 119
recent work shows how plasticity is “the epige ne tic variable par excellence” 
that lies “at the heart of the relationship between variation and se lection.” 
The environment triggers certain histones in an epige ne tic manner, and  these 
hormones shape the individual organism in a way that is inheritable, de-
spite the neo- Darwinian dogma. The inheritance of acquired characteris-
tics sounds Lamarckian, but this neo- Lamarckianism of epigenet ics ofers 
a new way to think the link between nature and culture. The philosophi-
cal understanding of the se lection of cultural forms based on Deleuze’s 
reading of Nietz sche operates based on “a princi ple of variation- selection 
analogous to the one that operates in nature.”43 A sophisticated under-
standing of Darwinian evolution, the newer science of epigenet ics, con-
temporary neurology, and Continental philosophy all converge on the 
plasticity of organic and cultural form.
Fi nally, in an essay on “The  Future of Derrida,” Malabou shows how 
her understanding of epigenet ics and biological materialism can be a way 
to refashion rather than repudiate Derrida’s philosophy.  Here Malabou op-
poses the themes of messianicity and the undeconstructible that charac-
terize Derrida’s  later work  because they undermine an operative notion of 
time. She claims that in works such as “Faith and Knowledge,” for exam-
ple, “time as such has been dissolved into messianity.”44 This dissolution 
of time undoes the  future except as a shadowy challenge to any concrete 
anticipation of it. “Exploring the neurological concept of plasticity,” how-
ever, is for Malabou “a way to look for a new systematic question of time 
opposing messianity.”45 Plasticity enters into the materiality of the biological 
system and ofers a new form of temporality that opposes the temporality 
of deconstruction and engages anew the “dialogue between determinism 
and freedom.”46
This dialogue operates at the level of the interaction between ge ne tics 
and epigenet ics, as we have seen. Epigenet ics opens up a space for the role 
of education and culture to shape an organism in power ful ways. Malabou 
links epigenet ics to a reading of Kant, who speaks in the Critique of Pure 
Reason of the “epigenesis” of reason. Epigenesis refers to “a biological the-
ory that opposes preformation,” where the individual begins with an un-
formed material in which “the form emerges gradually, over time.”47 Kant 
cites the epigenesis of reason, but then limits it  because he cannot imagine 
that a priori concepts or categories could evolve. For Malabou, this opens a 
space for the radicalization of Kantian epigenesis: “If reason is creative and 
self- formative, we are then allowed to say that the transcendental itself is 
plastic, and that  there must be a kind of experience within the realm of the 
a priori.”48 She admits that Kant would not have accepted the notion of a 
plasticity of the transcendental, but that Hegel would and does.
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At the end of her essay, Malabou contests the idea of the undecon-
structible. She says that “it arbitrarily both limits deconstruction and 
marks its sovereignty.”49 On the contrary, Malabou confesses her faith that 
nothing is undeconstructible. The plasticity of the transcendental means 
that every thing, including the transcendental, is deconstructible. And this 
opens a genuine  future, with and against Derrida. We might want to cling 
to Derrida and resist this understanding of plasticity, time and  future. Or 
we might want to view deconstruction itself as plastic, which is less a be-
trayal of Derrida than a way of opening his philosophy to a  future, which 
is not his own.
We know that Derrida himself tried to anticipate and affirm the  future, 
even though he knew that he could not anticipate his  future, or that of 
deconstruction.  There is no absolute necessity that the  future of Derrida 
be Malabou’s, but  there is no a priori reason that it could not. I have tried 
in this chapter to read Malabou’s challenge to deconstruction in a way that 
is compatible in some ways with Caputo’s affirmation of the religious pas-
sion of Derrida’s philosophy, even though it reaches a limit in technical 
terms. At the same time, I do think that  there is a perspective in which we 
can view Derrida’s thought genet ically outside of an envelope of writing, 
and that this can still be faithful, at least to the spirit of deconstruction. 
Derrida enlarges our understanding of writing; he generalizes it. But he 
becomes more difficult to read and to appreciate his importance as this 
paradigm of writing or arche- writing recedes in significance. It’s not a 
 simple, straightforward linear replacement of one motor scheme by another, 
but a complex interaction that does occur in time.
Malabou’s profound philosophical work challenges deconstruction. At 
the same time,  there is still a relation to deconstruction, as she herself con-
stantly affirms. She is both a critical reader of Derrida as well as a power-
ful phi los o pher in her own right. And she helps us understand the ways in 
which the natu ral sciences are crucial for what is called Continental phi-
losophy and vice versa. This connection is vital not only for the  future of 
deconstruction, but for humanity as well, given the ecological situation of 
our time, including the limits of economic growth given finite natu ral 
resources. We need a philosophical and theological ecol ogy in a broad 
sense, and Derrida and Malabou, as well as Deleuze and Guattari and 
more generally what is called New Materialism, provide theoretical re-
sources. In the final chapter, I delve into some philosophical aspects of 
theoretical quantum physics, and see how a con temporary phi los o pher 
of science, Karen Barad, uses Derrida’s philosophy to make sense of real ity 
at the subatomic level.
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At the end of The New Wounded, Malabou suggests that a wounded 
subject could be so intensely wounded that she could no longer be capable 
of responding to a person or a situation with afect or transference. She 
asks, “How could we deny that the new wounded call responsibility into ques-
tion?”1 If the inability of the patient to respond calls into question respon-
sibility, this suggests that “between psychoanalysis and neurology, it is 
precisely the sense of ‘the other’ that is displaced.”2 If the other is displaced 
from subjectivity in neurology and neurological brain damage, then we 
might have to seek it elsewhere, on the basis of what Malabou calls “a non-
transferential clinic,” or an analy sis that does not depend primarily on the 
other’s conscious recognition.
One of the ways I am trying to read Derrida is by displacing his phi-
losophy to an other context, one that is more explic itly material and plas-
tic. For Malabou, plasticity is the sign of a neurological paradigm and the 
site of a biological materialism. My turn to the work of Karen Barad  here 
is not meant to invalidate the significance of biology or to undermine 
the importance of Malabou’s philosophy, but to ofer another displace-
ment, a “nontransferential clinic” of quantum physics where a quantum 
Derrida operates. This shift to the quantum level, and in par tic u lar quantum 
field theory, allows us to further reflect on two threads that have already 
been acknowledged in this book.
The first theme is the underdeveloped third entity of Derrida’s question-
ing of Heidegger’s threefold schema of stone, animal and  human. It appears 
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Faith is a cascade.
— Alice Fulton, “Cascade Experiment”
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that in his late work Derrida was obsessed with  these Heideggerian  theses 
from Heidegger’s lecture course on The Fundamental Concepts of Meta-
physics. Derrida intervenes into Heidegger’s  theses most intensively on the 
notion of the animal. Heidegger distinguishes the animal, which is poor 
in world, from the stone, which simply lacks a world, and the  human be-
ing, who possesses the capacity of world- building. Derrida challenges the 
separation Heidegger sets forth between the animal and the  human. In 
Chapter  6 of Of Spirit, for example, Derrida challenges Heidegger’s 
denial of world and spirit to the animal in his infamous Rectorship ad-
dress.  Here, Heidegger claims that “the world is always a spiritual world,” 
and “the animal has no world”; therefore “the animal has no spirit since, 
as we have just read,  every world is spiritual. Animality is not of spirit.”3
Derrida does not  really reflect on the situation of the stone in his mul-
tiple engagements with Heidegger, although he does express astonishment 
that Heidegger uses a par tic u lar example  here rather than a general cate-
gory of an inanimate object. He asks: “Why does he take the example of 
an inanimate  thing, why a stone and not a plank or a piece of iron, or  water 
or fire?”4 At the same time, as we have already seen, Derrida says in “Rams” 
that “for reasons I cannot develop  here, nothing appears to me more prob-
lematic than  these three  theses.”5 He not only questions the thesis about 
the animal; he also implies that the thesis about the stone being worldless 
is problematic, at least in comparison to the animal and the  human. A stone 
is an object, and objects are much more complicated than we might sup-
pose, as discussed in Chapter 5. In this chapter, however, I want to con-
sider what kind of objects are subatomic particles?
The second theme of Derrida’s that I want to develop  here in relation 
to quantum physics is the provocative claim that “all other is all other.” 
This the phrase suggested in the last chapter of The Gift of Death, the 
idea that “tout autre est tout autre.” In The Gift of Death, Derrida reads 
Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, with its reflection on the Aqedah where 
Abraham nearly sacrifices Isaac. In his reading, Derrida generalizes the 
situation of sacrifice treated in the biblical story, and he understands that 
the ram substitutes as a sacrifice for Isaac but that does not do away with 
the sacrificial economy with which we continue to operate. Our civilized 
society “puts to death or . . .  allows to die of hunger and disease tens of 
millions of  children . . .  without any moral or  legal tribunal ever being con-
sidered competent to judge such a sacrifice, the sacrifice of  others to avoid 
being sacrificed oneself.”6 He says that we possess no authority, institu-
tion, or criteria to decide or “to determine with any degree of certainty 
who is responsible or guilty for the hundreds of thousands of victims who 
are sacrificed for what or whom one knows not, countless victims, each of 
Barad’s Hauntological Materialism ■ 123
whose singularity becomes each time infinitely singular,  every other (one) 
being  every (bit) other.”7
 Here in The Gift of Death, the phrase tout autre est tout autre is translated 
as “ every other (one) being is  every (bit) other.”  Every other individual person 
is absolutely unique and other, as valuable and worthy in his or her singular-
ity that brooks no logic of comparison, even though we carelessly compare 
all the time. Derrida then, following Kierkegaard in a way, extends this 
phrase to indicate divinity: “ ‘ Every other (one) is God,’ or ‘God is  every (bit) 
other.’ ”8 If God is the wholly Other, the source of absolute alterity, then it 
makes sense to think of God as the Other. But again, Derrida generalizes: 
he extends this divine alterity to  every one as other. He undermines the 
separation that Kierkegaard upholds between humanity and divinity.  Here 
God and the person are substitutable in their infinite otherness.
In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard, writing as Johannes de Silentio, 
posits a religious realm that lies beyond that of ethics. Ethics for Silentio 
is the home of the rational universal, which means that religion becomes, 
strictly speaking, absurd. Abraham is the paradigm of religious faith 
 because he obeys the command to kill his son even though it is horrific 
and immoral. Abraham has faith that he  will retain Isaac and the promise 
of his descendants, despite his expectation that he  will kill Isaac. Derrida 
generalizes the situation of Abraham’s faith, to indicate the sacrificial situ-
ation that confronts us all,  whether we believe it or not.
At the end of the book, Derrida shifts from Kierkegaard to Nietz sche. 
In the Genealogy of Morals, Nietz sche meditates on the phrase from the 
Gospel of Matthew (6:19–21) that admonishes Christians not to store their 
trea sures  here on earth, but to “lay up for yourselves trea sures in heaven,” 
“for where trea sure is,  there your heart  will be also.”9 Derrida follows Nietz-
sche in his critique of Chris tian ity as the spiritualization of an economic 
exchange, and we saw some of the efects of this economy in Chapter 2, as 
reflected in Merchant of Venice. The earthly trea sure is subordinated to a 
heavenly trea sure that is infinitely more rewarding  because it is deferred. 
Similarly, Christ’s teaching, reflected in the Sermon on the Mount, intro-
duces an infinite asymmetry, a “gift, a love without reserve” that reproduces 
the economy of sacrifice at a higher level.10 This is what Nietz sche refers 
to as the “stroke of genius called Chris tian ity”: “In questioning a certain 
concept of repression that moralizes the mechanism of debt in moral duty 
and bad conscience, in conscience as guilt, one might develop further 
the hyperbolization of such a repression.”11 The logic of sacrificial debt is 
not abolished in Christian sacrifice; it is universalized and infinitized. 
 Jesus’s sacrifice does not put an end to sacrifice; it interiorizes sacrifice as 
self- sacrifice of one’s desire.
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At the end of The Gift of Death, Derrida argues that “if  there is such a 
 thing as this ‘stroke of genius,’ it only comes about at the instant of the 
infinite sharing of the secret.”12 What is the secret of Chris tian ity? It is the 
secret of sacrifice as debt and, more impor tant, as credit. Christians are  those 
who believe in this hyperlogic of sacrifice, this unbelievable cosmic expan-
sion of debt that exposes us all to sacrificial death  unless we can be re-
deemed by our belief.  Here is
the reversal and infinitization that confers on God, on the other or 
on the name of God, the responsibility for that which remains more 
secret than ever, the irreducible experience of belief, between credit 
and faith, the believing suspended between the credit of the creditor 
and the credence of the believer. How can one believe this history of 
credence or credit?13
 There is a knot of belief, of credit and debt, at the heart of Chris tian ity. 
But it applies not only to Chris tian ity  because this Christian logic becomes 
the logic of the West, what Derrida calls “globalatinization” in his essay 
“Faith and Knowledge.”
What about science? Does modern science, which arose in what we call 
the “West,” contain this structure of belief and sacrifice? Do we believe in 
the existence of subatomic particles such as quarks, for example? What 
credit is extended to scientific procedures, theories, and facts, and how do 
 these practices of credence or skepticism place us in debt? A new discipline 
of science studies has emerged at the end of the twentieth  century to re-
flect not only on the history and politics of science, but also a sociology of 
science practice. Prob ably the most influential book about science on in-
tellectual academic non- scientists in the twentieth  century is Thomas 
Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn pays attention to the 
history of science and distinguishes between normal science according to 
an established paradigm, and revolutionary science, whereby one paradigm 
is replaced by another. In his usage of the term “paradigm,” Kuhn draws 
on discussions with Stanley Cavell and  others about Wittgenstein, and he 
makes an explicit analogy between scientific and po liti cal revolutions. Fur-
thermore, Kuhn suggests that the replacement of one paradigm by another 
is not due to logic, but operates more like a conversion. In this situation, 
 because rules are paradigm determined, a scientist cannot rely on the evi-
dence “provided by problem- solving.” Ultimately, the scientist must “have 
faith that the new paradigm  will succeed with the many large prob lems 
that confront it, knowing only that the older paradigm has failed with a 
few. A decision of that kind can only be made on faith.”14
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In Derridean terms, in what ways is science sacrificial? In the third es-
say of his Genealogy of Morals, Nietz sche argues that science remains  under 
the sway of an ascetic ideal, an unquestioned allegiance to the  will to truth. 
Asceticism is the sacrifice of earthly pleasures for spiritual rewards. Our 
“modern science,” Nietz sche declares, “is the best ally the ascetic ideal has 
at pres ent, and precisely  because it is the most unconscious, involuntary, 
hidden, and subterranean ally!”15 Does con temporary science remain the 
best ally of the ascetic ideal, or does it represent something dif er ent?
I am not a scientist and lack the expertise in experimental and mathe-
matical methods to evaluate the scientific legitimacy of science. Part of the 
reason for this is the hyperspecialization of knowledge in modern and con-
temporary civilization, which sunders scientific technical knowledge from 
more theoretical humanities- based knowledge. In his  later work, Derrida 
kept a critical distance from the natu ral sciences, but recent expressions of 
Continental philosophy have re- engaged with natu ral sciences, including 
biology, neurology, chemistry, physics, cosmology, and mathe matics. In 
this chapter, I want to think about a Derridean science, in this case quan-
tum physics, even though I do not possess the expertise to understand or 
evaluate quantum physics in strictly scientific terms.
We require intermediaries, including scientists as well as phi los o phers 
and sociologists of science, to help us interpret and understand scientific 
laws and theories. This necessity for intermediation is not restricted to sci-
ence, of course, and exists in any area of knowledge. In addition to the 
need for expert scientists, however, we also learn that scientists themselves 
require something to inter- mediate for them. Scientific discoveries require 
and rely upon an apparatus. So again, what does it mean to believe in and 
be indebted to an apparatus, especially in areas such as particle physics 
where nobody is capable of seeing without the aid of complex technical 
apparatuses that function as prostheses?
One way to read Karen Barad’s work is to see her as  doing something 
analogous to what Derrida is  doing with Kierkegaard in The Gift of Death: 
By focusing on the apparatus, she is generalizing this situation of credit 
and debt in quantum physics to science in general. The apparatus is the 
locus of belief for science, which is also the place where acesis and debt, 
infinite asymmetry and sacrifice, take place, even if she does not use this 
language. I  will unpack this analogy further between what Barad is  doing 
with quantum physics and what Derrida is  doing with philosophy, ethics, 
and religion. At a certain point, however, the analogy breaks down in two 
directions: first, the situation in experimental scientific practice is abso-
lutely dif er ent from that of philosophical reflection; and second and 
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more impor tant, the analogy is not just an analogy, especially if tout autre 
is tout autre.
In the early twenty- first  century, Barad’s book Meeting the Universe Half-
way has had a significant impact on phi los o phers and other nonscientist 
academics. Barad draws on science studies, feminism, poststructuralism, 
and her own expertise as a theoretical physicist to fashion a power ful ar-
ticulation of how the quantum world impinges on our own. According to 
Barad, “quantum mechanics is not a theory that applies only to small ob-
jects; rather, quantum mechanics is thought to be the correct theory of 
nature that applies at all scales.”16 The prob lem is how to understand quan-
tum physics  because the experimental results of quantum phenomena 
have outstripped our capacity to make sense of them.
Barad ofers a new ontology, an “agential realist ontology,” to account 
for quantum phenomena. Entities in the world not only interact; they intra- 
act, and the world is constituted in and through their intra- actions. “The 
world,” Barad states, “is an open pro cess of mattering through which mat-
tering itself acquires meaning and form through the realization of dif er-
ent agential possibilities.”17 Objects are not static  things, but dynamic 
pro cesses that change in their interaction and intra- action with other ob-
jects. Dynamics is not what happens between  things, but how  these  things 
become what they are as they transform themselves and their objects in 
a mutual asymmetrical pro cess of materialization.
Barad shifts our focus from  things or objects to apparatuses. Appara-
tuses for Barad “are not mere observing instruments, but boundary- drawing 
practices— specific material (re)configurings of the world— which come to 
 matter.”18  Here apparatuses are not simply devices in a laboratory but 
“material- discursive practices” that constitute phenomena, including how 
we conceive their relationships and intra- activity, and ultimately our 
entire world of “nature” and “culture.”19 Barad is a posthumanist, chal-
lenging the separation between  human culture and the objective natu ral 
world. Agency and intelligibility are not restricted to  human activity, but 
shared among vari ous phenomena. Phenomena are constructed, but not 
solely by  human means.
Phenomena are “ontologically primitive relations.” The understanding 
of  these relations, or intra- actions, challenges our traditional conception 
of causality, and leads Barad to the claim that “phenomena are the ontologi-
cal inseparability of intra- acting ‘agencies.’ That is, phenomena are ontological 
entanglements.”20 An apparatus is a construct that intervenes into phe-
nomena, producing an “agential cut” that efects a separation between 
what we call a subject and what we consider an object. As Mc Ken zie Wark 
explains, “ There is no good way of discriminating between the apparatus 
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and its object. No inherent subject/object distinction exists.  There is an 
apparatus- phenomena- observer situation.”21 The apparatus is the key con-
cept  here, loosed from the framework of traditional scientific bound aries.
In Meeting the Universe Halfway, Barad ofers a reinterpretation of Neils 
Bohr that  counters how he is sometimes downplayed in comparison to 
Werner Heisenberg and Erwin Schrödinger. In  doing so, she revisits the 
famous double- slit experiment, where a stream of electrons is directed one 
by one at a barrier with two openings, with a screen  behind it to rec ord 
the location that the electrons strike the screen. The issue  here is how the 
experiment presumes a number of discrete electrons, but the resulting 
pattern is an interference pattern, which is the result of wavelike be hav ior. 
“Unlike the be hav ior of  water waves, which go through both slits at once, 
the electrons are sent through one at a time. Does an individual electron 
‘interfere’ with itself? Does a single electron somehow go through both slits 
at once? How can this be?”22 So is an electron a wave or a particle?
Bohr relies on a variation of this experiment to formulate his notion 
of complementarity. He conducts a thought experiment that suggests that 
if a device could mea sure which path the electron takes— which slit it 
goes through— then the interference pattern would dis appear  because the 
result would look like the electrons are simply particles. This is part of a 
theoretical dispute about the nature of quantum phenomena with Einstein. 
Bohr claims that for subatomic quantum particles, “wave and particle be-
hav iors are exhibited  under complementary— that is, mutually exclusive— 
circumstances.”23 Bohr is the originator of the so- called Copenhagen 
interpretation of quantum mechanics, which is the idea that the strange 
be hav ior of  these particles is not due to our inability to observe or mea-
sure them correctly, but somehow intrinsic to the phenomena themselves.
Barad argues that complementarity depends on the experiment, and 
more importantly, the apparatus. If the electron double slit experiment 
could be conducted with a mea sure ment that determines which path each 
electron passes through, then the result is a classical one that makes it look 
like the electron is a particle. But when the experiment is conducted as it 
usually is, without determining which slit each electron passes through, 
the electrons demonstrate the interference pattern that is common to wave 
interaction and superposition. She cites  later experiments of Scully et. al. 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s that are able to determine which path 
the electron takes, and  these experiments show that Bohr was correct. Wave 
particle complementarity exists, and this complementarity is an onto-
logical notion. “What is the result?,” Barad asks. She says that “despite the 
lack of disturbance [that was the counterargument of Einstein and  others, 
that the striking of the screen ‘disturbs’ the experiment and creates the 
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appearance of interference] the experimenters nonetheless confirm the ex-
istence of which- path- interference complementarity.”24 Complementarity is 
not the result of an epistemic uncertainty; it is the result of an ontological 
indeterminacy.
Many nontechnical readers of quantum physics cite the famous Heisen-
berg “Uncertainty Princi ple,” which states that the mea sure ment of a par-
ticle’s location cannot be fixed if we want to specify its momentum, or vice 
versa. This uncertainty exists across a very tiny range, which is mea sured 
by a fraction of Planck’s constant, h. Heisenberg’s uncertainty is often seen 
as an epistemological uncertainty, due to the limitations of our mea sur ing 
devices. But Bohr argued that our lack of knowledge is ontological, based 
on a fundamental indeterminacy of real ity. Barad says that
Bohr understands entanglements in ontological terms (what are 
entangled are the “components” of phenomena. For Bohr, phenomena— 
entanglements of objects and agencies of observation— constitute 
physical real ity; phenomena (not in de pen dent objects) are the objec-
tive referent of mea sured properties. Complementarity is an ontic (not 
merely an epistemic) princi ple.25
Phenomena are entangled, and their intra- actions can be teased out by in-
teracting (and intra- acting) with them by means of an apparatus.
What does this understanding of quantum physics have to do with Der-
rida? Although Barad does not explic itly cite Derrida in Meeting the Universe 
Halfway, she does engage with Derrida’s work in other articles. I  will look 
at two of them to show how Barad understands Derrida’s philosophy as a 
hauntological materialism.
In “Quantum Entanglements and Hauntological Relations of Inheri-
tance: Dis/continuities, SpaceTime Enfoldings, and Justice- to- Come,” an 
article published in the journal Derrida  Today in 2010, Barad uses Derri-
da’s term “hauntology” from Specters of Marx to describe the world of quan-
tum phenomena. She acknowledges the materialist readings of Derrida 
by Vicki Kirby and Astrid Schrader as influences for her interpretation. In 
this article, Barad revisits some of the quantum material from Meeting the 
Universe Halfway, including her understanding of Bohrian indetermi-
nacy. She also reflects on how quantum superposition indicates a state of 
quantum entanglement.
The most famous example of this superposed state is Schrödinger’s 
 hypothesis about a cat whose life or death is determined by the state of 
decay of an atom. If the atom decays, it releases a gas that kills the cat. The 
classical presumption is that the atom is  either in a state of decay or not, 
Barad’s Hauntological Materialism ■ 129
and therefore the cat is  either alive or dead. The quantum suggestion is 
that somehow the cat is in a strange intermediate state, neither alive nor 
dead, or  else both alive and dead at the same time.
Barad clarifies this situation. She argues that:
A quantum superposition is a nonclassical relation among dif er ent 
possibilities. In this case, the superposition of “alive” and “dead” en-
tails the following: it is not the case that the cat is  either alive or dead 
and that we simply do not know which; nor that the cat is both alive 
and dead si mul ta neously (this possibility is logically excluded since 
“alive” and “dead” are understood to be mutually exclusive states); nor 
that the cat is partly alive and partly dead (presumably “dead” and 
“alive” are understood to be all or nothing states of afair); nor that the 
cat is in a definitive state of being not alive and not dead (in which 
case it presumably  wouldn’t qualify as a (once) living being). Quan-
tum superpositions radically undo classical notions of identity and 
being (which ground the vari ous incorrect interpretative options just 
considered). Quantum superpositions (at least on Bohr’s account) tell 
us that being/becoming is an indeterminate  matter:  there simply is 
not a determinate fact of the  matter concerning the cat’s state of being 
alive or dead. It is a ghostly  matter! But the  really spooky issue is what 
happens to a quantum superposition when a mea sure ment is made 
and we find the cat definitively alive or dead, one or the other.26
Quantum superposition means that phenomena are entangled in such a 
spooky way that  there is no  simple either/or.
Superposition is related to entanglement, which is the entanglement of 
particles and states in a nonclassical way.  These states have to be mea sured, 
which makes the entanglement of a live and dead cat “decohere” into a 
classical situation where the cat is  either dead or alive. Furthermore, this 
situation of quantum entanglement suggests nonlocality, which Einstein 
derisively called “spooky action at a distance.” Given two entangled states 
or particles, say two electrons whose spin is correlated, then mea sur ing one 
of the electrons gives the spin of the other one, no  matter how far apart 
they are. And the result of this mea sure ment happens faster than the speed 
of light. This understanding of entanglement is the result of Bell’s Theo-
rem, which John Bell proposed in the 1964 as a way of answering the chal-
lenge that Einstein proposed along with Boris Podolsky and Nathan 
Rosen known as the EPR paradox. Alain Aspect and  others then carried 
out experiments in the early 1980s that confirmed Bell’s theory and the 
predictions of quantum mechanics against Einstein’s criticisms.
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According to Barad,
Quantum entanglements are generalised quantum superpositions, 
more than one, no more than one, impossible to count. They are far 
more ghostly than the colloquial sense of ‘entanglement’ suggests. 
Quantum entanglements are not the intertwining of two (or more) 
states/entities/events, but a calling into question of the very nature 
of two- ness, and ultimately of one- ness as well.27
She argues that Derrida’s philosophy ofers a better way to understand this 
situation than many of the interpretations supplied by quantum physicists. 
Words, concepts, phenomena are entangled in complex ways, and decon-
struction attends to the manner in which such phenomena are spookily 
entangled.
This is a materialism of a sort, but a very strange kind of materialism, 
that Barad calls a hauntological materialism. Our entangled intra- actions 
as large slow beings repeat in a dif er ent way the relations among subatomic 
particles. We come to face our past lives and previous historical figures as 
ghosts, exerting a hauntological influence on the pres ent. We encounter 
 these ghosts of our past in a time “out of joint,” as Derrida quotes Hamlet 
in Specters of Marx. Furthermore,  these ghosts are
encountered in the flesh, as iterative materialisations, contingent and 
specific (agential) reconfigurings of spacetimematterings, spectral (re)
workings without the presumption of erasure, the ‘past’ repeatedly 
reconfigured not in the name of setting  things right once and for all 
(what pos si ble calculation could give us that?), but in the continual 
reopening and unsettling of what might yet be, of what was, and what 
comes to be.28
For Barad,  there is an ethics of responsibility derived from Derrida’s work 
that ofers a sense of justice or  doing justice in relation to her understand-
ing of quantum physics.
 There is an ongoing materialization of  matter, and an ongoing dynamic 
production of space and time, as the framework within which phenomena 
interact and intra- act. The apparatus names the agential cut that gives us 
the appearance of disparate phenomena, but we are still haunted, afected, 
and efected by the entangled superposition  these phenomena remain, at 
least virtually. Responsibility involves “facing the ghosts, in their materi-
ality, and acknowledging injustice without the empty promise of complete 
repair.”29 Quantum phenomena are intrinsically spooky, and they haunt 
us no less than larger scale phenomena.
Barad’s Hauntological Materialism ■ 131
In her article on “Quantum Entanglements and Hauntological Rela-
tions of Inheritance,” Barad does not simply comment on Derrida’s work. 
She quotes him at points, and then shows how his ideas are relevant to the 
world of quantum physics. In another article, “On Touching: The Inhu-
man That I Therefore Am,” she reflects on the paradox of touch within the 
context of quantum field theory, and connects this idea to Derrida’s book 
On Touching— Jean- Luc Nancy. The paradox Barad starts with is that for 
physicists, phenomena do not actually touch. In physical terms, touch 
is an electromagnetic interaction: “ there is no  actual contact involved.”30 
Touch is a paradoxical phenomenon, even at the most basic physical 
level.  Things get even more strange when Barad discusses quantum field 
theory.
According to Barad, in quantum field theory “ there is a radical decon-
struction of identity and of the equation of  matter with essence in ways 
that transcend even the profound un/doings of (nonrelativistic) quantum 
mechanics.”31 In quantum field theory, a particle is the expression of the en-
tire field at a specific point, a quantum. And conversely, the field is the 
expansion or generalization of the particle. For example, the photon is 
the quantum of an electromagnetic field. The particle and the field are 
two complementary ways of understanding the same phenomenon. Fur-
thermore, the particle and the field are entangled with a void. Particles do 
not exist within a void; they are constitutively entangled with the void. 
The void is not a  simple vacuum; it is “a living, breathing indeterminacy of 
non/being.”32 The vacuum is full of virtual particles.
What is a virtual particle? When quantum physicists explore the ways 
that particles act, they discover that  these particles give rise to virtual par-
ticles, particles that appear to jump into existence and then just as quickly 
jump back out of it.  There is a sort of perversity intrinsic to  these funda-
mental subatomic particles. Richard Feynman said the following about 
electrons: “Instead of  going directly from one point to another, the elec-
tron goes along for a while and suddenly emits a photon; then (horrors!) it 
absorbs its own photon. Perhaps  there’s something ‘immoral’ about that, 
but the electron does it!”33
Barad claims that “virtual particles are quantized indeterminacies- in- 
action.”34  These particles exhibit a propensity to touch and therefore 
self- touch  every other pos si ble particle as part of their paradoxical perver-
sity. In order to  handle the queer infinities produced by virtual particles 
and their interactions, physicists have to renormalize  these infinities in 
practice. But that does not eliminate the strangeness of  these virtual par-
ticles; it merely allows us to deal with them.
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For Barad, quantum touching is a strange phenomenon, where  every 
other particle intra- acts with itself and  every other particle. Although she 
does not specifically refer to Derrida’s phrase from The Gift of Death, tout 
autre est tout autre, I think it fits even better her description of the strange 
interactions and intra- actions of quantum field theory.  These intra- actions 
can be characterized as what Barad calls an “infinite alterity,” and she sum-
mons a Derridean responsibility to do justice to this insensible indetermi-
nacy of being.35 In a quantum field where quantized particles self- touch 
in virtual ways,  every other is indeed  every other. Self- touching is a kind 
of self- sacrifice  because  these virtual particles are created and destroyed 
in a wink of existence.  Matter is transient: “No longer suspended in eter-
nity,  matter is born, lives, and dies.”36  Here is a certain end of the Heideg-
gerian thesis, where the inanimate  thing is not a worldless stone but a 
virtual particle that inhabits worlds without end.37 Barad refuses the Hei-
deggerian refusal of a world for the stone; she ofers an opening to the 
inhuman that we also are. For Barad, ethics involves “a recognition that 
it may well be the inhuman, the insensible, the irrational, the unfathomable, 
and the incalculable that  will help us face the depths of what responsibility 
entails.”38 Responsibility, sacrifice, and the gift of death inhabit and haunt 
quantum worlds, even when the world as such is gone.  There are no 
worlds, only superposed islands of indeterminacy. Waves, particles, void, 
all entangled.
Karen Barad is not the only phi los o pher who is thinking about quan-
tum physics. In recent years, François Laruelle has developed his non- 
philosophy into what he calls a non- standard philosophy based on quantum 
phenomena. In his book Philosophie Non- Standard, published in French 
in 2010 and not yet translated into En glish, Laruelle makes explicit use of 
concepts from quantum physics to explicate non- philosophy. He argues for 
a more quantum- theoretical conception of the Real, and suggests that the 
wave- particle complementarity of quantum physics ofers a better model 
for theoretical thinking than atomic entities. Laruelle says that non- 
philosophy does not intervene directly in quantum physics, but rather 
takes the same relation to philosophy as quantum physics does to classical 
physics, which is less one of inclusion and more one of generalization along 
reconstituted lines.39
Laruelle claims that while traditional philosophy deals with discrete, 
corpuscular objects and concepts,  these concepts are deformed by the 
implications of wave superposition. Laruelle wants to superpose philo-
sophical concepts together, which is a scientific operation, or what he calls 
“the unity of a fusion of science and philosophy  under science.”40 This 
fusion is the result of superposition, which constitutes a radical immanence, 
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not absolute in the sense of being opposed to transcendence, but radical in 
the sense of being composed immanently by super- imposing concepts and 
seeing how they amplify or reduce each other. Non- standard philosophy 
works with superposed terms rather than simply discrete classical ideas. 
 These are complex ideas as opposed to  simple ideas, in the way that com-
plex numbers include not only real numbers but also an imaginary com-
ponent, which is the square root of −1, written as i. Laruelle says that an 
imaginary number can be thought of as a “quarter- turn” backwards from 
a circle, which is an immanent subtraction from the binary doublet of 
 immanence/transcendence.41
Laruelle’s terminology and writing is incredibly complex, and it is made 
more so by the fusing together of philosophical ideas and concepts, which 
he subjects to his own rigorous non- philosophical formulations, with quan-
tum ones. I am not  going to try to fully explain Laruelle’s philosophy— 
and in truth I could not do it justice— but I want to give a sense of what 
he is  doing and how it compares to Barad’s work. Barad is using the lan-
guage of Derrida, Levinas, and other poststructuralist phi los o phers to ar-
ticulate and explain quantum phenomena, and this helps us read  these 
theorists beyond any sort of naïve humanism or linguisticism. Laruelle thinks 
that poststructuralist phi los o phers, despite their desire to expose phi-
losophy to an infinite alterity, end up confirming and upholding the tra-
ditional status of philosophy and its authority to interpret the world. For 
Laruelle, non- philosophy is the attempt to use philosophical ideas and 
categories without reinforcing the sufficiency of philosophy’s mastery of the 
world. Laruelle uses quantum terminology and concepts to rethink and 
refashion what normally goes by the name of philosophy.
Derrida himself claims that what Laruelle does is to reinstate a kind of 
authority of science over philosophy. In a debate from 1988, Derrida 
suggests:
Then you went on to oppose to this description [of the sufficiency of 
philosophy] this new science, which you distinguished from its po-
liti cal, social,  etc., appropriations, and  there, obviously, I had the 
 impression that you  were reintroducing philosophemes— the tran-
scendental being only one of them— into this description, this con-
ception of the new science, the One, the real,  etc.  There, all of a 
sudden, I said to myself: he’s trying to pull the trick of the transcen-
dental on us again, the trick of auto- foundation, auto- legitimation, 
at the very moment when he claims to be making a radical break.42
And Laruelle replies by acknowledging that from a philosophical stand-
point what he’s  doing appears crude and contradictory, but that he allows 
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himself “the right, the legitimate right, to use philosophical vocabulary 
non- philosophically.” Laruelle claims that although Derrida uses philoso-
phy against itself, against its own pretensions to absolute knowledge, he 
still does so in the name of something like philosophical logic itself. Laru-
elle appeals to science, which “makes a non- positional, non- thetic use of 
language” to think outside of and beyond philosophy itself.43 And in Phi-
losophie Non- Standard, Laruelle appeals to the science of quantum physics 
to think philosophy other wise.
Gilles Deleuze is impressed by Laruelle’s proj ect, although he also sug-
gests that Laruelle grants too much authority to science. In his last book, 
What is Philosophy?, published in French in 1991 and co- authored with 
Félix Guattari, Deleuze writes in a footnote that “François Laruelle is 
engaged in one of the most in ter est ing undertakings of con temporary 
philosophy. He invokes a ‘One- All’ that he qualifies as ‘nonphilosophical’ 
and, oddly, as ‘scientific,’ on which the ‘philosophical decision’ takes root. 
This One- All seems to be close to Spinoza.”44 Deleuze appreciates the 
 efort to construct a non- philosophy along Spinozist lines, but he hesitates 
before Laruelle’s evident scientism, commenting that “we do not see why 
this real of science is not nonscience as well.”45
Part of the question at stake is the nature and role of science, and to 
what extent the appeal to quantum physics, mathe matics (as in the set the-
ory invoked by Alain Badiou), or biology involves a kind of trumping of 
philosophical practice by the discipline of the natu ral sciences. Unfortu-
nately, most scholars trained in philosophical or other humanities- based 
disciplines lack the technical expertise to evaluate scientific ideas, but even 
scientists trained in a certain discipline lack the expertise to evaluate 
another discipline. From my perspective,  after his early work on geome-
try, anthropology, and linguistics, Derrida is a  little too skeptical of 
the natu ral sciences, whereas sometimes phi los o phers, such as Laruelle, 
 Badiou, Meillassoux, and adherents of Speculative Realism and object- 
oriented ontology give science too much weight. I do think, however, that 
we need to try to understand and think about scientific ideas, even if we 
are non- scientists. And this is what Barad’s work gives us tools to do.
By way of a conclusion, I suggest that what Barad calls “difraction” 
functions as a kind of quantum différance. In Meeting the Universe Half-
way, Barad says that “ there is a deep sense in which we can understand 
difraction patterns—as patterns of diference that make a diference—to 
be the fundamental constituents that make up the world.”46 Difraction in 
classical terms occurs with waves, including ocean waves. As waves inter-
act with other waves or with an object, new patterns are formed. A dif-
fraction pattern is also an interference pattern  because of the way that 
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waves, or waves and objects, interfere with each other. When a wave meets 
another wave, depending on the wavelength it can  either cancel out the 
other wave or amplify it. We can also see an interference pattern or a dif-
fraction pattern when a wave hits a gap or hole as in a breakwater.
Difraction is “an entangled phenomenon” that takes place in large- scale 
classical phenomena, as well as in quantum subatomic phenomena.47 Barad 
explains that when waves meet and interact, they combine to form a new 
wave. “The resultant wave,” she says, “is a sum of the efects of each indi-
vidual component wave; that is, it is a combination of the disturbances cre-
ated by each wave individually.”48 The combination of individual waves is 
called superposition, a term that Laruelle also uses. Superposition works 
at quantum and large- scale levels, and it produces a difraction pattern.
As Mc Ken zie Wark explains in his discussion of Barad’s work, “difrac-
tion is not about how one  thing is an imaginary reflection or double of 
another.”49 Diference involves a joint or co- production of new phenom-
ena. “Difraction is about how  things pass through and produce diferen-
tial patterns,” and  these patterns are real at the level of material- physical 
phenomena.50 The apparatus is that object or entity that mea sures the re-
sult of this pro cess and evaluates in what way it is a novel phenomenon.
A difraction pattern is a pattern that is constituted by a diferentiator— a 
situation that prompts diference to relate to diference. When we think 
about diferences, we usually think about diference as derivative from or 
subordinate to identity. How can we compare anything except a prior iden-
tity from which something difers?  Here, the power ful re orientation of 
poststructuralism as epitomized in the philosophy of Derrida and Deleuze 
is the contention that diferences are primary, and that diferences can re-
late to diferences without depending on a pre- given identity.
Deleuze develops this notion most explic itly in Difference and Repeti-
tion. According to Deleuze, in order to relate diference to diference  there 
exists what he calls a second- degree of diference, a diferentiator. He says 
that for this second- degree of diference to operate, diferences must be or-
ga nized into a series. First of all,  there have to be at least two series, and 
second,  there must be a communication between  these series, a “force” or 
intensity that “relates diferences to other diferences.” It is the “intensive 
character of systems” or series that is impor tant  here, the manner by which 
diference is related to diference, the construction of a second- order dif-
ference. An intensive field communicates diferences to diferences, and 
produces individuations. According to Deleuze, “once communication be-
tween heterogeneous series is established, all sorts of consequences follow 
within the system. Something ‘passes’ between the borders, events explode, 
phenomena flash, like thunder and lightning.”51
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In order to recognize diference as diference, or to distinguish between 
and among diferences, we would seem to need to refer to a kind of resem-
blance or identity. We assume a privileged path of thinking from identity 
to diference, but as a  matter of fact it’s the reverse: “Thunderbolts ex-
plode between dif er ent intensities, but they are preceded by an invisible, 
dark precursor, which determines their path in advance but in reverse, as 
though intagliated.”52 This is  because of the pressure diferential in thun-
derstorms: “Likewise,  every system contains its dark precursor which en-
sures the communication of peripheral series.” The dark precursor is the 
diferentiator, and it is also what in Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari’s 
 later work becomes the plane of immanence or plane of consistency. 
 Deleuze explains:
 There is no doubt that  there is an identity belonging to the precursor, 
and a resemblance between the series which it  causes to communi-
cate. This “ there is,” however, remains perfectly indeterminate. Are 
identity and diference  here the preconditions of the functioning of 
the dark precursor, or are they, on the contrary, its efects?53
Deleuze argues  here for the second viewpoint, which means that the dark 
precursor proj ects “upon itself the illusion of fictive identity, and upon the 
series which it relates the illusion of a retrospective resemblance.”  There is 
an identity, but this identity is a transcendental illusion cast by the shadow 
of the dark precursor. Resemblance and identity are illusions— “in other 
words, concepts of reflection which would account for our inveterate 
habit of thinking diference on the basis of the categories of repre sen ta-
tion.”54 The dark precursor conceals itself in its operation, and this gives 
rise to the illusion of identity. The dark precursor is the diferentiator 
because, “given two heterogeneous series, two series of diferences, the 
precursor plays the part of the diferentiator of  these diferences.”55 The 
dark precursor is invisible and the path it traces only becomes vis i ble in 
reverse, when the lightning strikes.  These diferential conditions cause 
phenomena to occur. Diference in itself communicates to itself through a 
force or intensity that Deleuze names repetition. The dark precursor is 
“the disparate,” whereas resemblance is an efect or external result.56
A way to better understand the role of the dark precursor as the dispa-
rate is to think of it in terms of a moiré pattern. A moiré is an interference 
pattern that emerges when two fabrics or grids are brought together and 
superimposed, one on top of the other. The pattern that emerges is the dif-
ference between the two patterns. For Deleuze, diferentiation occurs when 
two series are brought together in such a way that the diferences between 
the two series creates a third. It’s not the identity of the points in the series 
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that creates identity  here; it’s the relationship of diference between the 
two series that generates the pattern. The dark precursor is the activity of 
relating series to series, without any background, and the lightning flash is 
what emerges when the two series are inter- related or inter- meshed. What 
Deleuze calls the disparate indicates the pro cess of the production of dif-
ference. Identity is generated by and out of diference.
I think that the way Deleuze understands diference in Difference and 
Repetition is very close to how Derrida understands différance. Derrida coins 
his neologism to take account of the dynamic aspect of diference, not just 
the normal static comparison of how one word or object difers from an-
other. Diference is always diferentiation, and it is a dynamic pro cess. 
 Derrida more explic itly treats linguistics and analyzes the diferential op-
eration of language, compared to Deleuze who is less influenced by the 
developments of structural linguistics. The verb différer, Derrida explains, 
has two distinct meanings that converge in the word différance. The first 
involves a temporal diference: “différer in this sense is to temporize, to take 
recourse, consciously or unconsciously, in the temporal and temporizing 
mediation of a detour that suspends the accomplishment or fulfillment of 
‘desire’ or ‘ will,’ and equally efects this suspension in a mode that annuls 
or tempers its own efect.”57 The second meaning of the word différer is 
the more common notion of not being identical, although  here Derrida 
also introduces a dynamism,  because diferences resist each other in terms 
of an “allergic and polemical otherness” in addition to just being dif er ent. 
He argues that
the word différence (with an e) can never refer to différer as tempori-
zation or to differends as polemos. Thus, the word différance (with an a) 
is to compensate— economically— this loss of meaning, for dif-
férance can refer si mul ta neously to the entire configuration of its 
meanings.58
I think that Derrida’s différance is very close to Deleuze’s concept of dif-
ferentiation, although Derrida claims that the prob lem with the term 
“diferentiation” is that it “would have left open the possibility of an or-
ganic, original, and homogeneous unity that eventually would have to be 
divided, to receive diference as an event.”59 And this is how all too many 
readers understand Deleuze’s philosophy, as positing an original and ho-
mogeneous unity that is then divided or diferentiated. But I contend that 
Deleuze’s philosophy is not nearly so  simple, and that his entire prob lem 
in Difference and Repetition concerns how diference relates to diference. 
This is a kind of difraction pattern, to put it in the language of Barad, 
and it gives us a way to view différance as a physical and not just linguistic 
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pro cess. Quantum field theory involves both the dynamic temporization 
of time and space (understood in terms of waves or wavelike phenomena), 
and a dynamic diferend as polemical opposition to identity (of a particle 
in relation to other particles)  because it involves the “simultaneous” cre-
ation and destruction of virtual particles, which extends to take into ac-
count all of real ity.
 Because Derrida most explic itly concerns himself with the limits of 
language, the otherness in and of language, most readers assume that 
différance is a purely linguistic phenomenon. I think this is a misunder-
standing of Derrida, even though he mostly investigates and applies dif-
férance to what Malabou calls the motor scheme of writing. We have the 
ability to read Derrida other wise, which includes reading him in a more 
materialist way.  There is no proper Derrida, but  there are more in ter est ing, 
relevant, and compelling iterations of Derrida’s thought. If we read dif-
férance as a difraction pattern, we see how it operates outside of language, 
in the world, including the world of quantum physics.
In this specific sense, then, aided by the extraordinary work of Barad, we 
can constitute a quantum Derrida not as the only Derrida, but one more 
Derrida, since  there is always more than one Derrida. This is a sort of fi-
delity, of love, even if it is also a queer reading, as Barad would affirm. I 
can imagine that Derrida would be hospitable to such an understanding, 
even if he would also resist and undercut it, seeing as how it would neces-
sarily deconstruct. I can also imagine that Derrida loves us and that he is 
smiling, as his final words instruct. And this is undeconstructable.
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Instead of a more conventional conclusion that summarizes the book, I am 
ofering an afterword that reflects more personally on Derrida in relation 
to love, fatherhood, and mourning.  These reflections, rather than build-
ing on the specific chapters, ofer another scene where Derrida’s philoso-
phy continues to be relevant, in many re spects beyond writing. Love is at 
once a po liti cal, religious, and a material force, as well as a way to indicate 
what  matters in our lives in ethical and spiritual terms.
 Here I want to reflect a  little more personally on what Derrida has 
meant to me, particularly as a kind of substitute  father figure. This issue 
of genealogical fatherhood is not just personal; it raises the question of 
patriarchal sexism in philosophy (and not just in philosophy). Derrida 
wrote profoundly and problematically about the question of  women, and 
his work has inspired feminist inspiration and critique. Derrida coined 
the word “phallogocentrism,” which means that what Lacan calls the phal-
lus structures our understanding of language and real ity. The phallus is 
not the penis, of course, but it substitutes for the penis in an idealized but 
problematic way. Derrida was highly critical of Lacan, but Lacan’s influ-
ence on Derrida is undeniable. Lacan’s theories about the nature of the 
symbolic and what he calls the “Name- of- the- Father”  will inform this med-
itation. I  will draw on some of the insights of Malabou, as well as some 
other impor tant  women thinkers: Noëlle Vahanian, Julia Kristeva, Luce 
Irigaray, Bracha Ettinger, Catherine Keller, Colleen Hartung, and Katerina 
Kolozova.
Afterword: The Sins of the  Fathers— 
A Love Letter
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In psychoanalytic terms, love is always ambivalent.  Here in this after-
word, love is a kind of love of the  father, or an idealization of the  father, 
including an idealization of Derrida as a father- figure in philosophical 
terms. But this, too, is ambiguous and ambivalent. According to Lacan, 
 there is no such  thing as a sexual relationship. This is a provocative claim, 
and what he means is that sexual connection does not occur in an exact 
match, one to one.  There is always a distortion, a missing of the mark, 
that both drives sexual desire and leads to its inevitable disappointment. 
Lacan says that love is more correctly associated with transference. In 
analy sis, transference is the projection of desires and ideals onto the ana-
lyst by the patient, and this can provoke a counter- transference on the 
part of the analyst back onto the patient. In clinical psychoanalysis, treat-
ment depends on the ability to successfully negotiate the transference on 
the part of the analyst and eventually the patient. But transference is a 
broader and more generalized phenomenon than the role it plays in the 
analytic setting.1
Transference exists in the classroom, for example, when the student 
transfers certain assumptions, desires, and expectations from his or her life 
onto the teacher, and this also risks counter- transference back onto the stu-
dent.  Every situation is always already gendered, sexualized, and racial-
ized in its dynamics,  whether or not we are conscious of  these dynamics.2 
In this Afterword, I am interested in the transfer from the biological 
 father to a substitute  father figure in philosophy, mainly in terms of a male 
subject position that has proved normative in philosophy, culture, and 
psychoanalysis.
Derrida was not my first philosophical love, but he has stayed with me 
the longest. My first love was Nietz sche, and reading Nietz sche tore me 
apart, and made it impossible for me to be a systematic or analytic phi los-
o pher or theologian. From Nietz sche I turned to Michel Foucault, and the 
impact of his History of Sexuality was enormous; it was mind boggling to 
consider the idea that our sexual desire is the essence of who we are is only 
a recent historical construction rather than a timeless phenomenon. In 
my last semester of college, I took a special topics course on “Language, 
Meaning and Theory from the Bible to Derrida,” and in that course we 
read se lections from Of Grammatology. I  didn’t  really understand Derri-
da’s thought, but it was provocative and transformative, the idea that the 
opposition between nature and culture could deconstruct.  Later, in gradu-
ate school at Syracuse University, I read Gilles Deleuze and his ideas have 
continued to influence and inform my thinking. Instead of understand-
ing Deleuze in opposition to Derrida, however, I ended up seeing Deleuze 
as much more profoundly complementary to him.
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In the film Derrida from 2002, directed by Kirby Dick and Amy Zier-
ing Kofman, Derrida is asked a question about who could be his philo-
sophical  mother. He answers:
My  mother, my  mother  couldn’t be a phi los o pher. A phi los o pher 
 couldn’t be my  mother. That’s a very impor tant point.  Because the 
figure of the phi los o pher is, for me, always a masculine figure. This 
is one of the reasons I undertook the deconstruction of philosophy. 
All the deconstruction of phallogocentrism is the deconstruction of 
what one calls philosophy which since its inception, has always been 
linked to a paternal figure. So, a phi los o pher is a  Father, not a  Mother. 
So the phi los o pher that would be my  mother would be a post- 
deconstructive phi los o pher, that is, myself or my son. My  mother as 
a phi los o pher would be my grand daughter, for example. An inheritor. 
A  woman phi los o pher who would reaffirm the deconstruction. And 
consequently, would be a  woman who thinks. Not a phi los o pher. I 
 always distinguish thinking from philosophy. A thinking  mother— it’s 
what I both love and try to give birth to.
 Here Derrida affirms the figure of the phi los o pher as a male, a  father fig-
ure, although he also claims that his work is dedicated to deconstructing 
the association of the phi los o pher with the  father, and opening up the pos-
sibility for a  woman phi los o pher. A  woman phi los o pher is a thinking 
 woman who would be at once  mother and grand daughter.
On the one hand, Derrida challenges patriarchal sexism, and the intrin-
sically male figure of the phi los o pher. On the other hand, he admits that 
he cannot have a  mother who is a phi los o pher, he can only imagine a 
 future— not even a  daughter but a grand daughter— where a  woman could 
be a phi los o pher and therefore a mother- philosopher. This is a kind of fan-
tasy, even if  every phi los o pher should desire for it to become a real ity. 
Philosophy is a chain of  father figures, who substitute for the biological 
 father in a way that structures knowledge and real ity, as Lacan has theo-
rized in his work.
“A child is being beaten,” says Freud, and this constitutes a certain pri-
mal scene. Authority and punishment stem from the role of the  father, who 
generates anxiety and fear on the part of the child. In Civilization and Its 
Discontents, Freud argues that religion stems from “the infant’s helpless-
ness and the longing for the  father,” although he does not fully consider 
how the  father helps to create and reinforce this sense of helplessness.3 The 
 father is the source of the internalized super- ego that makes the individual 
unhappy throughout most of his life  because the super- ego prevents the 
individual from expressing and enjoying his primal drives of aggression and 
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sexuality. My argument is that one part of the drive for philosophy results 
from the ambivalence  toward the biological  father and the work of identi-
fication with idealized substitute  fathers. As the Roman phi los o pher Sen-
eca declares, philosophy “allows me to choose my  fathers.”4
This is where it is helpful to consider the work of Julia Kristeva. In her 
groundbreaking book Revolution in Poetic Language, Kristeva distinguishes 
between the semiotic and the symbolic. The semiotic chora is the name she 
gives to Freudian “primary pro cesses which displace and condense both en-
ergies and their inscription.”5 The symbolic intervenes into the semiotic 
chora and establishes a secondary symbolic order of language and repre sen ta-
tion that constitutes the subject. We do not have any direct access the semi-
otic  after its replacement by the symbolic, but  these semiotic pro cesses can 
break the bounds of the symbolic in transgressive ways.  Here the semiotic is 
seen “as a ‘second’ return of instinctual functioning within the symbolic, as 
a negativity introduced into the symbolic order and as the transgression of 
that order.”6 Art, and specifically poetic language, is an irruption of the semi-
otic into and beyond the symbolic. Poetic language is a kind of sublimation 
that Kristeva values in Revolution of Poetic Language and  later works.
Although this is much less explicit in Revolution in Poetic Language, 
Kristeva associates the  mother or maternal with the semiotic, and the  father 
with the symbolic. She affirms both the necessity of passing from the se-
miotic to the symbolic, and the valuing of the negativity that emerges from 
the rejection of certain aspects of the symbolic when the semiotic re- 
emerges. In This Incredible Need to Believe, for instance, Kristeva argues 
that the infant “proj ects itself onto a third person with which it identifies: 
the loving  father.”7 This projection and identification are what liberate the 
child from the semiotic, which is depicted in Kristeva’s  later work as a de-
vouring  mother who threatens to prevent the child from achieving a per-
sonal identity. I think that Kristeva both overvalues the identification with 
the loving  father and the threat of the semiotic as devouring  mother. Never-
theless, I think  there is something impor tant about the pro cess that she 
articulates, which enables the perpetuation of patriarchy.
The biological  father, or the  father figure who is closest to the infant, takes 
on the qualities of the loving  father even as he is the source of fear and pun-
ishment as a figure of authority. Then, when and if the biological or familial 
 father figure is seen in more ambivalent terms during youth or adolescence, 
 there is the attachment to other figures who serve ideally if not actually as 
loving  fathers. This is part of the origin of philosophy, among other  things. 
For me, the ambivalence  toward my biological  father was partly replaced by 
a strong love— a projection onto and identification with the person of Jacques 
Derrida. He was a good  father, as well as a  great phi los o pher, partly  because 
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he challenged phallogocentrism. At the same time, we know that he was also 
a seductive “ladies man,” who had many afairs including a famous one with 
Sylviane Agacinski, who had one of his  children.8
This substitution is not one.  There are multiple  father figures, and for 
me the identification with Derrida is connected to two other male figures 
who served as positive role models: Charles Winquist and John D. Caputo. 
It was Winquist who became my mentor at Syracuse University, even 
though he was at the time more critical of Derrida’s philosophy. Winquist 
represented an ideal  father figure,  because he loved and supported me seem-
ingly unconditionally. It was Winquist who taught me how to read De-
leuze, and who chaired my dissertation on Kant’s sublime. It was Winquist 
who died of liver failure in 2002 as I was desperately searching for a tenure- 
track academic position. During my gradu ate study at Syracuse I was also 
struck by how much easier it was for me to flourish as a male doctoral stu-
dent compared to many of my female friends and colleagues  because of 
the ways that the acad emy and its disciplines are structured patriarchally.
Before Winquist died, he became friends with Caputo. And in some 
ways, Caputo came to substitute for Winquist as an academic quasi- father, 
or at least a loving paternal figure.  After Winquist died, I reached out to 
Caputo and he responded positively, helping me in many ways impossible 
to recount or repay. Furthermore, in 2004 Caputo replaced Winquist at 
Syracuse University, confirming this academic filiation and investing him 
in my success. Of course, it was also Caputo’s books and conferences at 
Villanova that mediated a large part of Derrida for me, beginning in 1995 
at the Roundtable discussion that became the book Deconstruction in a 
Nutshell. I drove down to Villanova with another gradu ate student from 
Syracuse, and  after the roundtable I was able to meet and talk to Derrida 
in person, and he autographed a copy of his book Aporias for me. A  little 
over a month  later my car was stolen of the street in Philadelphia, and 
this book was in my car.
I am setting up what Deleuze calls an efect series: Derrida, Winquist, 
Caputo. They all played a role as idealized substitute  fathers, and they all 
helped me tremendously in my life and  career, even if Derrida did not know 
me personally. Love always contains an ele ment of narcissism. According to 
Derrida, “ there is not narcissism and non- narcissism;  there are narcissisms 
that are more or less comprehensive, generous, open, extended.”9 Narcissism 
is how we appropriate the other. But if we  didn’t add something to the 
other, “the relationship to the other would be absolutely destroyed.”10 As 
Noëlle Vahanian, a fellow gradu ate student with me at Syracuse and now a 
significant phi los o pher of religion in her own right, explains, narcissism 
“becomes a desire to know the other, for the image of self is incapable of 
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containing the self.”11 We cannot simply love ourselves without an other, 
 because we are not simply ourselves. Vahanian argues that in this situation, 
the narcissist becomes an idolator, a rebel: “eyes wide- open, this narcissist 
sees more than herself in another, the other in herself. She saves herself.”12
Narcissism as love of the  father is a form of identification that stabilizes 
and perpetuates the sexist patriarchal order. But in Vahanian’s language, 
which also marks a shift in gender terms, this narcissism can also be seen 
as rebellious, and even salvific. This is incredible and actually impossible 
if I am just myself, relating my same male subjectivity to another male sub-
ject as role model and phi los o pher. Just as my attachment to a philosophi-
cal paternal figure constitutes a kind of rebellion against my biological 
 father, my own philosophical expression involves working out a kind of 
idolatry against  these substitute  fathers. To be faithful to the  father is to 
betray the  father. This ironically also perpetuates phallogocentrism.
I  don’t see Catherine Malabou as a maternal figure, but she is definitely “a 
 woman who thinks.” In her book Changing Difference: The Feminine and the 
Question of Philosophy, Malabou directly reflects on complex issues of gender 
and sexuality from the standpoint of her identity as a  woman phi los o pher 
and her viewpoint of plasticity. She argues that “to construct one’s identity 
is a pro cess that can only be a development of an original biological mallea-
bility, a first transformability. If sex  were not plastic,  there would be no gen-
der.”13 In an essay on “The Meaning of the ‘Feminine,’ ” Malabou develops 
her own thought in relation to that of Luce Irigaray and Judith Butler. She 
cautiously endorses Irigaray’s notion of the feminine as “the fold of the lips 
to one another, a withdrawal that is so easy to force open, to breach, to 
deflower, but which at the same time also marks the territory of the inviola-
ble.”14  There is a sense in which the feminine for Malabou consists in the 
inviolable: “without the feminine, the inviolable cannot be thought.”
 Because of its essential fragility, the idea of the feminine as the invio-
lable exists within a context of its  actual violability. She says that “no doubt 
 woman  will never become impenetrable, inviolable. That’s why it is neces-
sary to imagine the possibility of  woman starting from the structural 
impossibility she experiences of not being  violated, in herself and out-
side, everywhere.”15 But this situation leads Malabou to a prob lem,  because 
when we name the inviolable as the feminine, “we run the risk of fixing 
this fragility, assigning it a residence and making a fetish out of it.” At the 
same time, “if we resist it, we refuse to embody the inviolable and it be-
comes anything at all  under the pretext of referring to anyone.”16 To name 
the inviolable as the feminine is to “interrupt a void in diference,” whereas 
to refuse to name the inviolable is “to refuse to interrupt a void in difer-
ence.” Both stances are equally justified and equally problematic. The 
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specification of feminine diference risks fetishizing it, while the general-
ization of the inviolable beyond the feminine risks difusing and empty-
ing it in the context of patriarchal masculinity.
Malabou complicates the already complicated relationship between the 
feminine and  woman. She says that the terms of this relation need to be 
displaced, and she refers to her analy sis of the exchange between Being and 
beings in her book The Heidegger Change. “Being and being change from 
one into the other,” she writes, “that’s the plasticity of diference.”17 Being— 
here the feminine, and beings—in this case  women— “exchange modes of 
being.” This substitutability exceeds metaphysics,  because both Being and 
beings change in their exchange. If “substitutability is the meaning of Be-
ing,” then “transvestitism comes with diference.”18 Being is not incarnated 
in embodied beings, but bodies manifest Being as change even as they 
change Being by exchanging it.
Malabou opens up the question of the feminine to the transformation 
of Being and the change in diference that female beings make. This is a 
kind of transvestitism  because the  woman does not remain unchanged. 
She refers to a place in her Heidegger book where she and her translator, 
Peter Skafish, deci ded that the word “essence” in Heidegger’s philosophy is 
a kind of “going- in- drag.”19 If gender is a genos, a genre or an essence, and 
essence is always going- in- drag, then that suggests a kind of transvesti-
tism of Being and beings, a clothing across the heart of existence. Malabou 
concludes that “while the feminine or  woman (we can use the terms inter-
changeably now), remains one of the unavoidable modes of ontological 
change, they themselves become passing, metabolic points of identity, 
which like  others show the passing at the heart of gender.”20 Tracing the 
feminine leads us to a passing that is inscribed at the heart of gender.
 There is no question then that Malabou is a  woman phi los o pher, that 
she passes for a  woman phi los o pher, but it is not entirely clear what  either 
of  these signifiers means. She says that “if I’m a phi los o pher it is at the price 
of a tremendous vio lence, the vio lence that philosophy constantly does to 
me and the vio lence I inflict on it in return.”21 Philosophy is figured as mas-
culine  here, as the object of a “fierce quarrel” whose outcome is “ever more 
uncertain and unexpected,” that produces “an absolute solitude.”22  Woman’s 
liberation is essentially tied to the liberation of all of us, in our shared and 
unshareable absolute solitude, even  those of us who do not pass as  women. 
If Being  were not change, as Malabou asserts in her interpretation of 
Heidegger,  there would be no possibility for liberation from patriarchy.
I definitely pass as a male phi los o pher of religion, and in most re spects 
I acknowledge this identity. But this acknowledgement is not unambigu-
ous, and it comes at a cost of recognition, for myself and for  others. The 
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narcissism of my own self- identification passes through what Vahanian 
calls a rebellion, a revolt against the being of my being as masculine.  Because 
my being is also change, it is also essentially a passing or a “ going in drag.” 
This means  there is a part of me that does not know who or what I am, 
even when I perform my masculinity or benefit from its presumptions. And 
this is good news.
In her book The Matrixial Borderspace, painter and phi los o pher Bracha 
L. Ettinger develops an interpretation of what Kristeva calls the semiotic 
as less divorced from the symbolic. Ettinger claims that the semiotic ma-
trixial borderspace generates symbolic patterns in a productive way. She 
claims that the matrix “is a concept for a transforming borderspace of en-
counter of the co- emerging I and the neither fused nor rejected uncognized 
non- I.”23 For her, unlike for Kristeva,  there is no need for a break with the 
maternal semiotic in order to accede to the paternal symbolic, and the ma-
trixial borderspace informs all three levels of imaginary, symbolic, and 
real. I think that Ettinger’s reinterpretation of Lacan, along with her in-
sights into Kristeva and Deleuze, provides impor tant resources to recon-
ceptualize Lacanian concepts in a less antagonistic way. For Ettinger,
The matrixial psychic space concerns shareability and severality that 
evade the  whole subject in self- identity, endless multiplicity, collec-
tive community and or ga nized society. The matrixial borderspace is 
drawn and is further drawing virtual and real traumatic and phan-
tasmatic as well as imaginary and symbolic transgressive psychic con-
tacts by inhabitation and erotic co- tuning in the same resonance 
field; vibrating space or elusive time of which each participant be-
comes partial by its own reattunement and attention. Afective 
 vibrations that  tremble with virtual strings, body- psyche- space- 
time cross- imprints uncognized memory traces accumulated in sev-
eral threads transform each partial- subject into some kind of  mental 
continuity of the psyche of another partial- subject. Each psyche is a 
continuity of the psyche of the other in the matrixial borderspace.24
In Ettinger’s work, psychoanalysis is less intrinsically segregated into 
 registers and stages, and more conceived in terms of a metamorphic 
relationality.
For Catherine Keller, theology and ontology are essentially relational. 
Keller is one of our most power ful and creative con temporary theologians, 
and her work is challenging, provocative, and inspiring. In Face of the 
Deep, Keller rereads the opening chapter of Genesis 1 with the help of 
biblical scholars; poststructualist phi los o phers such as Levinas, Derrida, 
and Deleuze; and Whiteheadian pro cess theologians, to generate a pro-
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found theology of becoming. Creation is not ex nihilo, as the masculinist 
theological fantasy would have it, but ex profundis, out of a profound and 
virtually infinite deep. Keller argues that for her tehomic theology, the 
Derridean “deconstruction of the absolute Log os of the ex nihilo yields an 
otherness of cosmos bottomlessly preceding and exceeding  human language.”25
The Deep is a kind of matrixial borderspace, as is her image of the cloud 
in Cloud of the Impossible. Cloud of the Impossible is an extraordinary en-
gagement with negative theology and its “cloud of unknowing,” as well as 
quantum physics with its cloud of entanglement. She uses the theories of 
Whitehead, Deleuze, and Judith Butler to draw out some of the implica-
tions of thinking about real ity in terms of folds and foldings, and she re-
flects on our con temporary situation of precarious life on an unstable 
planet. Keller’s profound apophaticism is also a kind of mourning, a hos-
pice for a potentially dead God and a possibly  dying world. Keller says that 
“the pressure of looming climate cataclysm has been deepening the dan-
gerous denials, the willful ignorance,” but she  doesn’t want apocalypse to 
have the last word.26
How do we think about the end, even if we  don’t want it to be in apoca-
lyptic terms? Or, as Derrida says, “who, we?” At the end of his essay “The 
Ends of Man,” Derrida argues that we have but two strategies if we want 
to exit the system of metaphysical humanism that is now experiencing a 
“total trembling.” This text from 1968 evokes both the assassination of 
Martin Luther King and the insurrection of May ’68 in France. Derrida 
says the first choice is “to attempt an exit and a deconstruction without 
changing terrain,” by resorting to what ever tools are at hand inside, where 
“we are.”27 The other choice is “to decide to change terrain, in a discon-
tinuous and irruptive fashion . . .  by affirming an absolute break and dif-
ference.” So of course, confronted with an either/or, Derrida refuses to 
choose. Or rather, he chooses both: “the choice between  these two forms 
of deconstruction cannot be  simple and unique.” Rather, “a new writing 
must weave and interlace  these two motifs of deconstruction.” This new 
writing is a kind of double writing, which involves a change of style— “and 
if  there is style, Nietz sche reminds us, it must be plural.”28
I confess I can think of no better example of this new writing for which 
Derrida calls than Keller’s writing and Keller’s style in Face of the Deep and 
Cloud of the Impossible. This style consists of the interlacing of disciplin-
ary, interdisciplinary, and multidisciplinary texts, including voices within 
and without “us”: our tradition, religion, nation, gender, species, and as-
semblage. This style of writing that Keller performs for us is a kind of free-
dom  because it subtracts the “we” that exists between the two ends, the 
first end of the broken source, and the second end of the end of every thing, 
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including us, and keeps it in motion, spinning like an entangled word, or 
particle, or person. It radiates, deconstructively, drawing us up into her 
cloud like a vortex.
Derrida juxtaposes Nietz sche to Heidegger at the end of “The Ends of 
Man,” and he affirms “the diference between the superior man and the 
superman.” He recalls the end of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, where the supe-
rior man is “abandoned to his distress in a last movement of pity,” while 
the latter, Zarathustra himself, “awakens and leaves, without turning back 
to what he leaves  behind him. He burns his text and erases the traces of his 
steps.”29 The laughter of the superman rings out beyond the metaphysical 
repetition of humanism.
 Here, in the “early” Derrida of 1968, the laughter and the affirmation is 
less edged with nostalgia, loss, and mourning.  Later, Derrida  will embrace 
mourning more emphatically. But can we, in fact, choose between cele-
bration and mourning? Keller eloquently ofers us both. On the one hand, 
“gender— and now sex— are so tangled in our queerly eligible Earth that in 
resonance with an interreligious planetarity their vibrant move ments may 
do much to stir up a sustainable  future.”30 On the other hand, “our eco-
nomic arrangements may undermine that hope,” as she quotes Adrian Parr: 
“We are poised between needing to radically transform how we live and 
becoming extinct.” The  middle pose, which is not a  middle ground but re-
mains tethered to a relation that yet continues, consists of acknowledging 
“that radical transformation remains in this time of transition—to put a 
counterapocalyptic spin on it— maddeningly pos si ble.”31
At the end of “The Ends of Man,” Derrida evokes Nietz sche’s Super-
man, who burns his text, turns on his heels, and dis appears in a cloud of 
dust. Now Nietz sche seems just a  little too extreme, too hyperbolic, too 
dated for sophisticated Continental philosophy  today. And of course, as 
we all know, he was an incredible misogynist even if not a racist, an elitist 
even if not an anti- Semite. Still despite all that we know about Nietz sche, 
what if— just suppose— that Zarathustra was a  woman? What diference 
would it make? Perhaps none at all.
And yet, still I want to go  there, to follow Derrida back to the end of Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra and the cloud of the eternal recurrence.  Here Zarathus-
tra has found her long sought- after higher men, and she sings to them the 
song of how joy wants deep, wants deep eternity. But then the higher men 
get drunk and go to sleep, and Zarathustra realizes that “they do not un-
derstand the signs of my morning; my stride is for them no summons to 
awaken.”32 So she abandons  these higher men to their sleep, and returns to 
her animals: “You are the right animals for me; I love you. But I still lack 
the right men.”
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Thus spoke Zarathustra. And then it happened. She “suddenly heard 
[her]self surrounded by innumerable swarming and fluttering birds: but 
the whirring of so many wings and the thronging about [her] head  were 
so  great that [she] closed [her] eyes. And verily, like a cloud (!) it came over 
[her], like a cloud of arrows that empties itself over a new  enemy. But be-
hold,  here it was a cloud of love, and over a new friend.”33 This new friend 
is a sign that takes the form of a lion. And Zarathustra speaks but a single 
sentence: “My  children are near, my  children. Then [she] became entirely 
 silent. But [her] heart was loosed, and tears dropped from [her] eyes and 
fell on [her] hands. And [she] no longer heeded anything and sat  there 
 motionless, without warding of the animals any more.”34
The animals are all over Zarathustra, and she bears with the chaos, as 
Keller would say in Face of the Deep.35 Nietz sche says then that the higher 
men come out and hear the roar of the lion and then they flee. Zarathus-
tra reflects on what has just happened, and declares that her last temptation 
was pity for  these higher men. She cries out: “My sufering and my pity 
for sufering— what does it  matter? Am I concerned with happiness? I am 
concerned with my work.”36 Then she greets the morning, the daybreak. In 
Cloud of the Impossible, Keller invokes the cloud, which is also the cloud of 
love that appears to Zarathustra, and with it comes the temptation to pity 
the higher men, the men and  women— we— who created this world and 
this warrior complex and this sufering and death, at least the ones who 
genuinely understand it and are horrified by it and wish and want to fix it. 
The higher men are contrasted with the last men, who yawn,  don’t have a 
clue to what is happening, and are caught up in climate change denial and 
voting to elect  people chosen by our corporate masters who  will acceler-
ate our path to destruction. Zarathustra, however, calls us to a new 
 becoming, another species, and a dif er ent end to man, if  there is such a 
 thing.
In some ways I am imagining suggesting a genealogy in which Keller 
becomes a kind of  mother figure, taking the place of Nietz sche/Zarathus-
tra, although we have to take  great care with such meta phors. She might 
well not want to adopt me! In addition, while Keller writes very affirma-
tively about Derrida, she is much more ambivalent about Nietz sche, and 
she does not mention the cloud that appears at the end of Thus Spoke Zara-
thustra. The point is not so much to affirm this or that phi los o pher, but to 
find ways to help us undo the necessary link between  fathers and sons in 
theory and in philosophy.
Theory can never be completely divorced from practice and from life. 
In an essay included in a book coedited by Keller and Laurel C. Schneider 
called Polydoxy, Colleen Hartung reflects on “Faith and Polydoxy in the 
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Whirlwind.” At the opening of her essay, Hartung recalls a power ful tor-
nado that raged across Nebraska in 1975 while she was in her first year in 
college. She explains that while she was unhurt, the city of Omaha was 
cut of and  there was no way to communicate with her parents. She relates 
and reflects upon her  mother’s statement that her  family took the absence 
of specific news as an encouraging sign that she was not dead or seriously 
injured. Hartung says that this taking of no news, which could have been 
anguishing in its uncertainty, for good news, was “an extraordinary act of 
faith considering that it would have been five years that June since my 
 brother had died of leukemia.”37 This faith on the part of her  mother, that 
“no news was good news,” expresses the polydoxy she articulates in theo-
retical terms, using Derrida and Caputo.
Faith can take place in the absence of God, without God. Hartung 
evokes the sans or “without” that pervades Derrida’s work, partly as ex-
pressed by John D. Caputo. She says that “Derrida’s pursuit of the sans 
provides language that makes a faith without God, that is open to what is 
wholly other, theoretically unintelligible.”38 It seems to me that religious 
language requires God to be absent, or at least distant, in order to make 
a faith. Other wise it  wouldn’t be faith. That does not mean that God does 
not or cannot exist, but God cannot collapse the spacing required for faith, 
and some faiths work with God while other faiths may authentically take 
place without God. Or at least, we could choose to value  these faiths with-
out God as au then tic, rather than inauthentic, as lacking, or as being 
simply and neatly non- religious.
Hartung raises the stakes even further in her essay when she admits that 
she raids three con temporary theologians for their distinct insights that she 
then dislocates from the rest of their theological edifices, and then as-
similates them to her own theological vision, which is a theology without 
God. What is more, she chooses to elaborate on  these three themes of blind-
ness, embrace, and courage by way of an appropriation of and separation 
from three of the most creative and impor tant theologians working and 
writing  today, and not only that, from three theologians whose chapters 
are also included in the book Polydoxy, including the coeditors of the 
book.  These two coeditors are Laurel Schneider and Catherine Keller, 
and the third theologian is Mayra Rivera, author of The Touch of Tran-
scendence and Poetics of the Flesh.
Schneider is a theologian of multiplicity, and dislodging the logic of the 
One allows her to see divinity in its manifestation as multiplicity. Hartung 
claims that for Schneider, “to face and to see the fragile is to realize divine 
occurrence as incarnation again and again.”39 By contrast, Hartung 
 remains faithful to the blindness inherent in her  mother’s faith and in 
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Derrida’s thought that paradoxically sustains faith. According to Har-
tung, “Schneider’s emphasis on presence and on seeing . . .  considered 
from a Derridean perspective, might collapse this space between believing 
and seeing that Derrida attempts to keep open as a way of holding at bay 
a totalizing foreclosure that a too optical metaphysics of presence efects.”40 
If Hartung is correct, then Schneider twists  free of the logic and meta-
physics of the One, but perhaps her theology is still too entranced with a 
meta phorics and metaphysics of vision. Despite this distancing from 
Schneider’s affinity for seeing, Hartung celebrates Schneider’s foreground-
ing of ambiguity in bodies and in faith.
From Rivera, Hartung takes the phenomenality of touch or even em-
brace. Faith is a risky embrace of what is uncertain and unknown. But Ri-
vera chooses to hold onto a transcendence in which to anchor her 
understanding of faith as touch. For Hartung, she herself chooses instead to 
remain faithful to the faith of her parents  after the death of her  brother, who 
“let go of the name of God and yet in that release realized a faith that could 
and would, again and again, turn  toward an unthinkable, unspeakable, un-
graspable possibility— the death of a child.”41 The death of one’s child would 
seem to be one of the most faith- shattering events that could ever occur.
According to Hartung, Rivera wants to limit Derridean deconstruction 
by tracing its originary source to divine transcendence on the other side of 
différance. Hartung, however, wants to remain with différance and its in-
determinacy all the way. This is a cryptic move, just as the saying “no 
news is good news” is a cryptic saying, but “perhaps it could be read as a 
disclosure, as an opening that might make a space for love.”42 Do we need 
God or divinity to make love with and as bodies, or does the heaviness of 
God’s transcendence weigh love down? Hartung uses the image of a sur-
render of arms; she evokes the notion of giving up our arms and embracing 
life without the conceptual tools we generally employ to keep it in check. 
“ Here the surrender of arms is an embrace,” she says, “without the benefit 
of technological or religious good news.”43 Technological and religious 
arms are deployed to overdetermine life, to make it make sense, to make it 
appear good, to instrumentalize our experience and protect us from the 
uncertainty that makes living worthwhile. But  these arms ward of the 
possibility of the new.
With Keller, fi nally, Hartung is more tentative than with Rivera or 
Schneider. Hartung appreciates and appropriates Keller’s courage in the 
face of the deep, which is also the tehomic fury of the whirlwind. The 
only  thing she lets go of that Keller does not is the issue with which 
 Hartung begins this section of encounters, which is the name of God. 
Hartung confesses: “for me, the tehomic rhythm of life has washed away 
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any name that would underwrite faith with a destinal assurance. Yet this 
has not left me faithless.”44  Here  there is a tension  because while Keller 
does not give up the name of God, she also does not provide it any desti-
nal assurance. Furthermore, at least Caputo, if not Derrida, holds onto 
the name of God, but also in a way that would not guarantee or under-
write faith in any substantial way. Derrida is more complicated  because in 
his work he both saves and gives up the name of God, and the sans is not 
a  simple without, but always both a with and a without. This is a paradox, 
but then so is faith.
The real issue  here concerns Hartung’s provocative claim, which she ex-
presses in relation to both Schneider and Keller (and Rivera more implic-
itly): “In its polydoxy, theology risks a consideration of faith without the 
name of God.”45 Hartung quotes Keller as raising the relevant question: 
“What would theology be without theos?” (161). Keller does not answer 
this question, according to Hartung, but Hartung does suggest, with Der-
rida, that alternative theological beginnings without God could resonate 
“with a faithful Derridean deconstructive posture that courageously turns 
 toward the unforeseeable.”46 The passion of a faith without God no longer 
knows to whom or what to pray. One of the efects of moving between 
determinate faiths is a wearing away of any pure, au then tic, or determi-
nate lineage, and Hartung evokes this experience both for herself and for 
Derrida. She says that Derrida’s “is not a legacy of faith inscribed in a de-
terminable lineage that might be Christian or Jewish or demo cratic. Rather 
this inheritance is a plea . . .” (162). So the tehomic rhythms that ebb and 
flow may wear down the sharp edges of determinate lineages, and the lines 
may blur such that we do not know not only to whom we pray but who we 
are when we pray or plead. And this is a complex inheritance, which is in-
carnated in Hartung’s  mother and her par tic u lar faith.
For Hartung, her  mother’s theology, encapsulated in the phrase “no 
news is good news,” “resists gestures of faith that make light of a darkness, 
a blindness, and a grief that is the undoing of oneself and of the world over 
and over again.”47 We do not often get good news, but sometimes no news 
is the best news we could ever receive, and most of the time we have no 
idea how fortunate we are not to get news of disaster, illness, or the death 
of a loved one. What Hartung performs in this extraordinary essay is an 
existential theology that is not conceptually impoverished, but one that 
finds a way to honor both Derrida and her  mother by threading her theol-
ogy through the eye of the needle of three polydox theologians and stitching 
together something both refreshing and common. This faith of Hartung’s 
 mother as elaborated through Derrida “insinuates rather than claims. It 
holds on for dear life,” caught up amidst the whirlwind.48
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My  mother is not a phi los o pher. Both of my parents are incredibly smart; 
however, my  mother was not given the same level of encouragement and 
esteem as my dad got. But  there is a fundamental diference in how I can 
relate to them intellectually. My  father is supportive and proud of my suc-
cess, and we now have a very positive relationship, but he does not  really 
understand my philosophical and theoretical bent. He is much more prag-
matic in his outlook. My mom, on the other hand, has always profoundly 
appreciated and resonated with my ideas, has always been able to under-
stand me and to encourage me even when she  didn’t know the philosophi-
cal background about the theories that I was talking about. That is, she 
could and can grasp the most complex and profound ideas, intuitively, de-
spite not having studied them. This connection, which also exists between 
me and her  brother, my  uncle, has given me so much inspiration and con-
fidence in my pursuit of my intellectual vocation. It also has helped me 
understand how  people can have the capacity to think philosophically even 
without any conventional study or explicit training, as a more demo cratic 
practice as opposed to a more ste reo typical elitism.
One of the ways I try to relate to both of my parents is to be self- sufficient 
enough so that they get no bad news, and this lack of news is good news, 
as with Hartung and her  mother. I love my parents in a way that wants to 
not cause them worry and anxiety, although I know that any caring rela-
tionship necessarily entails such worry. One of the ele ments of generation, 
like  every relation to another living being, involves a relation to death and 
to mourning. When you have a child, one of your hopes is that you do not 
outlive your  children. When you are a child, one of the realizations of grow-
ing up is accepting that your parents do not want to outlive you, even if 
they want to live as long as pos si ble.
When someone close to you dies, you grieve and sufer and mourn. When 
someone you  don’t know dies, you  don’t usually feel any direct experience of 
loss. Love involves the possibility of mourning the loss of that love and that 
person, literally or not. Mourning is an impor tant theme of Derrida’s, as 
many readers have observed. In his book Not Half No End, Geofrey Ben-
nington says that one  thing Derrida taught him is that “life is an economy 
of death.”49 Bennington explains that for Derrida, mourning is an incom-
plete, interrupted pro cess that he sometimes called “half- mourning,” or 
demi- deuil.50 This demi- deuil, or incomplete mourning, is connected with 
melancholia, but not simply as a pathological condition. For Derrida, 
mourning and melancholia structure our experience of life, not as negative 
circumstances that we get over, but as ongoing, endless pro cesses.
So long as we live, we mourn. Or half- mourn to no end. In a power ful 
reflection on loss and love, Katerina Kolozova mourns the death of her 
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 father. Although her discussion draws mostly on François Laruelle, I think 
that her writing also has resonances with Derrida’s work. In her chapter 
“The Real Transcending Itself (Through Love),” which is included in her 
book Cut of the Real, Kolozova explains that she takes a heretical position 
vis- à- vis poststructuralist feminism. For her, the non- philosophy developed 
by Laruelle means that she is  free from any philosophical orthodoxy, or 
obligation to treat philosophical materials in an already structured, sys-
tematic manner. All philosophical concepts form a realm of chora, a “do-
main of transcendental material” from which to draw and make use.51 For 
non- philosophy, philosophical language cannot capture the real; all that 
we can do is posit the real in a “vision- in- one,” and then work backwards 
from  there to our own experience.
For Kolozova, language is inadequate to the real, but it can correlate 
with the resonance of the real in our lives. The concept of the real is used 
by Laruelle, but it is also fundamentally inflected by Lacan’s theorization of 
it as something inaccessible and inexpressible in symbolic terms. We cannot 
fully express the real in language, but in specific situations language can 
resonate with the real. When this occurs, “satisfaction is taken in the form 
of the token of this ‘love’: the translucent texture of language, weaving 
around the thickness of experience.”52 We experience ourselves as uniquely 
 human, or what Laruelle calls “the identity in the last instance of the 
human- in- human,” as a state of radical solitude. According to Kolozova, 
love ofers a way to think about the relation between language and the real, 
which is an asymmetrical relationship. We do not think from our language 
to the real; we can only go from the positing of the Real back to our lived 
experience of language. Laruelle attempts to formalize an insight into our 
experience of the Real in a way that works against the presumed mastery 
and sufficiency of philosophy. Kolozova adopts Laruelle’s approach and 
also radicalizes it with her insights into feminism.
It is impossible to speak of love. It is impossible to go directly from our 
solipsistic self to an other. So much of what is thought  under the name of 
poststructuralism involves underlining and complicating this relationship 
between self and other. Love is impossible, but for Kolozova “an act of love” 
involves “an act of attempting to reach out to the other as the instance of 
salvation from one’s radical self- enclosure.”53 Derrida would say that we 
are always already inhabited by an Other, whereas Laruelle and Kolozova 
use a dif er ent language. Kolozova claims that we are inhabited by a 
Stranger, which correlates with the real.
 There is a fluidity of the body in the philosophy of Luce Irigaray and a 
materialism of becoming in the philosophy of Rosi Braidotti that Kolo-
zova both affirms and radicalizes. Becoming takes place in the flesh, in the 
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lived experience of our material existence. At the same time, the efect of 
 these fluid, material and embodied pro cesses produces the radical soli-
tude that defines our identity as  human in the last instance. As Kolozova 
states, “we  were all ‘born’—as an ‘I,’ as that most primitive sense of self-
hood—in the most immediate experience of the state of inescapable 
situatedness in ourselves.”54 This means that the possibility of our ability 
to reflect upon ourselves is tied to the very impossibility of reflection, of 
the existence that escapes reflection, which is an acutely Derridean theme.
According to Kolozova, the mediation of the real “is enabled by and 
originates from the experience of radical solitude.” The mediation of the 
real by the experience of radical solitude paradoxically produces the expe-
rience of love, “which finds itself at the very origin of all and any transcen-
dence, at the heart of the creation of all our world(s).”55  Here language is 
not simply impotent  because it efects this experience of love, which is also 
an expression of empathy. Kolozova forges a new language of love, that 
works with and through the experience of radical solitude that is quintes-
sentially our own, to find a way to share with the other. As she explains:
Empathy with the radical solitude of the other by way of identifying 
one’s own enacted state of radical solitude with that of the ( imagined) 
other is an act made both of the event of “having lived through” 
(le vécu) and of the event of the mediation provided by language (or 
the transcendental).56
We connect our own experience of radical solitude with that of the other, 
and thus generate empathy, compassion, or love.
The Stranger in us bridges the gap between our radical and unbearable 
solitude and that of the other which is her Stranger. This connection is a 
fashioning of an unstable solidarity, one that acknowledges the vulnera-
bility of thought that  faces “its own desire for (or the fantasy of) the ulti-
mate truth as it is for the impossible immediacy of the other’s real.”57 The 
death of the other brings us back to that originary solitude. The experi-
ence of mourning the death of the beloved involves “the presentification 
of the real in its absolute form, cleansed from the soothing, that is, estrang-
ing, workings of the world.”58  Here mourning is an experience that con-
nects us to the real in a very power ful and par tic u lar way.
We cannot get to the real from the standpoint of language. We cannot 
adequately describe the real using philosophical language. We can, how-
ever, go from the real, posited as a “vision- in- one,” to language, and through 
language to our lives and our lived experience. The mourning of the loved 
one involves the survival of a phantasm of this person in our sensations. 
The phantasm is, in many ways, imaginary, but it does express the real. 
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Kolozova says that our remembrance of the lost person is “projected by the 
dark, thick sensation of the real of love and the real of loss. The event of 
longing for this . . .  loved one (in- dividual) is real; it is in the real.”59 Our 
remembrance, which is filtered through sensations of pain and nostalgia 
expresses the real in the world in way that re creates and renews love. As 
Kolozova concludes, “the real (of the sheer trauma) and the thought (of 
the world of language) are the coagulating ele ments of this emerging bril-
liance of renewed desire for the other—of the love born anew.”60
I think that Kolozova’s analy sis of love and of mourning is rich and in-
sightful; I also think that is resonates with my experience of Derrida. Spe-
cifically, the fact that she is mourning her  father is significant  because 
I am wrestling with my love for Derrida as a person and as a phi los o pher, 
as well as with my ambivalence concerning this sexist situation  because 
Derrida also is a father- figure. Perhaps it is healthier to mourn the death 
of the  father in feminist terms than it is to try to save or redeem the  father. 
Or to try to put the  father to death oneself, which may be too oedipal, and 
simply risks repeating the masculinist re- appropriation of the  father. I 
 don’t have the answer; as a white male I am also part of the prob lem. But 
the rebellious narcissism of Vahanian, the transgressing of gender at the 
heart of being of Malabou, and the radical solitude and love of Kolozova 
are profoundly encouraging to me, as are the cloud and the deep of Keller. 
Furthermore, I think that each draws out something that is more implicit 
in Derrida, that Derrida does not and cannot express.
The love and mourning of  fathers and  mothers pushes us to and hope-
fully in some re spects beyond the limits of filiality, and this reflection also 
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would be a fundamentally Derridean book to come.
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